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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

CONTINUING RESOLUTIONS: THE INFLUENCE OF TEMPORARY SPENDING RESTRICTIONS
ON MONTHLY EXPENDITURE PATTERNS OF FEDERAL AGENCIES
The federal fiscal year runs from October 1 to September 30, and many federal
agencies rely on annual appropriations to fund activities and programs. Nonetheless,
the federal government often enters a new fiscal year without a fully approved budget,
which actuates the requirement for a temporary means of funding government
operations. Congress and the president provide provisional resources by way of
continuing resolutions which enable the operation of government programs until
regular appropriations are enacted. However, continuing resolutions are restrictive by
design and may have unintended effects on government spending behavior beyond the
timeframe to which the resolutions apply.
This study explores the relationship between the uncertainty generated by the
implementation of continuing appropriations and the modification of expenditure
behavior in federal agencies. After a summary of the federal budget process and a
survey of the literature related to continuing resolutions, a model of agency spending is
presented. The associated theory explores suppositions related to ex ante and ex post
reactions of agency officials to: (1) a one-time occurrence of continuing resolutions, and
(2) an environment of regularly occurring continuing resolutions. Afterward, event
study methods are applied to a subset of federal monthly obligation data to reveal
patterns of spending which are suggestive of: (1) a saving-dissaving approach to
compensate for the restrictive nature of continuing resolutions, and (2) the presence of
signaling mechanisms between higher echelons of the federal government and
subordinate agencies. A second quantitative chapter builds on the idea that federal
agencies engage in expense shifting in anticipation of the enactment of continuing
resolutions. An agenda setting framework is used to demonstrate how agencies
monitor particular sources of the federal budget process to gain insight to the likelihood
of continuing appropriations being enacted. Findings show that decision-makers may be
able to determine the relevancy of particular budgetary signals within the congressional
budgetary scheme.

KEYWORDS: Continuing resolutions, continuing appropriations, federal budget, agenda
setting, information processing
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Chapter One
Introduction
The federal fiscal year runs from October 1 to September 30, and many federal
agencies rely on annual appropriations to fund activities and programs. Nonetheless,
the federal government often enters a new fiscal year without a fully approved budget,
which actuates the requirement for a temporary means of funding government
operations. Congress and the president provide provisional resources by way of
continuing appropriations which enable the operation of government programs until
regular appropriations are enacted.
However, continuing resolutions, as these legislative stopgap measures are also
known, are restrictive by design and may have unintended effects on government
spending behavior beyond the timeframe to which the resolutions apply. Government
agencies routinely formulate budgets and devise spending plans toward
accomplishment of organizational missions under the assumption that full funding will
be available at the outset of the coming fiscal year. Yet, these stopgap measures arise in
the absence of an approved federal budget and are intended to suppress organizational
spending until the budget impasse is resolved. Continuing resolutions place limits on
operational activities and may result in interim levels of funding that tend to be lower
than those for which the agency originally planned. As a result, continuing
appropriations may disrupt obligation plans thereby causing organizations to adopt
measures of execution that will increase the probability of achieving budgetary spending
goals.
1

How then do continuing resolutions affect the spending patterns of federal
agencies? Dating back more than a century, these stopgap measures have become a
mainstay of the federal budget process and most academic work pertains to higher-level
interactions. At the government-wide level, scholarly work is plentiful and tends to
focus on continuing resolutions as: (1) a legislative instrument which may tip the scales
between the legislature and the executive during budget negotiations, (2) an apple of
discord between authorizers and appropriators, and (3) a reluctant and temporary
solution to budgetary stalemate. At the agency level, empirical findings are the result of
case studies but the majority of research is conducted by practitioners. Consequently,
the bulk of the evidence at the agency level tends to be anecdotal because agencies do
not specifically track the effects of spending restrictions.
At present, the field of federal budgeting is nearly devoid of theoretical
frameworks and quantitative analyses regarding the effect of continuing resolutions on
the expenditure behavior of federal agencies. Instead, academic budgeting literature is
focused generally on budget preparation while budget execution, which is the stage at
which spending takes place, is largely the domain of practitioners (McCaffery & Mutty,
1999). Indeed, budgeting remains a practice-oriented discipline (Bartle, 2001) and
interactions between academics and practitioners, in the broader field of public
administration, continue to dwindle due, in part, to of barriers of mobility between the
two sectors (Posner, 2009).

2

Fortunately, the presence of this void does not mean that budget execution has
been overlooked by scholars. Academics in the field of management accounting have
explored the financial management aspect of budgeting where cost controls, cash flow
management, and capital expenditures take place (Balakrishnan & Sprinkle, 2002). With
regard to the study at hand, a framework of unused capacity from the field of ActivityBased Costing and economic theories in budget maximization and budget uncertainty
may provide points of debarkation for a theory of bureaucratic expenditure behavior.
Purpose of the dissertation
This research seeks to explore the relationship between the uncertainty generated
by continuing resolutions and modifications in expenditure behavior of managers in
federal agencies. In an attempt to foster a comprehensive understanding of continuing
resolutions on several fronts, the research seeks to answer the following questions:
(1) What research has been conducted on continuing appropriations acts?
(2) With regard to the obligation of allocated funding, how might an agency of the
federal government modify expenditure behavior while under the spending
constraints of a continuing resolution?
(3) What factors might account for these modifications in organizational expenditure
behavior as agency officials compensate for restrictions on federal spending?
(4) Which econometric methods might one use to reveal the expenditure behavior of
agency officials under said spending constraints?

3

Summary of chapters
Chapter two provides an overview of the federal budget process and serves as a
touchstone for terms and concepts used throughout the dissertation. This institutional
chapter opens with a brief summary of the evolution of the federal budget process, and
then guides the reader through the essential phases of budget formulation at the
federal level. The purpose of this overview is to offer a general understanding of the
federal budget process while preparing the reader for the examination of continuing
resolutions that follows in subsequent chapters.
Chapter three surveys the existing research on continuing appropriations acts
and segues to the theoretical exposition. The chapter opens with essential background
information such as the constitutional and statutory basis for continuing resolutions, the
types of stopgap measures, and the number of continuing resolutions employed over a
period of three decades. The discussion moves-on to a summary of the literature as it
relates to the institutions of the president and the Congress, while a synthesis of the
research dedicated to the effects of continuing resolutions at the agency-specific level
follows. The discussion then begins to dovetail with the theoretical material through
the notion of re-categorizing the effects of continuing appropriations on agency-specific
organizations and re-approaching the issue by way of a standardized accounting
classification system. The final segment of the literature review considers the current
state of the field.
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Chapter four contains a framework of agency spending and suggested research
hypotheses. The theoretical examination of how agency officials might budget
organizational resources in the face of spending restrictions begins with the base
assumptions under which the model will operate. The analysis proceeds with an
arithmetic model of unrestricted agency spending across three fiscal years and then
transitions to an environment of continuing resolutions. The three fiscal year setting
provides a manner of exploring suppositions related to ex ante and ex post reactions of
agency officials to: (1) a one-time occurrence of continuing resolutions, and (2) an
environment of regularly occurring continuing resolutions. Afterward, relaxation of
certain base assumptions enables a discussion of the limitations of the model in a lineitem budget setting and under a multi-year lump-sum appropriation.
Chapter five explores the influence of continuing resolutions on federal spending
patterns on a high frequency basis. Event study methods are applied to a subset of
federal monthly obligation data to show how federal agency officials adjust
organizational expenditure behavior to compensate for spending restrictions. Analysis
finds that when stopgap measures are on the horizon for the upcoming fiscal year,
agency personnel purchase additional contract services and supplies three months prior
to the end of the terminating fiscal year. While spending restrictions are in effect,
agencies do not deviate from normal monthly expenditure patterns. After restrictions
are lifted, however, obligation rates dip below normal levels for a brief period of time.
Taken together, these patterns of spending are suggestive of: (1) a saving-dissaving
approach to compensate for the restrictive nature of continuing resolutions, and (2) the
5

presence of signaling mechanisms between higher echelons of the federal government
and subordinate agencies. In addition, the findings raise concerns about expense
shifting vis-à-vis federal appropriations law and the bona fide needs rule.
Chapter six builds on the idea that federal agencies engage in expense shifting in
anticipation of the enactment of continuing resolutions. By examining budgetary
signaling mechanisms between the president, Congress, and executive agencies, this
chapter explores the concept of organizational learning as it relates to the federal
bureaucracy. A theoretical framework of agenda setting is used to demonstrate how
agencies monitor particular sources of the federal budget process to gain insight
regarding the likelihood of continuing appropriations being enacted. Findings also show
that decision-makers may be able to determine the relevance of particular budgetary
signals within the congressional budgetary scheme.
Chapter seven, the final chapter in this dissertation, offers a discussion of the
policy implications of these findings and presents future avenues of research.

Copyright © Thomas Alexander Jacobs 2014
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Chapter Two
The Federal Budget Process

Evolution of the federal budget process
The federal budget process that existed prior to 1974 was not the same as the
one by which Congress and the president abide currently. Early in the nation’s history,
balanced budgets were the norm. Federal expenditures outpaced revenues during only
one-third of the fiscal years between 1789 and 1916, mostly on account of wars.
Because the Federal Government was small and its needs were modest, Congress was
able to maintain the nation’s financial stability despite the lack of a comprehensive
budgeting system to coordinate revenues and expenditures (Schick, 2007).
Over time, however, fragmented obligation authority in Congress, uncoordinated
budgeting and spending by federal agencies, and the First World War (WWI) contributed
to an environment of persistent peacetime deficits. By the latter part of the 19th
century, some members of Congress had grown dissatisfied with the appropriations
committees’ efforts to control government expenditures. For instance, many southern
Representatives wanted to increase spending in their districts but were unable to do so
because of the requirement of a formal authorization prior to appropriation of funding.
Between 1877 and 1895, the House and the Senate stripped the appropriations
committees of jurisdiction over a majority of the appropriations bills and referred the
measures instead to the related legislative committees. Decentralization of
responsibility for appropriations enabled legislators to circumvent fiscal controls
7

instituted by the committees on appropriations and made it possible for authorizers to
craft legislation that permitted certain entities to obligate funding ahead of
appropriations. At the same time, many federal agencies routinely bypassed
presidential review of spending requests by submitting directly to congressional
committees. While the Treasury Department compiled agency budget requests in an
annual Book of Estimates, there was no coordination among agencies to ensure that
spending efforts were in accord with national policies 1. Circumstances such as these,
together with obligations incurred during WWI, caused federal spending to increase
from $726 million in 1914 to $19 billion in 1919 and public debt to grow from $1 billion
to $26 billion (109th Congress, 2005; 111th Congress, 2010; Lee, Johnson, & Joyce,
2008; Schick, 2007).
Two years later, Congress began to reshape budget procedures by establishing
an executive budget system. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 established the
statutory basis for a formal executive budget process by requiring the president to
submit to Congress annually a proposed budget for the Federal Government. The Act
created the Bureau of the Budget and the General Accounting Office (GAO). The former
was tasked with overseeing preparation of the federal budget and was reorganized as
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 1970. The latter was instituted to assist
Congress as the principal auditing agency of the federal government and was renamed

1

The First Congress assigned the Secretary of the Treasury the responsibility of compiling and reporting
estimates of the public revenues and expenditures, but did not afford the Secretary the authority to
review expenditure estimates and to oversee use of appropriations (109th Congress, 2005).
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the Government Accountability Office in 2004 (Committee on the Budget: U.S. House of
Representatives, 2013a; Lee, et al., 2008).
While the 1921 Act instilled a sense of order to the executive facet of budget
preparation, Congress still lacked a centralized mechanism for determining budgetary
priorities and for coordinating congressional actions on the budget. Instead,
congressional budget procedures were organized around the committee system. Once
Congress received the president’s budget request, component parts were parceled out
to and considered in isolation by specialist committees in each chamber. To wit, each
committee attended to those matters within its jurisdiction: proposed appropriations
were considered by the respective subcommittees of the appropriations committees;
the relevant authorizing committee in each house examined proposed authorizations;
and tax committees evaluated revenue proposals (Hartman, 1982; Hogan, 1985).
Thus, the congressional budget was a product of piecemeal decision making that
facilitated backdoor spending and a growth in deficits. Because revenue, authorizing,
and appropriations committees decided separately on matters within their defined
areas of responsibility, substantive committees were able to create legislation that
permitted agencies to incur obligations outside of the annual appropriations process.
Hence, irrespective of appropriations committees’ efforts to control spending, certain
agencies were authorized to borrow from the treasury and to enter into binding
contracts that would legally commit the government to future outlays. When coupled
with the advent and growth of entitlement programs, such as Social Security, Medicare,
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and Medicaid, such fiscal practices resulted in unplanned growth in public expenditures
and further increases in the federal deficit during the 1960s and 1970s (109th Congress,
2005; Hartman, 1982; Hogan, 1985; Lee, et al., 2008; Mikesell, 2007; Schick, 2007).
The perception that the congressional budget process was out of control and a
presidential challenge to congressional power of the purse led Congress to legislate
further budgetary reform. By the early 1970s, many Americans had come to regard the
growth in federal spending and deficit as a congressional show of fiscal irresponsibility.
At the same time, President Nixon, a fiscal conservative, was at odds with Congress over
budget priorities and reductions in spending. The president attempted to control
spending by vetoing appropriation bills and by seeking, unsuccessfully, the discretionary
authority to impose a spending ceiling for fiscal year 1973. Nixon’s eventual
employment of an impoundment strategy, in which he refused to spend appropriations,
finally prompted Congress to draft the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974 (Dumbrell, 1980; Hogan, 1985; Lee, et al., 2008; Schick, 2007).
With enactment of the 1974 Act, Congress sought to regain control over the
budget process. The legislation was designed to: (1) enable Congress to reassert its
power in matters of the nation’s purse, (2) temper the growth of both federal spending
and the federal deficit, (3) enable Congress to complete work on the annual budget by
the beginning of the fiscal year, and (4) help Congress manage conflicts related to the
federal budget (Ellwood, 1983; Hogan, 1985; Lee, et al., 2008). To accomplish those
objectives, legislators: (a) revised the congressional budgetary timetable and established
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key steps in the congressional budget process; (b) formed the House and Senate Budget
Committees and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO); (c) required more budgetary
information from the executive; and (d) strengthened both anti-impoundment laws and
the role of the GAO. Thus, the 1974 Act established a more comprehensive and
coordinated budget process and gave Congress the tools necessary to exert greater
control over fiscal matters, while curtailing the president’s authority to withhold
appropriations (Dumbrell, 1980; Finley, 1975; GAO, 2005a; Hogan, 1985; Lee, et al.,
2008; Schick, 2007)
Currently, the federal budget process is a multi-layered cyclical fiscal system.
The activities associated with any single fiscal year’s budget, from formulation to
execution, will span multiple fiscal years. For this reason, the federal government is
typically engaged with at least three fiscal years at any one point in time: (1) the current
year, (2) the budget year, and (3) the first out-year. The current year is the 12-month
fiscal period that began on October 1st, is already under way, and will terminate on
September 30th. The budget year is the fiscal year that Congress is deliberating
currently; it is the 12-month fiscal period that will begin this upcoming October 1st.
Finally, the first out-year is that 12-month fiscal period that follows the budget year
(Mikesell, 2007; Schick, 2007).
Excluding the audit and evaluation of federal expenditures, the federal budget
process for any one fiscal year can be broken down into three phases: (1) The executive
budget formulation phase during which the executive branch prepares the President’s
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Budget request; (2) The congressional budget phase that begins with the receipt of the
President’s Budget and during which Congress formulates a budgetary framework of its
own for taxing, spending, and borrowing; and (3) The budget execution and control
phase that begins once OMB apportions to federal agencies those funds which Congress
has appropriated and which the president has enacted into law (GAO, 2005a; Office of
Management and Budget, 2013). Table 2.1 below provides a timetable for a typical
fiscal budget cycle (Schick, 2007). Since the federal budget process is a cyclical and
iterative exercise, a logical place to begin explaining budget operations might be with
the formulation phase.

This space was left blank intentionally.
Table 2.1 follows on the next page.
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Table 2.1: Timetable for a Typical Fiscal Budget Cycle
Annual calendar
Activities
20X1
March – June
- Formulation period for budget guidelines and preliminary
policies. Agency budget offices request budget estimates
from operating units.
July – September
- Agencies formulate detailed requests and submit to OMB.
October – December - OMB reviews agency requests. Agencies revise budget
requests based on OMB feedback (this is known as
“passback”). Agencies may appeal to OMB and/or the
president for final disposition.
20X2
January
- CBO releases ten-year Budget and Economic Outlook for
fiscal years 20X3 – 20X3(+10).
January/February
- President submits FY 20X3 budget request to Congress
between first Monday in January and First Monday in
February.
March 15
- Congressional committees submit “views and estimates”
on the budget to budget committees.
April 15
- Target adoption date for congressional budget resolution
for FY 20X3 budget.
May 15
- If budget resolution has not yet been adopted,
appropriations may be considered in the House.
June – August
- Full House and Senate act on regular appropriation bills for
FY 20X3; OMB and CBO release new revenue and
expenditure projections for FY 20X3.
September
- Conference reports and enactment of regular
appropriations.
October 1
- FY 20X3 begins. Congress passes continuing resolution(s) if
regular appropriations have not yet been enacted into law.
October 20X2 –
- Congress may enact supplemental appropriations for FY
September 20X3
20X3.
20X3
February
- New revenue and expenditure projections for FY 20X3 are
included in the FY 20X4 budget.
September 30
- FY 20X3 ends.
October - December - Agencies, Treasury, and OMB close the books FY 20X3.
20X4
January – December - Agencies prepare financial statements, and post-audits and
and beyond
evaluations are conducted.
February
- Actual revenue and expenditure data for FY 20X3 are
included in the FY 20X5 budget.
Source: adapted from The Federal Budget Process: Politics, Policy, Process, Table 4-1, p. 54 (Schick, 2007)

13

Phase One: Executive Budget Formulation
The main participants in the executive budget formulation phase are: (1) federal
agencies and individual organizational units, which review current operations and
program objectives and request funding to discharge authorized programs and
activities; (2) OMB, which supervises the consolidated budget submission by reviewing
agency requests, compiling the budget for the president, monitoring congressional
action, and providing oversight of agency implementation of the budget; and (3) the
president, who establishes the revenue, expenditure, and borrowing policies set forth in
the budget (Committee on the Budget: U.S. House of Representatives, 2013a, 2013b;
GAO, 2005a; Office of Management and Budget, 2013; Schick, 2007).
By law, the president is required to submit to Congress a comprehensive budget
for the federal government for the upcoming fiscal year. The window for submission of
the budget opens on the first Monday in January and extends to the first Monday in
February (Keith, 2008b). On occasion, the timing of the budget submission changes to
accommodate circumstances such as the transition between administrations, but on
balance, most administrations submit the budget to Congress on or before the statutory
deadline (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2011; Committee on the Budget: U.S.
House of Representatives, 2013a; Keith, 2008b; Library of Congress. Congressional
Research, McMurtry, & Saturno; Schick, 2007).
Because of the complexity of the process and the number of participants
involved, preparation and review of the federal budget requires a significant amount of
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lead time. Shortly after the February submission of the budget to Congress, the OMB
Director begins the process anew by issuing an allowance letter to the head of each
federal agency. This initial step in the process occurs approximately nine months prior
to the president’s budget submission, or almost 18 months ahead of the fiscal year to
which the budget pertains. Allowance letters contain budgetary policy and planning
guidance regarding agency budget requests. Once agencies receive their respective
allowance letters, they begin the work of formulating the budget that the president will
submit to Congress (GAO, 2005a; Mikesell, 2007; Schick, 2007).
Over the course of the spring and summer, OMB works to establish policy for the
upcoming budget request. To do so, OMB officials must confer with agency personnel
to identify significant budgetary issues; to formulate options related to spending and
program requests; and to plan for the analysis of issues that may require future
decisions. The resulting policy, OMB Circular No. A-11, provides detailed guidance and
instruction to executive departments regarding the preparation of the budget requests
and submission of related data and materials. The Circular, which is currently almost
800-pages in length, is an expansive temporal document that provides guidance for the
upcoming fiscal year as well as for the nine subsequent fiscal years (GAO, 2005a; Office
of Management and Budget, 2012).
From September to October, all federal agencies submit initial budget requests
to OMB. The president’s budget request includes agency information from all three
branches of the federal government. Those agencies which are subject to executive
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branch review, and the District of Columbia, must submit their budget requests to OMB
by the first Monday after Labor Day. Agencies which are not subject to executive
review, such as the Federal Reserve Board and the legislative and judicial branches, are
required to submit preliminary budget requests to OMB by October (GAO, 2005a; Office
of Management and Budget, 2013).
Between October and early January, OMB reviews the budget proposals and
then informs agencies of preliminary budget decisions. After receipt of agency budget
estimates, “fall review” takes place during which OMB examiners and agency
representatives meet to consider the agency proposals in relation to presidential
priorities, program performance, and budget constraints. Once the review has taken
place and after the OMB Director has briefed the president on the budget proposals, the
president makes broad policy decisions (GAO, 2005a; Office of Management and
Budget, 2013). Agencies are notified of the president’s budget decisions in late
November during “passback.” For federal agencies, the president’s broad budget
policies manifest in the form of adjustments to their proposed budgets. OMB notifies
the agencies of the president’s decisions and passes-back to agencies the responsibility
for making changes to their respective budgets. Agency officials may appeal these
decisions, but whatever the disposition, agencies have until early January to revise their
budgets and to enter data into OMB’s budget database (GAO, 2005a; Office of
Management and Budget, 2013).
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In January, agencies prepare and OMB reviews congressional budget justification
materials and this first phase culminates with the submission of the budget to Congress.
Agencies spend the month of January assembling detailed budget justification materials
to account for and to explain their requests for funding. The end product, the
president’s budget, details the actual receipts and spending levels for the fiscal year just
completed. In addition, estimated receipts and spending for the current fiscal year, for
the upcoming fiscal year, and for the nine subsequent fiscal years are also included. In
accordance with the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, these budget justification books
are transmitted to Congress “on or before the first Monday in January but not later than
the first Monday in February of each year” and then distributed to the responsible
congressional entities (GAO, 2005a; Keith, 2008b; Office of Management and Budget,
2013). Table 2.2 lists the major steps in the in the executive budget formulation phase.

This space was left blank intentionally.
Table 2.2 follows on the next page.
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Table 2.2: Major Steps in the Executive Budget Formulation Phase
Timeframe
Activities
Spring
- OMB issues spring planning guidance to Executive Branch
(Approximately 9
agencies for the upcoming budget. The OMB Director issues
months prior to the
a letter to the head of each agency providing policy guidance
submission of the
for the agency’s budget request. Absent more specific
president’s budget
guidance, outyear estimates included in the previous budget
to Congress; circa
serve as the starting point for the next budget. This step
March or April)
marks the beginning of the process of formulating the budget
the president will submit the following February.
Spring and Summer - OMB and Executive Branch agencies discuss budget issues
and options. OMB works with agencies to:
(1) Identify major issues for the upcoming budget
(2) Develop and analyze options for the upcoming fall review
(3) Plan for analysis of issues that will require future
decisions
July
- OMB issues Circular No. A-11 to federal agencies. A-11
provides detailed instructions for submitting budget data and
materials.
September *
- Executive Branch agencies, except those not subject to
Executive Branch review, make budget submissions.
October 1
- Fiscal year begins. The formulation cycle (i.e., the previous 9
months) focused on this emerging fiscal year. The upcoming
12 months (October 1 – September 30), which was the
“budget year” now becomes the “current year.”
October –
- OMB conducts fall review. OMB staff analyzes agency
November
budget proposals in light of presidential priorities, program
performance, and budget constraints. The staff raises issues
and presents options to OMB director and other OMB policy
officials for their decisions.
Late November
- OMB briefs the president and senior advisors on proposed
budget policies. OMB Director recommends budget
proposals to the president after OMB has reviewed agency
requests and considered overall budget priorities.
- [Budget] Passback. OMB informs simultaneously all
Executive Branch agencies of decisions pertaining to
respective budget requests.
Late November –
- Immediately after passback, all agencies, to include
early January *
Legislative and Judicial Branch agencies, enter data into the
OMB budget database and submit print materials. This
process continues until OMB locks agencies out of the budget
database in order to meet the deadline associated with
printing the budget.
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Timeframe
December *

January
First Monday in
February

Table 2.2: Continued

Activities
- Executive Branch agencies may appeal to OMB and the
president. Agency heads may ask OMB to reverse or modify
certain budget decisions. In most cases, OMB and agency
heads resolve such issues; if not, they work together to
present them to the president for a decision.
- Agencies prepare and OMB reviews congressional budget
justification materials, which explain budget requests to the
responsible congressional subcommittees.
- The president transmits the budget to the Congress.

* OMB provides specific deadlines for this activity
Source: Adapted from Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-11, section 10, p. 3-4.

Phase Two: The Congressional Budget Process
Participants
Even though the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 mandates that presidents
submit budget proposals to Congress, the constitutional power of the purse is entrusted
solely to Congress. Therefore, the president’s submission is only a request and Congress
may choose to adopt, modify, or ignore the president’s budget proposal when adopting
a budget resolution, appropriations, and other laws (GAO, 2005a).
The congressional phase of the federal budget process begins once Congress
receives the president’s budget request. Upon receipt, the president’s submission is
parceled out to four sets of committees: (1) the Budget Committees, (2) the
Appropriations Committees, (3) the Authorization Committees, and (4) the Revenue
Committees. These committees are assisted by the CBO, the GAO, and the
Congressional Research Service. Each of these entities coordinates with each other to
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transition federal agencies from one fiscal year to the next via the formulation of the
congressional budget resolution, consideration of surplus or debt, authorization of
programs, drafting of revenue legislation, and the appropriation of funds (Hogan, 1985;
Schick, 2007).
Budget committees
The principal duties of the House and Senate Budget Committees are to develop
a congressional budget resolution, and to shepherd the resolution through their
respective chambers by coordinating it among the various congressional components.
The budget committees were established to: (1) exercise jurisdiction over the
development of the budget resolution, and (2) ensure that legislation did not vary
substantially from the resolution. Toward the first objective, the budget committees
monitor budget development year-round and advise Congress on the budgetary effect
of legislation. They also allocate new budget authority, outlays, and other aggregates to
associated committees; in other words, the budget committees set budget targets
which guide the efforts of other committees. With regard to the second objective,
material variance between current laws and the policies set forth in the resolution will
prompt the budget committees to draft reconciliation instructions directing attendant
committees to adjust legislation. Afterward, the budget committees compile the
reconciliation bill for consideration and approval of the full Congress (Lee, et al., 2008;
Schick, 2007).
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Revenue committees
As a complement to the actions of the budget committees, the revenue
committees bear the responsibility of writing and modifying revenue legislation. If
Congress needs to raise or lower tax rates, modify the distribution of the tax burden,
adjust the statutory limit on the public debt, or if the president recommends changes in
revenue policy, the members of the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate
Finance Committee are called upon to draft such legislation. These tax writing
committees are also responsible for reporting legislation on entitlements and social
insurance programs, such as Social Security and Medicare, and for submitting their
views and estimates to the budget committees (Committee on Finance, 2013;
Committee on Ways and Means, 2013; Mikesell, 2007; Schick, 2007).
As a procedural matter, all revenue measures originate in the House of
Representatives as per constitutional decree. On occasion, however, the Senate
circumvents this requirement by stripping a minor House bill of all but the enacting
clause and then substituting Senate-drafted revenue provisions; such an instance
occurred with the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA).
Authorization and appropriation committees
Congress establishes and funds federal entities using either authorizing
legislation drafted by the authorizing committees or appropriations measures written by
the appropriations committees. Authorizing legislation establishes the legal basis for
federal agencies and programs, while appropriations legislation enables agencies to
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incur obligations and expenditures (Schick, 2007). Before discussing the roles of the
authorizing and appropriations committees, it is important to draw distinctions between
the paired concepts of substantive legislation and authorization of appropriations, and
between direct spending and discretionary authorizations.
First, the two basic components of an authorization act are: (1) the enabling or
organic legislation that establishes a program or prescribes the terms and conditions
under which an entity may operate; and (2) the appropriation legislation, which
authorizes the making of appropriations for the agency or program. The first
component, the organic legislation, is further comprised of language which (a)
establishes the agency or program and (b) specifies the duties and functions of the
entity. Elements (a) and (b) are known as substantive provisions or substantive
legislation. Authorization acts also contain an authorization of appropriations section,
enumerated as component (2) above, which sets forth the amounts available to the
federal entity for expenditure (Mikesell, 2007; Schick, 2007).
Second, with respect to authorizing legislation, there are two types: (1)
discretionary and (2) non-discretionary (also called direct spending legislation). While
both types of legislation contain substantive provisions, the difference between the two
lies in the appropriation-obligation sequence. Discretionary authorizations provide the
authority for the House and Senate to appropriate funds for an agency, after which the
agency must obligate funding in accordance with the related appropriations act.
Accordingly, the appropriations committees control discretionary spending. Direct
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spending legislation, on the other hand, provides the authority to obligate ahead of
appropriations (i.e., before Congress makes appropriations)2. This distinction means
that non-discretionary funds may be obligated in accordance with the authorizing
legislation, thereby enabling authorizing committees, not appropriating committees, to
control non-discretionary spending (Heniff, 2010; Schick, 2007). For Fiscal Year 2012,
discretionary and direct spending comprised approximately 36 and 57 percent of federal
expenditures, respectively (Congressional Budget Office, 2013b).
Thus, the authorizing and appropriations committees also complement the work
of the budget committees, while serving different roles in the congressional budgeting
process. In addition to establishing account structures, discretionary expenditure
guidance, and reprogramming rules for federal agencies, appropriations committees
report regular and supplemental appropriations bills, review proposed rescissions and
deferrals, and subdivide budget authority and outlays among their respective
subcommittees. Authorizing committees generate authorizing and direct spending
legislation, and exercise oversight of executive agencies. Both committees submit views
and estimates to the budget committees (Heniff, 2010; Schick, 2007).

2

Lee and colleagues provide an illustrative example: With regard to mandatory spending programs,
authorizations provide for direct spending. When major entitlement programs, such as Social Security,
are authorized, appropriations are provided simultaneously. Thus, direct spending programs are
established by an authorization and the authorization itself creates the obligation for the federal
government to spend money that goes to program beneficiaries (Lee, et al., 2008). Congress must then
appropriate funding to cover those obligations.
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Formulating the congressional budget
Table 2.3 lists the major milestones of the congressional budget phase and the
schedule of events generally assumes Congress will complete the budget and
appropriations process before the start of the fiscal year (Mikesell, 2007; Office of
Management and Budget, 2013). Be that as it may, the table is not all-inclusive and its
brevity belies the level of complexity and the amount of coordination inherent in the
congressional budget process.
Table 2.3: Major Steps in the Congressional Budget Phase
Timeframe
Activities
January
- Congressional Budget Office provides congressional budget
committees a report of the budgetary and economic outlook
February
- CBO re-estimates the President’s Budget using internal economic
and technical assumptions
Within 6 weeks - Congressional committees convey preferences on budgetary
of budget
matters pertaining to the programs and activities for which they
transmittal
are responsible via “views and estimates” reports to Budget
Committees
April 15
- Congress completes action on concurrent resolution on the
budget
May 15
- House may begin considering annual appropriations bills, even if
action on budget resolution has not been completed
June 10
- House Appropriations Committee reports last annual
appropriations bill
June 15
- House completes action on reconciliation bill (if reconciliation is
required by budget resolution)
June 30
- House completes action on annual appropriations bill
September 30
- Congress completes action on appropriations bills for upcoming
fiscal year or passes continuing resolutions to ensure sustained
operation of the federal government.
Source: Adapted from Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-11, section 10, p. 4; and from
Fiscal Administration: Analysis and Applications for the Public Sector, Table 3-4, p. 89 (Mikesell, 2007).

To prepare the congressional budget committees for receipt of the president’s
budget request, the CBO assembles a comparison of baseline budgetary projections to
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proposed policy changes. In late January, CBO prepares The Budget and Economic
Outlook. This annual baseline report, which contains a ten-year projection of federal
revenue and spending, is based on current economic forecasts and the assumption that
existing laws and policies will remain unchanged. (Congressional Budget Office, 2013a;
GAO, 2005a; Office of Management and Budget, 2013). The CBO then analyzes the
president’s budgetary proposal and estimates the amounts by which proposed
legislation would change revenue and spending projections. This process of
comparison, known as legislative scoring, quantifies the budgetary effect of policy
changes in terms of variance from the baseline (GAO, 2005a; Office of Management and
Budget, 2013; Schick, 2007).
Incidentally, OMB also produces baseline budget estimates called current
services estimates (GAO, 2005a; Schick, 2007). The OMB estimates, which accompany
the president’s budget, cover a five-year timeframe and show the cost of continuing
federal services at the current level of effort (GAO, 2005a; Schick, 2007; Wildavsky &
Caiden, 2004). Both the CBO and OMB baseline estimates assume fixed current policies,
and both sets of estimates include inflationary and workload adjustments (Schick, 2007).
Within six weeks of budget transmittal, each House and Senate committee with
legislative jurisdiction over federal programs relays to the budget committees “views
and estimates” on revenue and spending levels for corresponding programs and
activities (GAO, 2005a; Office of Management and Budget, 2013; Schick, 2007). Section
301(c) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 includes provisions regarding the
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submission of views and estimates, but the reports are not restricted to a standard
practice or format; instead, they often take the form of a letter to the chair and ranking
member of the budget committee. The main purpose of the reports is to focus on major
legislation scheduled for reauthorization in the coming session and to offer discussions,
preferences, and recommendations regarding presidential budget proposals (GAO,
2005a; Heniff & Murray, 2013; Schick, 2007).
In conjunction with the views and estimates, the Joint Economic Committee,
which is responsible for reviewing economic conditions and for recommending
improvements to economic policy, submits fiscal policy recommendations to the
congressional budget committees. The budget committees use these reports to develop
the revenue and spending estimates contained in the concurrent budget resolution
(GAO, 2005a; Joint Economic Commitee, 2013; Office of Management and Budget,
2013).
The Congressional Budget Resolution
The budget resolution is a concurrent resolution which may originate in either
the House or the Senate. While it is considered a formal reply to the president’s budget
request (Wildavsky & Caiden, 2004), the resolution does not have a statutory effect
because it does not go before the president for signature or veto (Keith & Heniff, 2005;
Schick, 2007). In accordance with the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the temporal
scope of the resolution must include at least five fiscal years, but the time horizon often
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expands and contracts to accommodate the prevailing Democratic or Republican
budgetary agenda (Schick, 2007).
Stated succinctly, the resolution is a comprehensive budget plan for Congress.
As the steward of the nation’s purse, Congress must consider not only the amount of
money the federal government spends each year, but also the amount of revenue
collected and the amount of debt accumulated. The budget resolution serves as a
framework which links revenues and expenditures, thereby enabling Congress to set
revenue floors and spending ceilings, and to evaluate the efficacy of attendant revenueand appropriations measures and debt policies (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities,
2011; Schick, 2007).
Accordingly, the resolution establishes appropriate levels for four main
aggregate amounts: (1) totals of new budget authority and outlays, (2) total federal
revenues, (3) the surplus/deficit in the budget, and (4) the public debt. These
aggregated budget targets are known as 302(a) allocations after the section in the 1974
Congressional Budget Act that pertains to them. Spending capacity is then allocated
among the 20 budget functions listed in Table 2.4 through a process known as 302(b)
allocations. Consequently, these functional allocations must add-up to the budget
aggregates and, ideally, subsequent revenues and expenditures will correspond to the
levels specified in the resolution (GAO, 2005a; Heniff & Murray, 2013; Lee, et al., 2008;
Mikesell, 2007; Schick, 2007).
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Code
050
150
250
270
300
350
370
400
450
500
550
570
600
650
700
750
800
900
920
950

Table 2.4: Functions in the Budget Resolution

Function
National Defense
International Affairs
General Science, Space, and Technology
Energy
Natural Resources and Environment
Agriculture
Commerce and Housing Credit
Transportation
Community and Regional Development
Education, Training, Employment, and Social Services
Health
Medicare
Income Security
Social Security
Veterans’ Benefits and Services
Administration of Justice
General Government
Net Interest
Allowances
Undistributed Offsetting Receipts

Source: Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2006 (conference report to accompany H.
th
st
Con. Res. 95), H. Rept. 109-62, 109 Cong., 1 sess., April 28, 2005, pp. 4-11.

Beginning in March, the budget committees hear testimony from agency officials
regarding agency budget justifications. After hearings have concluded, committee
chairs convene their respective committees to mark-up (i.e., debate, amend, and
rewrite) the individual versions of the resolution. In crafting preliminary renderings of
the resolution, the budget committees rely on the substance of the CBO reports; views
and estimates from the Authorizing, Appropriations, and Revenue Committees; JEC
recommendations; congressional hearings with agency officials; and informal
communications with other members of Congress. Once the draft versions of the
budget resolution are complete, each budget committee reports to its respective
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chamber for the consideration of the full House and Senate, and for floor voting (GAO,
2005a; Office of Management and Budget, 2013; Schick, 2007).
As it was originally enacted, the Congressional Budget Act required the adoption
of two budget resolutions each year, the first by May 15 and the second by September
15. The May 15 resolution was intended as an advisory measure that set target levels
for budget authority, revenues, outlays, the corresponding fiscal year’s deficit or
surplus, and the attendant public debt. The first resolution would then be revised
before the start of the fiscal year to account for budget and economic changes, while
the second measure served as the binding resolution. In 1985, Congress passed the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act and eliminated the requirement
(effective in 1987) for a second budget resolution. Currently, April 15 is the date by
which Congress is expected to pass a concurrent budget resolution (Heniff & Murray,
2013; Schick, 2007; Wildavsky & Caiden, 2004).
Since the inception of the congressional budget process in 1975, Congress has
attempted to adopt at least one budget resolution for each corresponding fiscal year.
More often than not, however, the resolution does not pass in a timely manner, and on
six occasions to date, Congress did not complete action on an annual budget resolution:
(1) in 1998 for Fiscal Year (FY) 1999; (2) in 2002 for FY2003; (3) in 2004 for FY2005; (4) in
2006 for FY2007; (5) in 2010 for FY2011; and (6) in 2011 for FY2012 (Heniff & Murray,
2013). Table 2.5 lists adoption dates for the budget resolution from 1976 to 2010.

29

When this failure of adoption occurs the federal budgetary gears do not grind to
a halt. If the April 15 deadline passes without a resolution, Congress can still
appropriate funding and federal agencies can still continue to operate (Schick, 2007).
Budgetary operations are allowed to continue, in this case, because the budget
resolution is a multi-year projection; therefore, if Congress fails to pass a concurrent
resolution, the previous year’s resolution simply remains in effect (Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities, 2011). What is more, if legislators do not need to bring existing
revenue and direct spending laws into conformity with the budget resolution via a
process known as reconciliation (discussed further below), there may be little urgency,
in the short term, to adopt a concurrent budget resolution (Schick, 2007).
To address the issue of non-adoption in an ad hoc manner, Congress may rely
on a deeming resolution. While the term deeming resolution does not have an official
definition or any specific rule which governs its use, members of Congress use the
legislation as an annual budget resolution to establish enforceable budget levels for a
budget cycle. In addition to providing revised spending allocations to the appropriations
committees, deeming resolutions may also adjust aggregate budget levels and spending
allocations to other House and Senate committees (Lynch, 2010). Deeming resolutions
will be discussed further in Chapter 6.
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Table 2.5: Budget Resolution Adoption Dates, Fiscal Years 1976 – 2010
Fiscal Year
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

Date adopted
(Target date: 15 May)
14 – May – 1975
13 – May – 1976
17 – May – 1977
17 – May – 1978
24 – May – 1979
12 – Jun – 1980
21 – May – 1981
23 – Jun – 1982
23 – Jun – 1983
1 – Oct – 1984
1 – Aug – 1985
(Target date: 15 April) 3
27 – Jun – 1986
24 – Jun – 1987
6 – Jun – 1988
18 – May – 1989
9 – Oct – 1990
22 – May – 1991
21 – May – 1992
1 – Apr – 1993
12 – May – 1994
29 – Jun – 1995
13 – Jun – 1996
5 – Jun – 1997
Not adopted
15 – Apr – 1999
13 – Apr – 2000
10 – May – 2001
Not adopted
11 – Apr – 2003
Not adopted
28 – Apr – 2005
Not adopted
17 – May – 2007
5 – Jun – 2008
29 – Apr – 2009

Days after deadline
0
0
2
2
9
28
6
39
39
139
78
73
70
52
33
176
37
36
0
27
75
59
51
0
0
25
0
13
32
51
14

Source: Congressional Research Service, Congressional Budget Resolutions: Historical Information, CRS
Report RL30297, Table 12, p. 28-29.

3

As originally enacted, the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 required that Congress adopt two budget
resolutions each year: (1) an advisory resolution by May 15 and (2) and a binding resolution by September
15. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 eliminated the requirement for a
second resolution and set April 15 as the target adoption date (Heniff & Murray, 2008).
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The appropriations process
Ideally, Congress will complete action on the budget resolution by April 15 and
consideration of appropriations can begin in earnest. Still, even if Congress does not
pass a budget resolution by mid-April, the House may begin consideration of annual
appropriations on May 15 with a target date of June 30 for completion of all annual
appropriation bills. Between February and April, the House appropriations
subcommittees will hold appropriations hearings. From May to July, subcommittees
receive 302(b) allocations from the appropriations committees, the subcommittees
mark-up their respective appropriations bills, and then pass the measures on to the full
appropriations committee. After the full committee incorporates its changes, each bill is
considered individually by the full House (GAO, 2005a; Mikesell, 2007; Schick, 2007).
The Senate follows a similar appropriations schedule, but by virtue of a
precedent set by the First Congress, appropriations bills must always originate in the
House (Schick, 2007). During the July/August timeframe, the Senate will amend the
House-passed appropriations by inserting changes made in the upper chamber. If the
Senate does initiate an appropriations bill, the Senate-numbered bill will be
incorporated into the House bill upon final passage. During the month of September,
conference committees work to resolve differences in the measures passed by the
House and Senate. After Congress passes an appropriations bill, the bill is passed-on to
the president for enactment. For those bills that are not signed into law by first day of
the fiscal year, Congress will pass a continuing appropriations act (Lee, et al., 2008;
Mikesell, 2007; Schick, 2007), which will allow federal agencies to continue operating
32

until regular appropriations are enacted. Continuing resolutions are addressed in depth
in the next chapter.
Budget reconciliation
The discussion in the previous section was based largely on the assumption that
members of Congress are able to pass appropriations in a timely manner, which, as the
reader will see in subsequent chapters, is a very optimistic supposition. Likewise, the
discussion on the congressional budget resolution assumes that prevailing revenue and
spending laws and debt-limit levels are in accord with the policies set forth in the
budget resolution. This is also a rather sanguine assumption as Congress has needed to
change current laws to fit the parameters of the budget resolution 21 times over the
past 37 years (Heniff & Murray, 2013; Keith & Heniff, 2005).
When revenue and direct spending laws are not in-line with the parameters of
the budget resolution, the budget committees will include directives instructing revenue
and authorization committees to modify existing laws. The majority of tax revenue
collected and the non-discretionary spending that takes place each year are the result of
permanent laws previously enacted; therefore, a predetermined level of taxing and
spending will occur annually without correction from legislators. To ensure a sufficient
level of revenue generation, an adequate level of spending, and a manageable level of
debt, legislators may have to adjust existing taxing and spending laws from time to time.
While the budget resolution is the means by which Congress enforces its budget, the
budget committees are not permitted to change laws. For this reason, Congress uses a
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process known as reconciliation to harmonize revenue and spending laws with
budgetary plans (Keith & Heniff, 2005; Lee, et al., 2008; Mikesell, 2007; Schick, 2007).
In essence, reconciliation is a legislative effort designed to foster the
implementation of budget resolution policies. It is an optional two-step procedure first
used in 1980 via the Omnibus Resolution Reconciliation Act, which required committees
to change legislation to meet spending reductions or tax increases called for in the
budget resolution. The practice is used most often when there are major changes to
budget policy and the procedure requires: (1) the issuance of reconciliation directives to
designated committees instructing them to change existing laws that govern revenue
generation, non-discretionary spending, and debt-limit levels, and (2) the enactment of
a reconciliation bill(s) incorporating those legislative changes (Heniff & Murray, 2013;
Keith & Heniff, 2005; Schick, 2007).
Procedurally, the promulgation of reconciliation directives by House and Senate
budget committees to their respective finance and authorization committees is done in
such a way as to maintain the legislative division of labor. The changes stipulated in the
reconciliation instructions are based on the amounts by which taxing, spending, and
authorizing legislation are to be adjusted from the CBO baseline levels stated in the
Budget and Economic Outlook. Since budget committees do not have legislative
jurisdiction, however, reconciliation directives specify neither how the changes are to be
made nor which programs are to be affected. Such details are left to the discretion of
the committees identified by name in the reconciliation directives, thereby ensuring
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that budget committees cannot control both money and programs. Finally, not all
committees take part in reconciliation while others seem to have a fixed presence. The
revenue committees’ jurisdiction over taxes and entitlements means that finance
committees will almost always be among those designated to take part in reconciliation.
On the other hand, appropriation committees and authorizing committees whose
jurisdiction is limited to discretionary programs are not issued reconciliation instructions
(GAO, 2005a; Lee, et al., 2008; Schick, 2007).
After receiving the legislative recommendations of the instructed committees,
the budget committees package the recommended legislation into an omnibus measure
and report the legislation to the full House and Senate without making any substantive
revisions4,5. Consideration of reconciliation bills in the House takes place under a
special rule that indicates which amendments can be considered. The Senate considers
reconciliation bills under sections of the Congressional Budget Act that restrict both the
amount of debate that can take place and the types of amendments that may be
considered 6. Incidentally, both chambers require revenue neutrality in reconciliation
amendments, which is to say that changes which reduce revenue or increase spending
must also be accompanied by offsets. Once differences in the House and Senate
versions of the legislation have been resolved in conference, the bill is submitted to the

4

An omnibus measure is one that contains several bills (Streeter, 2008a).
The Congressional Budget Act prohibits the budget committees from making substantive revisions to the
legislation that the committees of jurisdiction report, even when the proposed legislation does not abide
by the dollar targets stipulated in the reconciliation instructions. However, budget committees may make
technical corrections at the request of the instructed committees and they may offer amendments to the
legislation during floor consideration (Schick, 2007).
6
The Senate allows only 20 hours of debate on the reconciliation bill (Schick, 2007).
5
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president for signature (Committee on the Budget: U.S. House of Representatives,
2013b; Keith & Heniff, 2005; Schick, 2007).

Phase Three: Budget Execution and Control
The federal fiscal cycle begins anew on the first of October each year. On
October 1, approximately 18 months after the OMB Director transmits allowance letters
to agency heads, the federal fiscal year begins. The term budget execution and control
refers both to the period during which budget authority made available by
appropriations remains available for obligation, and to the applicable fiscal statutes and
administrative controls that govern agency spending. Throughout this new fiscal year,
the body of enacted laws that provides appropriations will function as the overarching
financial plan for the federal government, while the Antideficiency Act (ADA) serves as
the mechanism which enforces the spirit of the applicable appropriations.
Table 2.6 lists the major steps in the budget execution and control phase. OMB
apportions appropriations among federal agencies, which then sub-divide the funding
among organizational sub-units for measured obligation throughout the fiscal year. In
the course of spending appropriations, agencies must abide by the precepts of the
Antideficiency Act, administrative controls, and obligation rules, each of which is
discussed in more detail below.
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Table 2.6: Major Steps in the Budget Execution and Control Phase
Timeframe
Activities
October 1
- Federal fiscal year begins
September 10 - OMB apportions funds made available in the annual
(or within 30
appropriations process. Agencies submit apportionment requests
days after
to OMB for each budget account by August 21 or within 10
approval of a
calendar days after the approval of the appropriation, whichever is
spending bill)
later. OMB approves or modifies the apportionment specifying
the amount of funds agencies may use by time period, program,
project, or activity.
Throughout
- Agencies incur obligations and make outlays to carry out the
the fiscal year
funded programs, projects, and activities. Agencies record
obligations and outlays pursuant to administrative control of funds
procedures, report to Treasury, and prepare financial statements.
September 30 - Federal fiscal year ends
Source: Adapted from Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-11, section 10, p. 4.

The Antideficiency Act
The primary fiscal statute for the federal government is the Antideficiency Act,
which Hopkins and Nutt (1978) refer to as “the cornerstone of Congressional efforts to
bind the Executive branch of government to the limits on expenditure of appropriated
funds.” The statute evolved over time to prevent expenditures in excess of amounts
appropriated and to preclude “coercive deficiencies (L. Fisher, 1975).” The latter term
refers to the shrewd practice of continuing to incur obligations after exhausting an
entire appropriation during the opening months the fiscal year, and then pressing
members of Congress for additional funds to survive the remainder of the year (GAO,
2004e). The Act is currently the only fiscal statute that includes both civil and criminal
penalties for violation (GAO, 2004e) 7.

7

A violation of the ADA occurs upon: (1) overobligation or overexpenditure of an appropriation or fund
account; (2) entering into a contract or making an obligation in advance of an appropriation, unless
specifically authorized by law; (3) acceptance of voluntary services, unless authorized by law; and (4)
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The Antideficiency Act is a funds control and financial management statute that
achieves control by way of apportionment, allotment, and allocation of appropriations
(GAO, 2005a). The Act mandates that the executive branch apportion appropriations in
such a manner that funds lasts for the full period for which they were intended by
Congress ("Protecting the Fisc: Executive Impoundment and Congressional Power,"
1973). Accordingly, OMB apportions amounts to executive branch agencies, which
subdivide the apportionments among organizational subunits. Those subunits then
obligate funding within the parameters of the Act. From a managerial standpoint, the
Antideficiency Act requires agency heads to prescribe a series of administrative controls
which provide for the effective obligation of appropriations (GAO, 2004e, 2005a; Schick,
2007).
Apportionment
After appropriations are enacted into law, OMB must apportion the
appropriations to executive agencies before execution of funding can begin. The GAO
(2005a) defines apportionments, in part, as the action by which the OMB distributes
amounts available for obligation. This process marks the last point at which OMB can
formally control agency spending, and the intention behind apportionment is (1) to
prevent obligation practices that would require the enactment of deficiency or

overobligation or overexpenditure of (a) an apportionment or reapportionment or (b) amounts permitted
by the administrative control of funds regulations (GAO, 2005a).
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supplemental appropriations 8 and (2) to achieve the most effective and economic use of
funds (GAO, 2004e, 2005a; Lee, et al., 2008; Schick, 2007).
Procedurally, agencies submit apportionment requests to OMB for each budget
account by August 21 or within 10 calendar days after approval of the appropriation,
whichever occurs later. In turn, OMB exercises the discretion to apportion
appropriations by specific time periods (usually fiscal quarters), activities, projects,
objects, or by any combination thereof. From there, apportionments can be further
subdivided by an agency into allotments, sub-allotments, and allocations (GAO, 2005a;
Lee, et al., 2008; Mikesell, 2007; Office of Management and Budget, 2013; Schick, 2007).
Allotment
After agencies receive apportionments from OMB, program managers are
notified, by way of allotments, of the actual resources available for the fiscal year.
Allotments are distributions of budget authority among organizational subunits, such as
bureaus, divisions, and field offices, and they are a manifestation of the agency’s system
of administrative control of funds whose purpose is to prevent obligations and
expenditures from exceeding apportionments. An agency head or an authorized
designee distributes allotments, on a monthly or quarterly basis, pursuant to procedures
mandated in OMB Circular No. A-11. Using the allotments, program managers execute
funding according to spending plans formulated during the executive budget
8

Supplemental appropriations are funds appropriated in addition to those already enacted in an annual
appropriation act. Such appropriations provide additional budget authority in cases of urgent need. By
comparison, a deficiency appropriation is made to pay obligations for which sufficient funds are not
available and they often result from violation of the ADA. Incidentally, Congress has stopped passing
separate deficiency appropriations and the term has fallen into disuse (GAO, 2005a).
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formulation phase. Examples of such spending include the hiring of personnel; the
purchase of contract services, supplies, and equipment; and the fulfillment of official
agency travel (GAO, 2005a; Lee, et al., 2008; Schick, 2007).
Obligations
Once funds are allotted, managers may begin executing the funds or making
obligations on the government’s behalf. Obligations are an agency’s binding
commitment to another party, or a legal liability of the U.S. government with regard to
goods or services to be provided, or amounts to be paid. Funding may be obligated only
during the period for which the appropriation is available; beyond that period, funds
lapse and the authority to obligate expires. Funds must be used to meet a public need
and expenditures must be related to the purpose for which appropriations were made.
Agencies incur obligations upon placing an order, signing a contract, purchasing a
service, or engaging in any activity which requires the government to make payments to
the public or from one government account to another. These payments may be made
immediately or at some point in the future (GAO, 2004e, 2005a; Schick, 2007).
Successful obligation requires a style of financial management that some may
interpret as wasteful, but is actually the result of cautious behavior. For appropriated
monies, the managerial objective is to obligate 100 percent of allotted funding by the
end of the fiscal year. Prima facie, spending all of the agency’s money may seem simple
enough. However, agencies that overobligate (i.e., exceed appropriation,
apportionment, or allotment) risk violating the Antideficiency Act, while those that
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underobligate risk future budget cuts by appropriators or senior officials who may view
the agency as being awash in funding. To guard against overexpenditure, program
managers often set aside funding for unforeseen events. As the fiscal year winds down,
managers spend-down these contingency funds to ensure full execution. This practice
results in a spike in expenditure rates which many see as profligate government
spending; in actuality, it is often the result of prudent management of limited financial
resources (Schick, 2007).
The idea of putting aside funding for contingencies is not a practice that is
exclusive to the arena of federal budgeting; in fact, that sort of convention is more
generally known as organizational or budgetary slack. Budgetary slack is the residual
between “the total resources available to a firm and the total necessary to maintain the
organization coalition (Cyert & March, 1963),” or the excess of the amount budgeted
over that which is necessary (Merchant, 1985). While budgetary slack is often referred
to in a pejorative light (Merchant, 1985), it behooves rational economic individuals to
create slack (Lowe & Shaw, 1968), and its true value depends on the manner by which it
is utilized. In essence, organizational slack offers alternative funding methods that may
not otherwise be available or sanctioned because of scarcity of resources (Onsi, 1973).
The propensity for creating budgetary slack is greater in certain financial or
accounting systems, and the practice is made possible through imperfections in the
organizational process of resource allocation (Onsi, 1973). In systems where there is an
emphasis on achieving budgetary targets; a centralized, top-down, “authoritarian (Onsi,
1973)” perspective on budget implementation; or an intermittent requirement for
41

strategic recourse to avoid shortfalls and overruns, managers will feel compelled to
generate organizational slack (Merchant, 1985; Onsi, 1973). Since slack becomes
practically undetectable at aggregate levels, departmental heads often rely on division
controllers/comptrollers to institute budgetary slack by way of errors in estimation or
changes in levels of efficiency (Lal, Dunk, & Smith, 1996; Merchant, 1985; Onsi, 1973).
While budgetary slack is not a formal part of the federal budget process, it is an
intrinsic exercise of the resource management profession. Organizational slack in the
form of contingency funding is addressed here because it is an integral part of the
analysis in chapters four and five.
Deferrals and rescissions
A discussion of the execution and control of the federal budget would not be
complete without acknowledgement of the topic of impoundment. The GAO (2005a)
defines impoundment as any action or inaction by an officer of the federal government
which prevents the obligation or expenditure of budget authority. More simply stated,
impoundments are a refusal to spend all or part of the funds appropriated by Congress
(Schick, 2007; Wildavsky & Caiden, 2004). By virtue of its domain over the nation’s
purse, appropriations are a signal of congressional intent and refusal to obligate
appropriations is a violation of that intent (Schick, 2007).
Beginning with Thomas Jefferson, most presidents have made use of
impoundment, but on the heels of President Nixon’s controversial application of the
authority, Congress passed the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Hogan, 1985; Lee, et
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al., 2008; Schick, 2007)9. The Act categorizes impoundment into: (1) deferrals, which
postpone the obligation of budget authority, and (2) rescissions, which cancel budget
authority previously enacted by Congress (GAO, 2005a).
Budget authority cannot be deferred for policy reasons; instead, it may only be
deferred for reasons permitted by the Antideficiency Act: (1) to provide for
contingencies, (2) to achieve savings in governmental operations, or (3) as provided by
law. Agencies may propose deferrals but the president must transmit a special message
to Congress detailing (a) the amount to be deferred, (b) the program and account
affected, and (c) the length of time the funds are to be deferred. Deferrals become
effective unless either the House or Senate disapproves them; however, once the
deferral is disapproved the associated budget authority must be made available for
obligation immediately. In addition, deferrals cannot extend beyond the end of the
fiscal year to which the budget authority pertains, and agencies must release all other
deferred budget authority with sufficient time remaining in the fiscal year to allow for
prudent obligation (GAO, 2005a; Lee, et al., 2008; Schick, 2007).
By comparison, rescissions may be proposed for policy reasons, and the 1974 Act
includes provisions for the president to request a rescission of budget authority. If the
president deems all or part of any budget authority unnecessary for realization of
program objectives, the president may propose rescission by way of a special message
that details: (a) the amount to be rescinded, (b) the reasons for rescission, (c) the

9

The Impoundment Control Act was enacted in the same measure as the Congressional Budget Act, and
together they are known as the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Schick,
2007)
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accounts and programs affected, and (d) the estimated budgetary and program impacts.
After receipt of the special message, Congress has no less than 45 days of continuous
session to consider the rescission proposal. That is to say rescissions do not take effect
unless approved by Congress. If both chambers have not completed action on the
rescission bill within the 45 day timeframe, any funds withheld must be released for
obligation. What is more, Congress may also initiate rescissions for reasons such as
program terminations, excessive unobligated balances, and a change of priorities (GAO,
2005a; Lee, et al., 2008; Schick, 2007)10.

In summary
Over time, the federal budget process in the United States has evolved from a
committee-centric arrangement suited to meet the modest needs of a small
government into a highly-coordinated and comprehensive fiscal system capable of
supporting what is currently the largest economy in the world. In the existing process,
the federal government spends nine months building a budget from the bottom up
using top-down guidance, and another nine months adjudicating the efficacy of that
budget. If everything goes according to script, it will take approximately 18 months to
plan for 12 months of spending. To the casual observer the federal budget process may
seem terribly inefficient. However, considering the amount of communication,
feedback, coordination, adjustment, and protocol required to ensure that the
10

The GAO draws a distinction between rescissions and reallocated budget authority. When making
appropriations, if Congress “rescinds” funds from one account and immediately “appropriates” an
identical amount to a different account, the GAO considers the transaction as reallocated budget
authority and not a formal rescission (GAO, 2009c)
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government’s fiscal house remains in order and that all participants are equally
dissatisfied, it is a marvel that budgets are passed at all.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a very brief overview of the federal
budget process to prepare the reader for the upcoming examination of continuing
resolutions. In truth, the process is far more intricate and involved than what has been
portrayed in the preceding pages. The acquisitive reader seeking a more detailed
account of federal budgeting may benefit from reading The Federal Budget: Politics,
Policy, and Process by Allen Schick; Fiscal Administration: Analysis and Applications in
the Public Sector by John Mikesell; and Public Budgeting Systems by Lee and colleagues,
as these works provide analysis and different perspectives of the same phenomenon.
From here, the discussion will turn to the subject of stopgap measures that are
employed in light of budgetary discord and the absence of annual appropriations. While
mentioned only tangentially in this chapter, continuing resolutions are the main focus of
this study. The next chapter offers background information on continuing
appropriations acts, a summary of the literature as it relates the institutions of the
president and Congress, and a synthesis of the research regarding the effects of
spending restrictions on agency-level spending. Likewise, the analyses in chapters four,
five, and six also pertain to continuing resolutions, so it is hoped that chapter two will
function as a touchstone for terms and concepts referred to throughout this evaluation.

Copyright © Thomas Alexander Jacobs 2014
45

Chapter Three
Continuing Resolutions: A Review of the Literature

Introduction
As mentioned previously, the Federal government’s fiscal year begins on October
1. To ensure continuity of operations for federal agencies from one year to the next,
appropriations acts must be enacted by the first day of the fiscal year. Congress
provides funding by way of annual appropriations acts which enable agencies to
obligate and expend money from the U.S. Treasury 11. Agency officials then spend their
respective allotments and allocations over the course of the fiscal year, in accordance
with budgetary execution plans, to ensure that all appropriations are fully spent by
September 30, the final day of the fiscal year. The execution process begins anew with
the advent of the next fiscal year.
To complicate matters, the federal government often enters a new fiscal year
without a fully approved budget, which means the government may operate in a
constrained and uncertain environment. If Congress and the president do not enact
appropriations by the first day of the fiscal year, a funding gap ensues and the
government must shutdown. To prevent a cessation of operations, Congress will, most
often, provide temporary funding by way of continuing appropriations acts, which are
also known as continuing resolutions or continuing appropriations. These measures are
11 Congress funds federal agencies by way of several regular appropriations acts which can vary in
number from year to year. From fiscal years 1968 – 2005, the number of regular appropriations acts
remained steady at 13. The number reduced to 11 during the 109th Congress, and increased to 12 during
the 110th Congress (Pulmonte, 2011; Streeter, 2008b).
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the legislative mechanism that enables the operation of government programs until
Congress and the president agree on regular appropriations.
However, the restrictive nature of continuing resolutions may have unintended
effects (Hartman, 1982) on government spending beyond the timeframe to which the
resolutions apply. Government agencies routinely formulate budgets and devise
spending plans toward accomplishment of organizational missions under the
assumption that full funding will be available at the outset of the coming fiscal year.
Continuing resolutions place limits on operational activities and may result in interim
levels of funding that tend to be lower than those for which the agency originally
planned. As a result, continuing resolutions may disrupt obligation plans thereby
causing organizations to adopt measures of execution that will increase the probability
of achieving budgetary spending goals.
What, then, is the effect of continuing resolutions on the spending patterns of
federal agencies? Dating back more than a century, these stopgap measures have
become a mainstay of the federal budget process, yet quantitative analyses of effects
are hard to come by. At the government-wide level, scholarly work tends to focus on
continuing resolutions (1) as a legislative instrument which may tip the scales between
the legislature and the executive during budget negotiations, (2) as an apple of discord
between authorizers and appropriators, and (3) as a reluctant and temporary solution to
budgetary stalemate. At the agency-level, both scholars and practitioners generate
empirical findings by way of case studies; however, the majority of research is
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conducted by practitioners and tends to be anecdotal because agencies do not
specifically track the effects of spending restrictions.
As it stands, the field of federal budgeting is, by and large, devoid of studies that
isolate and quantify the effects of continuing resolutions on agency spending patterns.
This dynamic is partly due to a practitioner-heavy attribute, but also because other
disciplines have shown more interest in the aspect of budget execution. Bartle (2001)
submits that budgeting research is largely practice-oriented, while McCaffery and Mutty
(1999) add that academic budgeting literature is focused on budget preparation, while
budget execution, the stage at which spending takes place, is customarily the domain of
practitioners. That does not mean, however, that budget execution has gone unnoticed
by scholars. In the context of this study, academics in the field of management
accounting are concerned with the financial management aspect of budgeting where
cost control, cash flow management, and capital expenditures take place (Balakrishnan
& Sprinkle, 2002), and Cooper and Kaplan (1992) offers an Activity-Based Costing
framework of unused capacity that may be applicable to the discussion.
The objectives of this chapter are, first, to provide the reader with a brief history
of continuing resolutions and to offer a basic understanding of the purpose, the type,
and the frequency of usage of these appropriations. The second objective is to show
that the attendant literature can be thought of in two dimensions: (1) a governmentwide perspective which addresses the effects of continuing resolutions on the Congress
and the president, and (2) an agency-specific viewpoint which concerns the bearing of
continuing appropriations on agency spending behavior. The final objective is to show
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that the agency-specific literature can be rearranged and regarded in such a way as to
reveal patterns of spending which lend themselves to quantitative analysis.
Before continuing further, it is important to note that this chapter will not
include a discussion of legislative anomalies. As part of a recent study of continuing
resolutions, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) compiled a list of standard
provisions associated with such resolutions (see Appendix A). Legislative anomalies can
be thought of as exceptions to the resolution rules. The president and congress may
include these extraordinary legislative measures to accommodate exceptional
circumstances or to avoid major problems which would arise with a uniform approach
to funding. Anomalies are quite rare and most agencies operate under the standard
provisions of continuing resolutions (Brass, 2010; GAO, 2009b; Pulmonte, 2011).
The discussion of federal budgeting, in general, and of continuing appropriations,
in specific, continues in the next section with essential background information such as
the constitutional and statutory basis for continuing resolutions, the types of stopgap
measures, and the frequency of usage. The third segment of the chapter summarizes
the literature as it relates to the institutions of the president and the Congress, and
section four synthesizes the writings dedicated to the effects of continuing resolutions
at the agency-level. The fifth section explores the notion of re-categorizing the effects
of continuing appropriations on agency-level organizations and re-approaching the issue
by way of a standardized accounting classification system. The final part of the chapter
concludes with a brief discussion regarding the state of the field and a suggestion of
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how empirical research might proceed in an area of study ripe for quantitative
applications.

The essentials of continuing resolutions
Article 1, Section 9, Clause 7 of the U.S. Constitution requires the enactment of
appropriations before money can be drawn from the U.S. Treasury. In addition, the
Antideficiency Act, under threat of criminal sanctions, fines, or removal from office,
forbids obligations in excess of appropriations and largely prohibits agencies from
operating in the absence of funding; only those activities involving the safety of human
life or the protection of property are exempt from the ADA provision (Brass, 2010; GAO,
2004e; Pulmonte, 2011; Streeter, 2008b).
One outcome of these statutory provisions is the possibility of government
shutdown. If Congress does not approve funding by the first day of the fiscal year, a
funding gap will ensue and agencies must begin an orderly shutdown of operations
(Pulmonte, 2011; Streeter, 2008b). Alternatively known as a “lapse in appropriations”
or “appropriations hiatus,” a funding gap occurs: (1) when regular appropriations have
not been agreed upon by the start of the fiscal year and the president has not signed a
continuing resolution into law (Pulmonte, 2011); (2) when a regular appropriation is
exhausted before the end of the fiscal year (GAO, 2004e); or (3) when one continuing
resolution expires and another is not enacted (Brass, 2010). In other words, a funding
gap refers to any period of time during the fiscal year which is not covered by an
appropriation. Incidentally, instances in which a continuing resolution is enacted the
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day after the preceding short-term resolution expires are not considered to be funding
gaps (Keith, 2008a; Tollestrup, 2011). Prior to the government shutdown of Fiscal Year
2014 (October 1 to October 16, 2013), no funding gaps had occurred since 1996 (Brass,
2010; Pulmonte, 2011; Streeter, 2008b).
To avoid funding gaps, Congress and the president employ continuing
resolutions, which are the legislative mechanism that enables government programs to
operate in the absence of regular appropriations. More formally known as continuing
appropriations acts, continuing resolutions are referred to as such because they are
enacted in the form of joint resolutions between the House and Senate (Pulmonte,
2011; Schick, 2007; Streeter, 2008b). The resolutions allow the government to continue
operating on a temporary basis until Congress and the president (or the chambers
within Congress) reach an agreement on regular appropriations (Brass, 2010; Pulmonte,
2011; Tollestrup, 2011).
Continuing resolutions have been in use since 1876 when Congress appropriated
ten days of funding for select government accounts (Devins, 1988; Pulmonte, 2011;
Streeter, 2008b). With regard to modern times, Congress has passed at least one such
resolution each year since 1952, and from 1961 to 1980, only 15 percent of annual
appropriations were enacted on time. (Brass, 2010; Devins, 1988; GAO, 2009b;
Pulmonte, 2011; Streeter, 2008b; Tollestrup, 2011; Joe White, 1988). From 1952 to
2010, Congress and the president enacted all regular appropriations acts in a timely
fashion on only four occasions: fiscal years 1977, 1989, 1995, and 1997. During fiscal
year 1977, however, a handful of appropriations were dropped from the regular
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appropriations act and Congress enacted two continuing resolutions to fund the
unauthorized programs. Between fiscal years 1998 and 2010, Congress enacted 79
continuing resolutions which averaged 18 days in duration and ranged in length from 21
to 365 days. During that period of time, agencies, on balance, spent the first four
months of the fiscal year under the restrictions of a continuing appropriation
(Tollestrup, 2011).
Even though continuing appropriations are used frequently, the resolutions are
not always applied in a blanket fashion. Some agencies are fortunate enough to receive
regular appropriations by the start of the fiscal year, while others must wait until the
budget impasse is resolved. Table 3.1 lists the number of appropriations acts approved
by October 1 for fiscal years 1977-2010 along with the number of continuing resolutions
enacted in each of those years (Pulmonte, 2011; Streeter, 2008b). A 2009 GAO study of
the effect of continuing appropriations on federal agency operations finds no discernible
pattern associated with the duration of resolutions enacted between fiscal years 19992009. However, Figure 3.1 shows that, over that same period of time, military- and
security-type appropriations enjoyed shorter durations of restriction while
appropriations related to Commerce, Justice, Labor, and Health and Human Services
endured longer periods of austerity (GAO, 2009b; Pulmonte, 2011).
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Table 3.1: Regular Appropriations Bills Enacted by the Start of the Fiscal Year and
Continuing Resolutions, Fiscal Years 1977-2010
Appropriations acts approved
Number of continuing
Fiscal Year
by October 1
resolutions enacted
1977
13
2
1978
9
3
1979
5
1
1980
3
2
1981
1
3
1982
0
4
1985
4
5
1986
0
5
1987
0
5
1988
0
5
1989
13
0
1990
1
3
1991
0
5
1992
3
4
1993
1
1
1994
2
3
1995
13
0
1996
0
13
1997
13
0
1998
1
6
1999
1
6
2000
4
7
2001
2
21
2002
0
8
2003
0
8
2004
3
5
2005
1
3
2006
2
3
2007
1
4
2008
0
4
2009
3
2
2010
1
2

Source: adopted from Sandy Streeter’s Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RL30343 titled
Continuing Resolutions: FY2008 Action and Brief Overview of Recent Practices (Streeter, 2008b). An
updated version of the report was included in Closed: Government Shutdowns and Continuing Resolutions
(Pulmonte, 2011).
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Figure 3.1: Average Annual Duration of Continuing Resolutions by
Appropriations Subcommittee, Fiscal Years 1999-2009
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Adopted from the GAO study titled Continuing Resolutions: Uncertainty Limited Management Options and
Increased Workload in Selected Agencies (GAO, 2009b). An updated version of the report was included in
Closed: Government Shutdowns and Continuing Resolutions (Pulmonte, 2011).

Concerning the timeline for adoption of continuing appropriations acts, it seems
that Congress tends to wait until the close of the fiscal year before finalizing such
actions. Using the Government Printing Office’s Federal Digital System, queries for the
initial continuing appropriations associated with fiscal years 2000-2012 showed that
Congress and the president most often adopted continuing resolutions into public law
on the final day of the fiscal year (see Table 3.2). On three occasions, fiscal years 2001,
2002, and 2008, the acts were passed into law one to two days early. For Fiscal Year
2010, the resolution was adopted into public law on the first day of the associated fiscal
year, October 1, 2009.
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Table 3.2: Continuing Resolutions, Date of Adoption by Congress
Fiscal Year
Public Law
Date Adopted by Congress
2000
106-62
September 30, 1999
2001
106-275
September 29, 2000
2002
107-44
September 28, 2001
2003
107-229
September 30, 2002
2004
108-84
September 30, 2003
2005
108-309
September 30, 2004
2006
109-77
September 30, 2005
2007
109-289
September 30, 2006
2008
110-92
September 29, 2007
2009
110-329
September 30, 2008
2010
111-68
October 1, 2009
2011
111-242
September 30, 2010
2012
112-33
September 30, 2011

Source: U.S. Government Printing Office, Federal Digital System located at the following URL:
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/home.action

There are two types of continuing resolutions: interim and full-year. Brief in
both duration and word-length, the most frequently applied of the two methods are
interim continuing resolutions. Also called traditional (Schick, 2007), partial-year
(Tollestrup, 2011), or short-term continuing resolutions (Brass, 2010), these temporary
measures may be enacted for a few short days or they may span several months.
Usually only a few pages long (Schick, 2007), interim resolutions are valid until a specific
date, which is stated on the initial resolution, or until the enactment of the regular
appropriations act, whichever comes first. Most often, when a series of interim
continuing resolutions are employed in a single fiscal year, subsequent resolutions will
simply overwrite the expiration date of the preceding resolution (GAO, 2009b;
Pulmonte, 2011; Streeter, 2008b; Tollestrup, 2011).
While regular appropriations acts can be very explicit in funding verbiage,
interim continuing resolutions often provide for an attenuated level of operations by
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way of various spending rates. For example, Congress may restrict agencies to levels of
execution commensurate with the previous fiscal year by mandating a pace of spending
not to exceed the “current rate (Hartman, 1982; I. Rubin, 2007; Streeter, 2008a;
Wildavsky & Caiden, 2004),” effectively providing for no increase in funding over the
prior fiscal year. By allowing only for an inflationary adjustment or an increase in the
number of beneficiaries, legislators may also seek to govern spending at a rate that
maintains existing program levels detailed in statute. Lawmakers may also resort to
versions of what Kiewiet and McCubbins (1988) refer to as the “Fenno Rule” after James
Fenno’s (1966) explanation of the general provisions of continuing resolutions.
According to the Fenno Rule, when an agency is subject to a continuing resolution, that
agency’s spending authority is restricted to the minimum of the House version of an
appropriations bill, the Senate version of the same appropriations bill, or the previous
fiscal year’s regular appropriations act (Fenno, 1966; GAO, 2009b; Hartman, 1982;
McCaffery & Mutty, 1999; Pulmonte, 2011; I. Rubin, 2007; Streeter, 2008b; Tollestrup,
2011).
In contrast to the brevity of partial-year measures, full-year continuing
resolutions contain more text and are intended to sustain agency operations thru fiscal
year-end. Full-year resolutions generally enable agency operations by: (1) referencing
the full text of the related regular appropriations act; (2) cross-referencing language
from the latest stage of congressional action, such as the conference agreement; (3)
mandating spending rates; or (4) some combination of the previous three methods
(Pulmonte, 2011; Streeter, 2008b). Because full-year measures often include the full
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text of regular appropriations, they tend to be several hundred pages in length (Schick,
2007). In essence, full-year continuing resolutions provide funding in place of regular
appropriations and they expire at the end of the fiscal year (Pulmonte, 2011; Schick,
2007; Streeter, 2008b). Thus, full-year resolutions differ from regular appropriations
only to the extent that the amount of funding provided may differ from what would
have been included in the regular measures.
It is also not unheard of for an agency to begin the fiscal year under a series of
interim measures only to have a full-year continuing resolution adopted in the event of
extended budget negotiations, as most recently happened in fiscal years 2007 and 2011
("DoD & Full-Year Continuing Approprations Act, 2011," 2011; GAO, 2009b). When this
happens, Congress seems to be cognizant of the need to declare the implementation of
full-year spending restrictions in a timely manner. With regard to Fiscal Year 2007,
three interim continuing resolutions were signed into law before a full-year resolution
was finally implemented on February 15, 2007 thereby providing for operations through
the end of the fiscal year (Pulmonte, 2011; "Revised Continuing Appropriations
Resolution, 2007," 2007). For Fiscal Year 2011, full-year continuing appropriations were
implemented on April 15, 2011 (112th Congress, 2011). Hence, in the same manner
that Congress requires agencies to allow sufficient time in the fiscal year for prudent
obligation of funding in the case of disapproved deferrals, Congress will grant agencies
ample time to adjust to new funding paradigms brought about by full-year resolutions.
Schick (2007) draws a temporal distinction between interim- and full-year
appropriations by alluding to the former as “traditional” continuing resolutions and the
57

latter as “contemporary” continuing resolutions. As Schick points out, traditional
measures have been in use for decades and follow the interim procedures detailed
above. Contemporary continuing resolutions, on the other hand, are a combination of a
full-year continuing appropriations act and an omnibus appropriations act to the extent
that a full-year continuing resolution may serve as a legislative vehicle for several
appropriations.
A brief discussion of omnibus appropriations acts may be helpful here. Congress
usually evaluates and approves regular appropriation bills separately. On several
occasions, usually during the conference stage, legislators have combined two or more
bills into one measure called an omnibus appropriations measure. The packaging of
regular appropriations bills facilitates legislative bargaining by enabling lawmakers to
negotiate trade-offs among several bills. This process is an efficient means of resolving
budgetary differences. Incidentally, there is not a consensus definition of an omnibus
appropriations measure. In fact, the term minibus appropriations measure identifies a
measure containing a “few” regular appropriations bills; whereas, an omnibus
appropriations measure contains “several” regular appropriations bills (Streeter, 2008a).
To recap, continuing appropriations acts become necessary when conflict over
the federal budget cannot be resolved by the start of the fiscal year. On most occasions,
interim or traditional continuing resolutions afford agencies the means to continue
operations while Congress and the president negotiate budgetary differences. If those
differences cannot be reconciled, Congress may exercise the option of passing a fullyear continuing appropriations act to carry affected agencies through the remainder of
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the fiscal year. Another approach, and one that has been used regularly since 1997,
involves packaging multiple uncompleted appropriations into an omnibus measure at
the conference stage in an attempt to expedite the completion of the appropriations
process by the start of the fiscal year (Pulmonte, 2011). Doing so paves the way for
lawmakers to: (1) engage in legislative logrolling; (2) avoid floor consideration of certain
controversial floor amendments to regular appropriations bills; (3) reduce the number
of votes required to pass the measure; and (4) reduce the number of opportunities for
presidential veto (Aksoy, 2012; Pulmonte, 2011).

Effects of continuing resolutions on the Congress and the President
As just mentioned, continuing resolutions have the intended effect of preventing
a government shutdown while allowing Congress and the president time to resolve
budgetary differences. Yet, the extension of time is not without cost. This section
discusses the intense dislike among legislators for the passage of spending measures
which have not been previously authorized, and the exclusionary tactics associated with
continuing resolutions that seem to violate the norms of democratic processes.
Notwithstanding budgetary discord, continuing appropriations keep the federal
government running and the suboptimal budget environment provides motivation for
political reconciliation.
Congress’s constitutional prerogative to withhold funding was intended to
safeguard against executive overreach. In order to control federal spending and debt
levels after the First World War and to impose structure on the federal budget process,
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Congress passed the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, thereby giving the president
the instruments necessary to exercise fiscal restraint over the executive branch. In so
doing, Congress attempted to assume the role of principal and to place the president on
an agency footing by requiring the executive to submit an annual consolidated budget
for the federal government (Schick, 1980, 1990, 1994, 2007; Shuman, 1992).
In the early part of the twentieth century, however, Congress delegated many of
its monetary authorities to other agencies and spending eventually began to outpace
revenues. In 1913, legislators transferred the power to coin and to regulate money to
the Federal Reserve System. The authority to pay debt and to borrow money went to
the Treasury Department in 1917. Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy,
and Johnson routinely used the budget to promote spending initiatives and to increase
social programs. During the Vietnam era, government spending increased, large deficits
accrued, and entitlement programs expanded. The erosion of public confidence in
Congress’s ability to manage the nation’s finances and President Nixon’s impoundment
strategy ultimately prompted Congress to reassert its pecuniary authority. The
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 formally established a
congressional budgetary apparatus and gave Congress the tools and expertise necessary
to co-manage the nation’s purse and to engage adequately the president on spending
matters (Dumbrell, 1980; Hartman, 1982; Hogan, 1985; Schick, 1990, 2007; Shuman,
1992).
Given a level budgetary playing field between Congress and the president,
continuing resolutions not only allow Congress to assume a more aggressive posture
60

opposite the president on budgetary matters, but also imply greater accountability for
the budget overall. In their examination of the extent to which the presidential veto
influences congressional decisions on appropriations, Kiewiet and McCubbins (1988)
frame continuing resolutions as a best alternative to a negotiated agreement (R. Fisher
& Ury, 2011). The authors explain that under the Fenno Rule continuing resolutions
become a de facto reversionary expenditure, a fallback position of sorts, comprised of a
zero expenditure level or the previous year’s expenditure level. This arrangement is
designed to guard individual members of Congress and the president against committee
threats to shut down the government in the event of budgetary impasse.
Be that as it may, the idea that an agenda setter can present voters with a “take
it or leave it” choice has direct relevance to a discussion of budgetary negotiations
between Congress and the president. Consider the notion that a monopolistic agenda
setter may be a bureau that formulates a budget estimate for the coming fiscal year and
which has a preference for the largest feasible expenditure. Apropos of the Fenno Rule,
affected voters to the budget are left with a binary choice between the proposed
budget and a reversionary expenditure. By Romer and Rosenthal’s estimates, the
presence of a reversionary expenditure strongly affects the allocation of budgetary
resources and is, therefore, integral to the outcome of the expenditure election (Romer
& Rosenthal, 1978). In the context of continuing resolutions, Congress, because of its
power over the purse, assumes the role of monopolistic agenda setter, while the
president assents to the role of affected voter (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1988).
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Indeed, Wildavsky (2004) holds that continuing resolutions effectively “vitiate
the veto power” while Kiewiet and McCubbins (1988) submit further that veto power
only imparts the president the ability to reject spending levels, not to extract more
appropriations than Congress prefers. Schick (2007) adds that presidents must sign or
veto the entire bill and this all-or-nothing aspect is most evident under divided
government when Congress may load appropriations bills with provisions that run
counter to the president’s policies.
Presidents also seem to be at a particular disadvantage when bills are presented
in omnibus fashion and displeasure over a few provisions does not merit a veto of the
entire bill, or after the start of the fiscal year when failure to sign would result in a
shutdown of government. Yet, some presidents have used veto power effectively. With
public opinion on his side, President Clinton’s strategic use of veto power often
compelled Congress to revise bills to gain executive support. As another example,
President George H.W. Bush was able to leverage the support of members of his own
party in Congress to gain 30 consecutive victories in veto override votes (Schick, 2007).
The combination of these institutional arrangements gives Congress the latitude
to assume a more aggressive stance with the president in terms of budget offers
(Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1988), while also implying that Congress, as an outcome of the
1974 Budget Act, has primary responsibility for the budget (Devins, 1988).
Within Congress, however, continuing resolutions breed feelings of contempt
between authorizers and appropriators because the measures tend to serve as an
expeditious means of passing unauthorized appropriations. For annual appropriations,
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the authorization-appropriations process happens in sequence. Recall from chapter two
that authorization acts establish, continue, or modify agencies or programs. Legislative
committees, such as the House Committees on Agriculture and Homeland Security or
the Senate Committees on Armed Services and the Judiciary, have jurisdiction over
authorization measures and are responsible for crafting substantive legislation and for
the authorization of appropriations. After authorization has been established,
appropriation acts provide funding or budget authority for the authorized entities. The
House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, which are not legislative committees
and therefore do not have jurisdiction to establish, continue, or modify existing law,
write the appropriations measures that provide budget authority for entities that have
been previously authorized (Streeter, 2008a).
Unauthorized appropriations are budget authority contained in an
appropriations bill for entities whose authorization has not been enacted, has expired,
or exceeds the authorized ceiling. House Rules XXI, Clause 2, House Rules XXII, Clause 5,
and Senate Rule XVI prohibit legislative provisions and unauthorized appropriations in
general appropriations bills (Devins, 1988; House of Representatives Committee on
Rules, 2013a, 2013b; Schick, 1980, 2007; Streeter, 2008a, 2008b).
However, continuing resolutions are not deemed general appropriations;
therefore, they are not subject to the House and Senate restrictions mentioned above
and members often fill the resolutions with unfinished business without drawing a point
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of order 12 (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1988; Myers, Rumburg, & Johnson, 1989; Schick,
2007). That is to say, members cannot formally object to or question unauthorized
appropriations written into continuing appropriations because it is not against the rules
to include such provisions in continuing resolutions. Unauthorized appropriations, if
enacted, have the force of law and are available for obligation or expenditure (Streeter,
2008a). For this reason, authorizing committee members have long bristled at the
notion that appropriators can circumvent the will of committee or subcommittee
chairmen who opposed consideration of a bill (Joe White, 1988). As an example, Schick
(1980) cites Representative Walter Flowers’ immense and colorfully worded
dissatisfaction with the encroachment of the budget and appropriations processes on
authorization committee territory, and Senator Walter Magnuson, Chair of the Senate
Appropriations Committee in 1979, was quoted as saying, “When you cannot get
anything through a legislative committee, you tack it on an appropriations bill (Devins,
1988).”
Thus, the use of continuing resolutions seems to undermine the notion of a
deliberative and democratic legislative process. While this “must pass” legislation
(Brass, 2010; Devins, 1988) keeps the government running in the face of a government
shutdown, the respite comes at the expense of the close examination and careful
prioritization of spending proposals (I. Rubin, 2007). Internal rules preclude the debate
and amendment of the resolutions, and lawmakers-at-large are denied access to the
final bill (Devins, 1988). In the context of a separation of powers system, the act of
12

A point of order is a query, raised during a formal debate or meeting, as to whether parliamentary
procedures are being followed.
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passing continuing resolutions comes across as a centralized process in which a few
powerful legislators and their aides make secretive decisions for everyone else (Devins,
1988; Joe White, 1988).
While some may view the use of continuing resolutions as “a bankruptcy of the
budget system (Schick, 1980),” others see the measures as a lone conduit supplying
money to the government in times of budget impasse (Joe White, 1988). As Irene Rubin
(1999) notes, “conflict is endemic to budgeting” and according to Schick (2007) the
intense and sustained conflict over budget policy generates dysfunction within the
regular appropriations process. Conflict drives the negotiating parties from the
bargaining table, while continuing resolutions are the suboptimal arrangement which
provides incentive for the participants to seek accord (Brass, 2010; Pulmonte, 2011). On
balance, continuing resolutions seem to be the legislative adaptation to the demands
which the process of budgeting levels upon a representative democracy (Joe White,
1988).

Effects of continuing resolutions on agency-level spending
Associated research at the agency level tends to take the form of case study
analysis, due in part to the difficulty of obtaining agency-level budget data (as the
reader will see in chapter five). What is more, because the field of budgeting is
practitioner-oriented (Posner, 2009), the preponderance of research at the agency level
is mostly anecdotal in nature.
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Scholarly efforts are apt to find that continuing appropriations create an
environment of uncertainty for program managers. Hartman (1982) submits that
operating under a continuing resolution is an unacceptable manner by which to conduct
the public’s business. Interim funding approaches tend to generate uncertainty
regarding the availability of funding, and the lack of surety exacerbates managerial
inefficiency (Hartman, 1982; McCaffery & Mutty, 1999). Managers are apt to become
overly cautious about committing funds and awarding contracts, and agency spending
takes on unconventional patterns (Hartman, 1982). Rubin (2007) submits that
predictability suffers when agency managers lack certainty about budget levels from
one timeframe to the next. Kiewiet and McCubbins (1988) counter that, in the context
of the Fenno Rule, continuing resolutions might actually offer a measure of
predictability in so far as the budgetary outcome is predetermined if regular
appropriations fail to pass.
In a corresponding manner, practitioners find a similar relationship between the
implementation of continuing resolutions and the manifestation of uncertainty. At the
behest of then Senator George Voinovich, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
attempted to investigate the effect of continuing resolutions on the operations of
federal agencies. Auditors analyzed the provisions of continuing resolutions from 19992009, and conducted a series of case studies of six federal agencies from three cabinetlevel departments. 13

13

The six agencies included in the GAO case study were: (1) Administration for Children and Families and
(2) Food and Drug Administration, which fall under the Department of Health and Human Services; (3)
Veterans Health Administration and (4) Veterans Benefit Administration under the Department of
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The findings of the GAO study coincide with Hartman’s (1982) and Rubin’s (2007)
empirical results. While continuing resolutions enabled agencies to operate until the
enactment of regular appropriations, the limitations engendered uncertainty about the
timing and the levels of funding to come. Specifically, the restrictions tended to
increase administrative burdens; delay the hiring of personnel; compress application
time for grants; and impede the award or renewal of contracts. In addition, resolutions
contributed to distortions in year-end spending for those agencies operating under
restrictions for prolonged periods (GAO, 2009b).
Still, GAO auditors were unable to isolate the effects because none of the
agencies under study made a concerted effort to monitor and record the affected
resources (GAO, 2009b). The Congressional Research Service submits further that, aside
from anecdotal accounts, the flexible nature of continuing resolutions, in conjunction
with the disparate composition of agencies and programs, increases the difficulty of
formulating general notions of the effects of such constraints on federal spending
(Brass, 2010; Pulmonte, 2011). Along those lines, White (1988) supposes that
continuing resolutions exhibit only marginal effects on spending, while the absence of
budget and allocation data render Balakrishnan, Soderstrom, and West (2007) unable to
rule-out continuing resolutions as an explanation for expense shifting among U.S. Army
hospitals.

Veterans Affairs; and under the Department of Justice, (5) Bureau of Prisons and (6) Federal Bureau of
Investigation (Pulmonte, 2011).
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A path forward
A recurring theme from the discussion above is managerial uncertainty with
regard to the availability of future short-term funding, and one method of mitigating
such uncertainty is to establish contingency funds. Uncertainty over future income
motivated Leland (1968) to model the precautionary demand for saving. Zimmerman
(1976) extended Leland’s research by analyzing the effects of budget uncertainty on the
allocation decisions of nonprofit managers and found that budget and/or expenditure
uncertainty will compel managers to establish contingency funds. Awareness that
allotted funding must last for the entire fiscal year will compel managers of federal
organizations to pursue the prudent financial management strategy of holding a portion
of funding in abeyance for unanticipated needs (McCaffery & Mutty, 1999; Schick,
2007). A portion of that contingency funding is often put aside, or “saved,” in the form
of durable inventory which is reduced in the early stages of the next fiscal year, while
unencumbered funding is spent on other factor inputs (Zimmerman, 1976).
Balakrishnan, Soderstrom, and West (2007) confirm similar saving-dissaving behavior at
U.S. Army Hospitals as administrators stockpiled pharmaceuticals and supplies at fiscal
year-end and then consumed the stockpile as uncertainty abated in the succeeding
fiscal year.
Agency officials and resource managers spend funding on goods and services
toward the accomplishment of organizational missions; thus, holding funds in abeyance
amounts to unused capacity. While the academic study of budgeting has been
concerned largely with budget preparation (McCaffery & Mutty, 1999), the study of
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excess capacity in the context of budget execution resides primarily in managerial
accounting literature.
Ng and Lee (1999) explores the use of idle capacity as a strategic resource which
helps service firms to reduce costs, enhance service quality, and increase customer
loyalty. Balakrishnan and Sprinkle (2002) develop a framework which integrates profit
variation analysis and capacity costing to help managers identify the cost of unused
capacity. They report that the overproduction of inventory in absorption costing
systems facilitates the transfer of capacity costs across periods which, in turn, affects
reported income. Balanchandran, Li, and Radhakrishnan (2007) also develop a
framework for reporting unused capacity costs. The authors write that firms build-in
excess capacity to plan for future growth of the organization as well as to accommodate
uncertainty caused by fluctuating demand and variance in internal processing times.
The framework disaggregates unused capacity from production costs and categorizes
the capacity into five distinct categories.
Cooper and Kaplan (1992) offers a simplified framework of unused capacity that
is most applicable to the discussion at hand. From an Activity Based Costing
perspective, the insight that measurement of unused capacity links the cost of resources
used to the cost of resources available leads the authors to develop the following
framework:
Activity Available = Activity Utilized + Unused Capacity
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Modifying Cooper and Kaplan’s formula toward the spending concerns of federal
agencies yields the following equation:
Funding Allotment = Expenditures + Contingency Fund
In this setup, the annual or quarterly funding allotment provides the parameters for
available activities, expenditures signifies the utilization of activity, and contingency fund
connotes unused capacity.
In the same way that variations in Activity Utilized affect Unused Capacity,
changes in agency expenditure patterns should influence an agency’s contingency fund.
By examining how resource managers adjust obligation patterns to accommodate the
implementation of spending restrictions, one may also gain insight to how agencies
employ unused capacity. An appreciation of both should foster an understanding of the
effects of continuing appropriations acts on agency spending behavior.
What is needed, then, is a standardized method of studying the expenditures of
disparate federal agencies. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) tracks federal
government obligations by object class (Office of Management and Budget, 2012). Since
all federal agencies must record expenditures using the same accounting nomenclature,
examining the results of other GAO performance audits through the lens of OMB
classifications may provide a method toward isolating and quantifying the effects of
continuing resolutions. In other words, examining how agencies spend appropriations
may provide insight to how organizations adjust operations to accommodate for
spending restrictions associated with continuing resolutions.
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OMB relies on four classification systems to track and analyze federal spending.
The character classification or character class is used to aggregate and analyze budget
authority, outlays, and offsetting receipts devoted to investment and non-investment
activities. Investments include those expenditures which yield future benefits such as
the construction, purchase, or rehabilitation of physical assets; the emption of research
and development; or the attainment of education and training. Non-investment
activities include certain grants to state and local governments or those outlays which
are not otherwise classified as investments. Functional class also captures budget
authority, outlays, and offsetting receipts, and is a field of input to OMB’s Budget Data
System which is used to collect and process information for the preparation of the
budget. Functional classifications are designed to inform OMB and the Congressional
Budget Office of the major purpose served by a given expenditure such as national
defense, health, or agriculture. The program activity classification captures direct and
reimbursable obligations incurred for specific activities or projects, such as The
American Competitiveness Initiative or the Cooperative Extensions System, listed in the
program and financing schedules of the president’s budget. (GAO, 2005a; Office of
Management and Budget, 2012). While these three methods of classification help to
categorize federal spending, they do not provide a level of granularity sufficient to
analyze unused capacity.
Object class, on the other hand, also captures obligations but is a method of
classification that provides very detailed information about agency expenditures.
Federal agencies use object classes not only during budget preparation, but also as the
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primary means of recording agency obligations. In addition, object classifications inform
the reader of the type of goods, services, or items purchased, such as supplies, rent, or
equipment (see Appendix B for a list of object classes). What is more, public law 31
U.S.C 1104(b) mandates the presentation of expenditures by object class in the
president’s budget submission ("Budget and Appropriations Authority of the President,"
2007; GAO, 2005a).
Re-categorizing by object class, a previous sampling of GAO findings and
associated agency remarks related to continuing resolutions reveals that the effects of
spending constraints may tend to manifest most often in contractual services, personnel
compensation, and acquisition of assets accounts 14. Brass (2010) reviews a 20-year
sample of GAO performance audits which made mention of the effects of continuing
resolutions on agency operations. Brass evaluated and divided remarks made by agency
officials about the effects of continuing resolutions into two categories: (1) effects
attributed to the funding levels of continuing resolutions, and (2) effects attributed to
funding uncertainty generated by continuing resolutions. Unfortunately, categorizing
the effects in such a non-standardized manner may introduce a degree of ambiguity to
the taxonomy. For example, in one instance agency officials working at the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) delayed a national training seminar because they
were uncertain whether funding levels would be adequate when it came time to travel

14

The four major categories of object class are personnel compensation and benefits; contractual services
and supplies; acquisition of assets; and grants and fixed charges (refer to Appendix B for a table of
subcategories).
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to the seminar (GAO, 2004c). Comments such as these could be classified in either or
both of Brass’ categories.
A less ambiguous method of classification would be to organize the effects of the
spending restrictions by object class. Using object classification to categorize the
remarks of agency officials from the HHS example above enables one to assign the
effects of spending restrictions to discrete categories of expenditure. To illustrate,
cancellation or rescheduling of travel arrangements would manifest in object class 21:
Travel and transportation of persons, while obligations related to the amendment or
cancellation of reservations for a training venue might manifest in object class 25.2:
Other services from non-federal sources. Assigning the remarks of agency officials to a
discrete category of effect diminishes the levels of subjectivity in the classification
process and may enable one to formulate suppositions regarding how agencies respond
to spending constraints.
Considering the GAO audits by way of this re-categorization, shows that, with
regard to contractual services and supplies, continuing resolutions contributed to delays
in contract deliverables (GAO, 2003b) and the award of contracts (GAO, 2009a);
deferment of re-engineering/transformation of business operations (GAO, 2003a,
2003d); postponement of employee training (GAO, 2004c, 2007a); and the underexecution of agency funds (GAO, 1999, 2004a).
In personnel compensation and benefits accounts, continuing resolutions made
it difficult to keep pace with attrition and retirement rates (GAO, 2007a, 2007b) and
impeded the hiring process by way of moratoriums on hiring (GAO, 2003e, 2006).
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Agencies also experienced delays in the transfer of funds intended for hiring (GAO,
2004b) or simply did not have time to bring the requisite number of personnel on-board
after receiving regular appropriations late in the fiscal year (GAO, 2003c, 2004f).
With regard to acquisition of assets accounts, continuing resolutions delayed
military construction efforts associated with Base Realignment and Closure (GAO,
2007c), prompted the internal reprogramming of agency funds to help cover expenses
(GAO, 1998) and suspended the issuance of mortgage guarantees (GAO, 2005b, 2005c).
Referring to Appendix B, one will readily see that each one of the remarks above
falls into a discrete category of object class. Obligations related to the hiring, furlough,
and retirement of personnel, travel arrangements, the purchase of supplies and
equipment, and the letting of contracts are all captured on a monthly basis by the
budgeting and resource management offices in federal agencies.
A temporal analysis of agency obligations, by object class, might then reveal
patterns in agency spending that tend to coincide with the instances of continuing
resolutions. With regard to unused capacity, the purchase of supplies and materials is
captured under object class 26. If agency officials do engage in the transfer of costs
across periods, such conventions of saving-dissaving should be evident through timeseries analysis of the supplies and materials object class. Assuming, then, that resource
managers do accumulate and transfer unused capacity in the form of stockpiled
inventory, incorporating the instances of continuing resolutions into the quantitative
analysis should reveal variations in the agency’s unused capacity. In this fashion, not
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only is quantitative investigation of the effects of continuing resolutions on federal
spending possible, but also it would further the study of budget execution.

Discussion
Continuing resolutions are usually mentioned in the context of congressional
budgetary procedures (Hartman, 1982) or as part of the appropriations process (Fenno,
1966; Heniff, 2010; McCaffery & Mutty, 1999; Myers, et al., 1989; Schick, 1995, 2000,
2007). Occasionally, the focus turns to the influence of stopgap measures on
managerial decision-making (GAO, 2009b; I. Rubin, 2007). Much of the discussion
revolves around a historical recounting of budgetary events (Schick, 1980) with the most
critical work following closely on the heels of high-profile episodes such as President
Reagan’s January 1988 State of the Union Address (Devins, 1988; Joe White, 1988) or
the 1996 shutdown of the federal government (Streeter, 1996).
Absent from the field of budget research are quantitative analyses of the effects
of continuing appropriations on the spending behavior, the hiring practices, the letting
of contracts, and the general day-to-day operations of federal agencies. Given the
discussion above, one might conclude that the amorphous nature of continuing
resolutions and the differences among federal agencies preclude quantitative empirical
study. However, the writings of scholars and the testimony of agency officials would
suggest otherwise. No matter how one might view stopgap measures, all assessments
seem to reach the common conclusion that continuing resolutions generate budget
uncertainty. Moreover, despite a variety of organizational missions, all agencies
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encounter similar difficulties when it comes to the implementation of spending
restrictions and all federal agencies classify expenditures in a standardized fashion.
Thus, this chapter demonstrates that by reorganizing existing case study literature and
peering through the lens of a standardized accounting classification system, one may
gain insight as to where the effects of uncertainty engendered by continuing resolutions
tend to manifest in federal spending patterns. Such an approach not only facilitates
quantitative research, but also links an output of the legislative branch to a related
outcome in the executive branch.
A manner by which to analyze the effects of stopgap measures on agency
spending behavior might include event study methodologies. Broadly, event studies
explore whether a particular event influences some outcome (Wooldridge, 2009). In
researching market anticipation of common stock splits, Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll
(1969) is widely viewed as a landmark study (Corrado, 2011) if not the seminal work on
event study methodologies (J. J. Binder, 1998; Sandler & Sandler, 2012). Since the work
of Fama and colleagues, the techniques have been applied successfully across several
fields. From a federal policy perspective, Denison (2000) investigates the 1994 Orange
County, California bankruptcy that ultimately resulted from an increase in the discount
rate charged by the Federal Reserve Bank. Rose (1985) investigates the effects of motor
carrier deregulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission on the stock prices of
publicly traded trucking companies. Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2012) estimates the
effects of the Food Stamp Program (FSP) on work incentives to reveal an absence of
trends in outcome variables prior to introduction of the FSP and sharp changes in labor
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supply after food stamps are introduced. Another event study related to the
introduction of the FSP finds benefits of increased birth weight and improvements in
neonatal mortality (Almond, Hoynes, & Schanzenbach, 2010), while Hoynes, Page, and
Stevens (2011) discovers similar increases in birth weight with the implementation of
the Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC).
In the context of federal spending, event study methods should enable one to
explore whether the implementation of continuing appropriations influences
expenditure outcomes. In other words, since continuing resolutions have a common
implementation date (i.e., the first day of the fiscal year or thereabouts), one may be
able to explore the likelihood that the federal resource management community, in
anticipation of continuing resolutions, engages in expense shifting by stockpiling
supplies at the end of the fiscal year or through early renewal of annual contracts. Such
is the focus of chapter five. Before embarking upon quantitative analysis, though, the
next chapter seeks to address questions pertaining to the modification of agency
expenditure behavior when subject to the constraints of a continuing resolution.
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Chapter Four
Continuing Resolutions and Lump-Sum Appropriations: An Arithmetic Notion of How
Federal Agency Officials Might React to Interim Spending Restrictions

Introduction
While continuing appropriations have been in use since the late 1800s, very little
has been published in the way of theoretical frameworks regarding the effect of these
measures on the expenditure behavior of agency officials. Therefore, the material in
this chapter reflects an attempt to address the manner by which bureaucratic agencies
rely on contingency funds to mitigate the uncertainty that accompanies the
implementation of continuing resolutions.
The purpose of this chapter is to construct a theory regarding the modification of
expenditure behavior of agency officials who are confronted with a continuing
appropriations act. Program managers in the federal resource management community
often operate in an uncertain budgetary environment which requires the employment
of contingency budgeting. The analysis that follows theorizes that resource managers
attempt to mitigate the uncertainty associated with continuing resolutions by using
contingency funds to stockpile additional stores of inventories and contract services.
Those additional stores are carried across fiscal year boundaries and subsequently used
to afford the agency spending latitude while under the constraints of continuing
appropriations.
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The efforts below are an attempt to combine and build upon the works of Leland,
Zimmerman, and Cooper and Kaplan by way of a theoretical model of ex ante and ex
post reactions of federal agency officials to interim continuing resolutions in the context
of single-year lump-sum appropriations. The next section of the chapter summarizes
the literature which is most relevant to the theory, and the third section presents the
foundational assumptions upon which the theory is based. The fourth section models
agency spending in absence of continuing resolutions, while the fifth section introduces
continuing resolutions and analyzes the modification of expenditure behavior. The
discussion section relaxes base assumptions one and two, and explores the limitations
of the model in a line-item budget setting and under a multi-year lump sum
appropriation. The final section concludes.

Precautionary demand for saving and its link to contingency funding
Hayne Leland (1968) pioneered the precautionary demand for saving; that is, the
extra saving that occurs as a result of uncertainty in future income. Using a two-period
model of consumption, Leland showed that risk aversion alone is an insufficient
condition to guarantee a level of saving above that which already occurs for the
consumer who prefers to avoid simple risk. To guarantee an increase in the consumer’s
saving rate, uncertainty of second period income is the necessary element in the twoperiod model. By Leland’s account, a positive third derivative of the consumer’s strictly
increasing and strictly concave utility function reflects a positive precautionary demand
for saving.
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Jerold Zimmerman (1976) applied Leland’s theory to the resource allocation
decisions of a nonprofit organization in a fixed-budget setting. Zimmerman’s work
pertains to those bureaucratic organizations which: (1) are subject to a strict fiscal year
budget constraint, and (2) impose loss functions to budget deficits and surpluses.
Budget uncertainty and/or expenditure uncertainty impels risk-averse managers to
defer expenditures to later periods in the fiscal year, thereby disrupting the prearranged
sequencing of expenditures. This type of postponement is commonly referred to as
contingency budgeting and takes the following form:
𝜕𝐶𝑡∗ (𝜑𝑡 )
<0
𝜕𝜎 2 �𝐵� |𝜑𝑡 �

(1)

Where, 𝐶𝑡∗ signifies planned expenditures in period t; 𝜑𝑡 is the current information set
regarding the budget; 𝐵� is a random variable which represents the fiscal budget; and

𝜎 2 �𝐵� |𝜑𝑡 � indicates the conditional variance of the budget given the current information
set (Zimmerman, 1976).

Equation (1) exhibits decreasing utility of planned expenditures associated with
increases in conditional variance of the budget. In other words, as uncertainty
increases, risk-averse bureau managers will cut back on expenditures to save money for
unforeseen circumstances. Zimmerman further stipulates that a portion of the deferred
expenditures are used at year-end to purchase durable inventories, which are then
stored and subsequently consumed during the first month of the next fiscal year. Those
funds in the new fiscal year, which become unencumbered as a result of the dissaving
associated with the stores of durable inventories, are then applied to other factor inputs
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(Zimmerman, 1976). Balakrishnan, Soderstrom, and West analyze spending patterns at
U.S. Army Hospitals and confirm Zimmerman’s saving-dissaving results.
Recall that Schick (2007) dispels the notion that contingency budgeting is akin to
wasteful government spending, referring to the practice, instead, as prudent financial
management of limited resources. Indeed, the establishment of contingency funds may
be in the best interest of rational economic actors (Lowe & Shaw, 1968) because these
reserves can have a stabilizing influence for the organization during downward trends
(Cyert & March, 1963). As such, contingency funding may be effectively set aside by
understating revenues and overstating costs in the planning process (Douglas & Benson,
2000); changing levels of efficiency or building slack into standards (Onsi, 1973); or
through the establishment of withhold accounts that are visible to the division
comptroller yet indiscernible at aggregate levels of the budget (Merchant, 1985;
Resource Management Officer Interview, 2014).
Because the monies that are set aside for unforeseen events will still be used at
some point in the associated fiscal year to accomplish organizational goals and
objectives, contingency funding may be understood also as idle capacity. As mentioned
in the previous chapter, Cooper and Kaplan’s (1992) activity-based costing framework of
unused capacity portrays an additive relationship between utilized activity and unused
capacity which has implications for the overall activities of the organization:
Activity Available = Activity Utilized + Unused Capacity.
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(2a)

Equation (2a) can easily be modified to suit the needs of federal agencies
Funding Allotment = Expenditures + Contingency Fund.

(2b)

The discussion that follows will examine how bureaucratic resource managers
adjust agency expenditures to mitigate the additional uncertainty that accompanies the
implementation of continuing appropriations acts.

Base assumptions of the model
The theoretical construct rests on three overarching assumptions which govern
spending behavior of agency officials in federal organizations. The three following
assumptions are related to the fiscal operating capacity of the organization, the limited
timeframe for budgetary execution to which the organization is confined, and the
punitive element associated with a violation of budgetary constraints.
First, assume the organization in question is a federal agency at the cabinet-level
or below which, in aggregate, receives funding in the form of lump-sum appropriations
from Congress. To be clear, a lump-sum appropriation is a sum of money intended to
cover a number of specific programs, projects, or items (GAO, 2004e). Further, the
agency has no means of revenue generation; instead, the agency ultimately receives
funding by way of a series of apportionments and/or allotments distributed to the
agency in equal amounts over the course of the fiscal year.
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Assume also that the organization is unable to carryover unused funding into the
next fiscal year. Because of this single-year limitation on funding, unobligated resources
will be an impetus for budgetary reductions in subsequent fiscal years. Recall that
annual appropriations lapse on the final day of the fiscal year so an organization must
spend one hundred percent of allocated funding by year-end close-out (Schick, 2007;
Zimmerman, 1976). Unused funding, then, is perceived as a surplus resource which will
revert back to the United States Treasury. Accordingly, the funding agency to which the
organization is subordinate may reduce organizational funding in subsequent fiscal
years by the amount of the surplus (Wildavsky & Caiden, 2004; Zimmerman, 1976).
Base assumptions one and two, together, narrow the field of funding possibilities
to those lump-sum amounts that are appropriated by Congress and are intended to
fund day-to-day activities over the course of a single fiscal year.15
Finally, assume that the organization is strictly prohibited from exceeding
obligation limits by way of statutory provisions and institutional mechanisms. In
addition to the statutory prohibitions of the Antideficiency Act, other mechanisms, such
as congressional retribution through budgetary reduction or line-item restriction (GAO,
2004e; Schick, 2007), negative personnel evaluations (Balakrishnan, et al., 2007), the
threat of audit of budgetary procedures, and the loss of public confidence (Zimmerman,

15

“Salaries and Expenses,” “Operating Expenses,” or “Operation and Maintenance” appropriations are
examples of lump-sum appropriations which are valid for a single fiscal year only and are intended for
day-to-day operations. Further, the Governmental Accountability Office defines a lump-sum
appropriation as “one that is made to cover a number of specific programs, projects, or items (GAO,
2004e)” The discussion section provides additional information on both lump-sum and line-item
appropriations.
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1976) provide strong incentives for managers to adhere to budgetary constraints even
though it may not be economically optimal to do so. To gauge the applicability of the
model, base assumptions one and two will be relaxed in a subsequent section, but
because base assumption three is a legal constraint it will not be relaxed.
With these foundational assumptions in mind, the following theoretical
discussion addresses the spending behavior of federal agency officials under two
different budgetary scenarios. Scenario one illustrates how an organization might
operate over the course of three consecutive fiscal years in a relatively unrestricted, yet
uncertain operating environment. With that simplified budgetary backdrop in mind,
scenario two introduces the implementation of an interim continuing appropriations act
at the outset of the second fiscal year. This approach enables a formulation of
suppositions regarding ex ante and ex post reactions of agency officials to: (1) a onetime occurrence of continuing resolutions, and (2) an environment of regularly occurring
interim continuing resolutions.

Scenario one: federal spending in absence of continuing resolutions
Year one: lump-sum budget without spending restrictions
Assume that on the first day of the first fiscal year, FY, agency officials have full
knowledge of the organization’s total annual budget, BT. BT can be thought of in terms
of the final disposition of the organization’s budget where subscript T signifies the total
number of time periods into which the fiscal year is divided. While the fiscal year may
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be divided into quarters, T is equal to 12 here to indicate the number of months in a
given fiscal year and to facilitate exposition. The notion that an organization might be
fully informed of its total annual budget at the outset of the fiscal year refers to the
signing into law of annual appropriations for FYj prior to the start of the fiscal year, say
during the fourth quarter of FYj-1.
The organization receives a share of annual appropriations in the form of
monthly allotments from a headquarters-type agency. Recall also that OMB apportions
appropriations to federal agencies by periods within the fiscal year to prevent
premature exhaustion of resources (GAO, 2004e; Schick, 2007). Apportionments are
then subdivided by a headquarters-type entity and distributed to subordinate
organizations by way of a stream of budgetary allotments, At, where subscript t refers to
an incremental timeframe. Allotments in aggregate equal the total organizational
budget such that

Alternatively,

𝐴𝑡 =

𝐵𝑇
𝑇

12

� 𝐴𝑡 = 𝐵𝑇

(3a)

(3b)

𝑡=1

The organization then uses At to purchase a vector of routine services, S, which
enable the day-to-day operation of organizational activities. These services may include
expenses such as wages and benefits for personnel, official travel, minor transportation
of goods (i.e., bills of lading), and payment of utilities. Once purchased, utilization of
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these services cannot be carried forward into subsequent periods and it is assumed that
the organization fully consumes S during the month in which the services are purchased.
The agency also uses At for the regular purchase of a broad vector of tangible
goods, G, such as general office supplies, cleaning and toilet materials, copier paper,
medical supplies (for hospital-type organizations, of course), motor oil and petroleum
products (for organizations with motor pools), and incidental equipment purchases16.
Once purchased, these assets can be utilized over the course of multiple periods. For
the purpose of the discussion in scenario one, however, assume that G is sufficiently
depleted each period to the extent that the organization must restock G at the end of
period t.
In addition, the organization sets aside a portion of At for contingencies, C.
Assume that the contingency fund is figured as a fixed nominal percentage of At, and is
used to mitigate small emergencies and unforeseen events. Following Leland (1968)
and Zimmerman (1976), contingency funds constitute a cautionary demand for saving
on behalf of the agency director or budget official. Recall also that unused contingency
funds may accumulate, over the course of the fiscal year, in non-interest bearing
accounts which are internal to the agency’s accounting scheme. During the final period
of the fiscal year, unspent contingency balances are fully drawn-down through the
purchase of additional S in the form of monetary bonuses and incentive/performance
16

To clarify, the term tangible goods is used in this context to describe a set of assets, such as those listed
above, which an agency might purchase for use within, say, one or two calendar years. These tangible
goods stand in contrast to conventional durable goods, such as construction equipment, which an agency
might purchase with procurement funding. Incidentally, Congress segregates procurement funding and
salaries & expenses funding into separate appropriations (DFAS, 2012).
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awards to employees or additional business travel, and/or via the purchase of additional
G in the form of year-end expenditures on equipment such as additional desktop
computers, or minor upgrades and repairs to the organization’s working environment 17.
Accordingly, utilization of the agency’s monthly budget allotment can be thought
of in the fashion of a budget constraint similar to equation (4).
(4)

𝐴𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡 + 𝐶𝑡

Rearranging terms in (4) so that expenditures, S and G, are on the right-hand
side of the equation, as presented in (5a) and (5b), not only separates the contingency
fund from budgetary obligations, but also creates a distinction between allotments and
expenditures, E.
𝐴𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡

(5a)

𝐸𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡

(5b)

To keep matters simple, equation (6a) embodies the assumption that agency
officials engage in a uniform level of spending during the first eleven months of the first
fiscal year. Hence, budgetary allotments will exceed monthly expenditures by the
amount of funding accrued in the contingency fund.
11

11

11

11

11

𝑡=1

𝑡=1

𝑡=1

𝑡=1

𝑡=1

� 𝐴𝑡 − � 𝐶𝑡 = � 𝐸𝑡 = � 𝑆𝑡 + � 𝐺𝑡
17

(6a)

Federal personnel, to include Senior Executive Service (SES) members, may receive cash in the form of
incentive and performance awards (DFAS, 2012)
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11

11

𝑡=1

𝑡=1

(6b)

� 𝐴𝑡 > � 𝐸𝑡

Equation (7) shows that month 12 expenditures exceed the budgetary allotment
in month 12 by the sum total of the amount accrued in the contingency fund. In the
absence of unforeseen events, officials will have continued to accrue contingency
funding which, if unspent, will revert back to the U.S. Treasury. To avoid losing these
funds and risking budgetary reductions in subsequent fiscal years, agency officials will
engage in year-end spending in order to fully deplete reserve funding (Balakrishnan, et
al., 2007; McCaffery & Mutty, 1999; Zimmerman, 1976)18. The agency does so by using
the accrued contingency funds to purchase additional goods and services, as in equation
(7)
11

𝐴12 < 𝐸12 = 𝑆12 + 𝐺12 + � 𝐶𝑡
𝑡=1

(7)

where ∑11
𝑡=1 𝐶𝑡 would be divided among additional purchases of S and/or G at the

discretion of agency officials. 19 The concept of allocating contingency fund balances

18

This effort to deplete reserve funding is the spike in expenditure rates referred to in the Obligation
section of chapter 2, or the year-end “bulge” in expenditures that Schick (2007) refers to as the end result
of prudent financial management on the part of the program managers.
19
The assumption of uniform spending for the first 11 months of the fiscal year with year-end spending
confined to month 12 is made to exemplify the model. Agency officials may spread year-end purchases
over a number of months but incorporating such an approach here would introduce unnecessary
complications to the model. What is more, McCaffery and Mutty (1999) and Balakrishnan, Soderstrom,
and West (2007) present evidence that the bulk of year-end purchases are made during the final month
of the fiscal year.
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across purchases of S and G will be integral to an appreciation of equations (10a), (10b),
and (10c) below.
On the final day of the fiscal year, the sum total of expenses must equal the sum
total of budgetary allotments which, in turn, must also equal the agency’s total annual
budget, as in equation (8).
12

12

𝑡=1

𝑡=1

� 𝐴𝑡 = � 𝐸𝑡 = 𝐵𝑇

(8)

Years two and three: lump-sum budget without spending restrictions
With the timely approval of the annual appropriations act by Congress and the
subsequent signing into law of appropriations by the president, the process will simply
repeat itself during the second and third fiscal years, FYj+1 and FYj+2, respectively.

Scenario two: Implementation of a continuing resolution in the second fiscal year.
Year one: ex ante reaction to continuing appropriations
To consider the possible ex ante and ex post reactions of agency officials to the
implementation of partial-year spending restrictions, assume agency officials learn of a
pending budget impasse during the third quarter of FYj and are able to determine that
the organization will open FYj+1 under the constraints of an interim continuing
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appropriations act. Officials will react to this development by devoting a portion of the
agency’s contingency funding to purchase an additional stockpile of G.
Similar to the setting in scenario one, the agency will use allotted funding to
purchase routine levels of S and G, and accrue contingency funds as the fiscal year
progresses. Budget allotments will continue to exceed expenditures during, say, the
first ten months of FYj. 20
10

10

10

10

10

𝑡=1

𝑡=1

𝑡=1

𝑡=1

𝑡=1

� 𝐴𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗 − � 𝐶𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗 = � 𝐸𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗 = � 𝑆𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗 + � 𝐺𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗
10

10

𝑡=1

𝑡=1

� 𝐴𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗 > � 𝐸𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗

(9a)

(9b)

Upon learning of the impending continuing resolution, organization officials will
begin to stockpile additional levels of G. To help distinguish between that portion of G
purchased for routine business operations from that fraction of G intended for stockpile,
the former segment will continue to be referred to as G, while the latter will be denoted
using R, for reserve.21 To acquire R, the agency must forego the accrual of C11, FYj to

20

The 10-month timeframe used in equations (9a) and (9b) is an arbitrary figure. Agency officials would,
of course, begin to stockpile sundries at any time after making a determination regarding continuing
resolutions. The discussion herein assumes normal and uniform operations during the first 10 months of
the fiscal year; discretely assigns a lump-sum purchase of reserves to month 11; and confines year-end
purchases to month 12 to help illustrate the concept.
21
Agency officials would not typically partition supplies and the like into discrete bundles labeled
“routine” and “stockpile.” That convention is employed here, again, to facilitate explanation.
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purchase R11, FYj, with the underlying assumption that C11, FYj = R11, FYj. Month 11
expenditures, then, will equal month 11 allotments as portrayed in equation (10a).
𝐴11,𝐹𝑌𝑗 = 𝐸11,𝐹𝑌𝑗 = 𝑆11,𝐹𝑌𝑗 + �𝐺11,𝐹𝑌𝑗 + 𝑅11,𝐹𝑌𝑗 �

(10a)

Alternately, if agency officials feel compelled to accumulate an even larger
stockpile of tangible goods, they may do so by drawing-down contingency funding by
discretionary amounts, CѲ, as shown in equations (10b) and (10c).
𝐴11,𝐹𝑌𝑗 < 𝐸11,𝐹𝑌𝑗 = 𝑆11,𝐹𝑌𝑗 + �𝐺11,𝐹𝑌𝑗 + 𝑅′11,𝐹𝑌𝑗 �

(10b)

Where
11

11

𝑡=1

𝑡=1

𝑅′11,𝐹𝑌𝑗 = � 𝐶𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗 − �� 𝐶𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗 − �𝐶11,𝐹𝑌𝑗 + 𝐶𝜃,𝐹𝑌𝑗 ��

(10c)

It is important to recall that unused contingency funds are drawn down in the final
month of the fiscal year through the purchase of additional S as well as additional G;
therefore, to purchase a stockpile of R and R’, agency officials must forego the purchase
of some level of additional S at the end of the fiscal year.
Similar to equation (7), equation (11) shows that month 12 expenditures will
again exceed budgetary allotments by the sum total of the contingency funds remaining
as agency officials take up year-end spending.
11

𝐴12,𝐹𝑌𝑗 < 𝐸12,𝐹𝑌𝑗 = 𝑆12,𝐹𝑌𝑗 + 𝐺12,𝐹𝑌𝑗 + �� 𝐶𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗 − 𝑅11,𝐹𝑌𝑗 �
𝑡=1
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(11)

The notion that agency officials might stockpile additional tangible goods, in
anticipation of a continuing resolution, leads to the first testable hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: When a continuing resolution is on the horizon for the coming fiscal
year, the rate of spending on tangible goods during the final quarter of the
terminating fiscal year will exceed the rate of spending on tangible goods for the
corresponding timeframe when a continuing resolution will not be in effect in the
coming fiscal year.

On the final day of FYj, the sum total of allotments, expenses, and total agency
budget would equate to each other, as can be seen in equation (12).
12

12

𝑡=1

𝑡=1

� 𝐴𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗 = � 𝐸𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗 = 𝐵𝑇,𝐹𝑌𝑗

(12)

Year two: implementation of interim continuing appropriations and ex post reaction.
The agency will begin FYj+1 under the restrictions of an interim continuing
resolution and must restrict spending to prior year levels. Interim continuing
resolutions provide for an attenuated level of operations until a specific date or until
regular appropriations are passed. Agencies may be instructed to limit spending to the
lesser of the House- or Senate-approved versions of the applicable appropriations bill,
or the previous year’s rate of spending (Pulmonte, 2011; I. Rubin, 2007; Streeter, 2008b;
Tollestrup, 2011). In keeping with previous findings (Hartman, 1982; Lee, et al., 2008; I.
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Rubin, 2007; Schick, 2007; Streeter, 2008a; Wildavsky & Caiden, 2004), the discussion
will move forward under the assumption that the agency is restricted to the previous
year’s rate of spending. Using the agency’s prior year obligation rate, in lieu of House or
Senate figures, simply provides a reference point for the model. As such, month 1
expenditures in the new fiscal year will equal the month 1 expenditures from the prior
fiscal year, as displayed in equation (13).
𝐸1,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 = 𝐸1,𝐹𝑌𝑗 = 𝑆1,𝐹𝑌𝑗 + 𝐺1,𝐹𝑌𝑗

(13)

The idea that agency spending, while under an interim continuing resolution, is
tied to the previous fiscal year’s rate of spending informs the second testable
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: While under a continuing resolution, the rate of spending on
tangible goods will be less than or equal to the rate of spending on tangible
goods during corresponding periods in the fiscal year void of continuing
resolutions.

While under the constraints of an interim continuing resolution, the stockpile
provides agency officials with a degree of spending latitude. The spending restrictions
allow the agency to perform at routine levels of operation but without the benefit of a
contingency fund to offset unforeseen events. Because of the stockpile of R11, FYj,
however, agency officials have the flexibility to forego the purchase of G1, FYj+1 to the
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extent that R11, FYj would offset the need for G. 22 In other words, the fungible nature of
lump-sum funding allows agency officials to shift monies previously dedicated to the
purchase of G1, FYj+1 over to the purchase of additional S1, FYj+1, or to mitigate a minor
emergency, while still consuming routine levels of G from the stockpile. 23 If the need for
additional S does not become pressing enough to drawdown R11, FYj, the agency would
simply maintain R11,FYj until after Congress and the president provide regular
appropriations.
Assume, then, that the president signs the associated appropriations act into law
at the end of the first month of FYj+1 and the agency is allowed to resume normal
operations for the remainder of the fiscal year. In keeping with a simplified discussion,
assume further that the agency does not receive an increase in appropriations over FYj
levels. That is to say, the current year’s budget is equal to the prior year’s budget, as in
equation (14).
𝐵𝑇,𝐹𝑌𝑗 = 𝐵𝑇,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1

(14)

The FYj+1 monthly budget allotment, for the remainder of the fiscal year, will
increase by the amount withheld from the agency while under the restrictions of the
continuing resolution. Referring to equation (3a), the monthly budget allotment under
22

Unexecuted single-year funding cannot be carried across fiscal year boundaries, but executed funding in
the form of supply inventories can be. Zimmerman (1976) discusses transfers between fiscal years and
submits that “excess funds can only be ‘saved’ in the form of durable goods [and an] implication is that
spending in the first month of the next fiscal year is curtailed since the group can maintain operations by
consuming the durable inventories acquired in the previous year.”
23
The shifting of expenditures mentioned above should not be confused with transfers. The transfer of
funds refers to the shifting of funds between appropriations which is prohibited without statutory
authority (GAO, 2004e). Closely related to the discussion above is the practice of reprogramming, which
the GAO defines as a shifting of funds from one object to another within an appropriation (GAO, 2004e).
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scenario one was computed by dividing the total agency budget by the total number of
applicable time periods. A similar computation applies to scenario two, but the
aggregate FYj+1 allotment is now reduced by the amount of expenditures accrued while
under continuing resolutions and then spread evenly across a fewer number of time
periods, as figured in equation (15).

𝐴𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 =

𝐶𝑅
𝐵𝑇 − ∑𝑡=1
𝐸𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1

𝑇 − 𝐶𝑅

(15)

Where CR signifies the total number of months spent under the continuing
resolution.
Thus, by virtue of equation (15), the FYj+1 monthly budgetary allotment will be
marginally higher than the FYj monthly budgetary allotment.
𝐴𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 > 𝐴𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗

(16)

In the second month of FYj+1, the allotment will continue to exceed expenditures,
but the agency will purchase higher levels of S by curtailing the purchase of G, thereby
making-up for services foregone in the previous fiscal year; will deplete R through
dissaving; and will resume the accrual of C at a marginally higher level. One may arrive
at this notion by holding the purchase of S, in equation (4) constant at FYj levels and by
figuring C as a deterministic percentage of At. In so doing, one may contemplate the
behavior of agency officials with regard to the purchase of additional amounts of S, visà-vis the curtailment of G.
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With the passage of the appropriations act, uncertainty about BT will dissipate
and agency personnel will consume the balance of R through dissaving which would
preclude the need to purchase some or all of G2, FYj+1 (Balakrishnan, et al., 2007;
Zimmerman, 1976). Thus, funding intended for the purchase of G2, FYj+1 will then be
diverted to either additional C2, FYj+1 or S2, FYj+1. Using the funds to accrue additional C
would ensure that the agency is that much more prepared to weather an unforeseen
event. However, the purchase of additional S presents agency officials with two
advantages. First, in the short-term, the consumption of additional levels of S will help
meet operational needs of the agency through the provision of, say, additional official
travel or employee training. Second, in the long-term, S2, FYj+1 expenditures will be
higher by the amount of G2, FYj+1 diverted to S2, FYj+1, and this diversion will help to
maintain month two buying power in the event of continuing appropriations in FYj+2.
The argument is restated below in more arithmetic terms.
First, recall equation (4)
𝐴𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡 + 𝐶𝑡

(4)

Assume the agency receives month two allotment, A2, FYj+1, which will be
marginally higher than A1, FYj, subject to equations (13) and (14)

Assuming:

𝐴2,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 = 𝑆2,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 + 𝐺2,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 + 𝐶2,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1

𝑆2,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 = 𝑆2,𝐹𝑌𝑗
𝐺2,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 = 0, as the agency depletes 𝑅11,𝐹𝑌𝑗 through dissaving.
𝐶2,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 = a fixed nominal percentage of 𝐴2,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1
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(17a)
(17b)
(17c)
(17d)

Agency officials must now determine how best to use the funds originally
intended for the purchase of G2, FYj+1. Accruing additional levels of C places the
organization in a much better position to mitigate minor emergencies. However,
referring to equation (5b), additional accrual of C will cause E2, FYj to exceed E2, FYj+1.
Should the agency be subject to continuing resolutions in FYj+2, organizational
expenditures will be limited to the E2, FYj+1 level. Therefore, it benefits the agency to
purchase additional S2, FYj+1 using the unencumbered G2, FYj+1 funding. It follows, then,
that S2, FYj+1 expenditures will be approximately equal to the sum total of S2, FYj and G2, FYj,
as in equation (17e).
𝑆2,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 ≈ 𝑆2,𝐹𝑌𝑗 + 𝐺2,𝐹𝑌𝑗

(17e)

This line of reasoning leads to two hypotheses that are inversely related.
Hypothesis 3a: The average rate of spending on service-type activities during the
period immediately following the termination of a continuing resolution will
exceed the average rate of spending on service-type activities goods during a
corresponding period of a fiscal year void of continuing resolutions.
Hypothesis 3b: The average rate of spending on tangible goods during the period
immediately following the termination of a continuing resolution will be less than
the average rate of spending on tangible goods during a corresponding period of
a fiscal year void of continuing resolutions.
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Having depleted R11, FYj, agency officials will resume routine spending patterns.
Assuming the FYj+2 appropriations are approved in a timely manner, spending in months
three through eleven, represented by equations (18a) and (18b) will closely resemble
spending in equations (9a) and (9b).
11

11

11

11

11

𝑡=3

𝑡=3

𝑡=3

𝑡=3

𝑡=3

� 𝐴𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 − � 𝐶𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 = � 𝐸𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 = � 𝑆𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 + � 𝐺𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1
11

11

𝑡=3

𝑡=3

(18a)

(18b)

� 𝐴𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗 > � 𝐸𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗
Similar to equation (11), expenditures in the final month of FYj+1 will exceed

budgetary allotments as the organization attends to year-end spending, as in equation
(19).
11

𝐴12,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 < 𝐸12,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 = 𝑆12,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 + 𝐺12,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 + �� 𝐶𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 − 𝑅11,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 �

(19)

𝑡=1

As in equation (12), the agency will have fully executed its total annual budget by
the final day of the fiscal year, and allotments and expenditures should equal the
agency’s total budget per equation (20).
12

12

𝑡=1

𝑡=1

� 𝐴𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 = � 𝐸𝑡,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1 = 𝐵𝑇,𝐹𝑌𝑗+1
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(20)

Year three: routine occurrence of interim continuing appropriations.
Between 1952 and 2010, Congress and the president enacted all regular
appropriations on only four occasions: 1977, 1989, 1995, and 1997. While continuing
resolutions are not applied in a blanket fashion, federal agencies ordinarily spend the
first four months of the fiscal year under the restrictions of a continuing resolution
(Pulmonte, 2011; Streeter, 2008b; Tollestrup, 2011). Thus, it is highly likely that a
federal agency will, at some point, endure consecutive fiscal years under the restraints
of a continuing appropriations act. For this reason, it is necessary to widen the temporal
scope by one more fiscal year to improve the relevance of the model.
As before, assume that agency officials learn of a budget impasse during the
third quarter of the fiscal year. Once again, they ascertain that the organization will
open the fiscal year, this time FYj+2, under a continuing resolution. Depending on their
preferences for risk, officials might pursue one of two courses of action. Those
managers who are risk averse might choose, once more, to stockpile a reserve of
tangible goods to offset the uncertainty inherent with continuing appropriations. Under
this approach, ceteris paribus, equations (9a) through (20) would apply, ad infinitum.
On the other hand, those managers who are risk neutral or risk seeking, viewing
FYj+1 in retrospect, may come to the conclusion that the practice of stockpiling a reserve
of tangible goods presents little, if any, benefit to the organization. While the purchase
of R11,FYj had the effect of shifting expenses from one fiscal year to another, the strategy
merely delayed the consumption of tangible goods for a brief time and forced agency
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officials to defer service-type expenditures. According to this line of thought, the end
result for the organization is a zero-sum gain and, holding all else equal, equations (6a)
through (8) would eventually prevail.

Discussion
The applicability of the model hinges on the fungible nature of the organization’s
resources. In other words, the model is applicable to the extent that an organization is
able to substitute one type of funding for another. Base assumption one presumes that
the organization is funded with a lump-sum appropriation. It follows that discretion
regarding the use of organizational funding lies with agency officials. The lump-sum
assumption, then, begs the degree to which the federal government is funded in this
fashion.
Lump-sum appropriations
Over time, the need for lump-sum appropriations has evolved to the point at
which most discretionary federal expenditures are, indeed, carried-out using lump-sum
appropriations. Up until the twentieth century, it was quite common for the House
Ways and Means and the Senate Finance Committees to rely upon line-item
appropriations to mandate explicitly how agencies were to spend federal dollars. As the
government grew in size and complexity, Congress began to group individual items into
broader classifications of execution; in consequence, lump-sum appropriations arose
out of necessity. Presently, the majority of appropriation accounts in the federal budget
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are funded via lump-sum appropriations. 24 In fact, the federal budget is comprised of
more than 1,000 appropriation accounts, 200 of which account for more than 90
percent of discretionary federal expenditures (GAO, 2004e; Schick, 2007).
In this way, Congress recognizes the organizational need for both money and
administrative discretion to carry-out daily operations. As alluded to in footnote 6,
many federal agencies are appropriated a single Supplies and Expenses account which is
often labeled Operating Expenses or Operation and Maintenance and is to be used for
daily operating expenses (GAO, 2004e; Schick, 2007). Furthermore, as the steward of
the nation’s purse, Congress purposefully accords executive agencies a measure of
flexibility with regard to budget execution. The following excerpt from a 1975
Comptroller General decision regarding the U.S. Navy’s use of Defense Appropriations
and the Navy’s interpretation of the associated conference report, exemplifies the
Government Accountability Office position concerning the legal parameters of lumpsum appropriations (GAO, 2004e).
“Congress has recognized that in most instances it is desirable to
maintain flexibility to shift around funds within a particular lump-sum
appropriation account so that agencies can make necessary adjustments
for ‘unforeseen developments, changing requirements, … and legislation
enacted subsequent to appropriations’ (GAO, 2004e).”

24

An appropriation account such as the Operation and Maintenance, Army appropriation account is the
basic unit of an appropriation (i.e., the Operation and Maintenance Appropriation or the Salaries and
Expenses Appropriation). In general, an appropriation reflects each unnumbered paragraph in an
appropriation act which is the document signed into law by the president (GAO, 2005a).
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By that same token, the Supreme Court ruled that in the absence of detailed
statutory language, decisions related to the allocation of funding within a lump-sum
appropriation are a matter of agency discretion. The case of Lincoln v. Vigil concerned
the Indian Health Service’s discontinuation of a program of clinical services for
handicapped children in the Southwest in order to establish a nationwide treatment
program. The Court was called upon to decide whether the agency was legally
permitted to discontinue the program without seeking judicial review. In its ruling, the
Court noted that,
“The very point of a lump-sum appropriation is to give an agency the
capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and meet its statutory
responsibilities in what it sees as the most effective or desirable way
(GAO, 2004e; U.S. Supreme Court, 1993).”

Therefore, base assumption one is a very realistic and feasible assumption which
need not be relaxed in order for the model to remain applicable. From the argument
above, it is apparent that lump-sum appropriations represent a significant portion of the
federal budget. Moreover, the legislature not only recognizes the need for agency
discretion but also condones administrative flexibility by structuring appropriations in
such a way as to facilitate the fungibility of resources. In addition, the Supreme Court
added legal precedence to the notion that agency officials are perfectly within legal
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parameters when exercising administrative discretion over the use of lump-sum
appropriations.
Line-item appropriations
Still, one may realistically relax base assumption one by introducing line-item
appropriations. While lump-sum appropriations cover a broad number of programs,
projects, or items, line-item appropriations are available only for the specific item
described in the appropriation act (GAO, 2004e). To the extent that legislators desire to
restrict funding or seek to minimize agency discretion with regard to the execution of
federal monies, Congress can and will issue line-item appropriations. The Comptroller
General’s 1975 opinion cited previously also includes a sentiment about Congress’s
prerogative to regulate agency spending.
“When Congress does not intend to permit agency flexibility, but intends
to impose a legally binding restriction on an agency’s use of funds, it does
so by means of explicit statutory language (GAO, 2004e).”

In addition to line-item restrictions, Congress may also delimit spending by way
of provisions in authorization acts or via reference instructions found in conference
reports (GAO, 2004e). Correspondingly, the model above is expected to break down to
the extent that agency officials are unable to exercise administrative discretion.
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Earmarks
A less binding type of restriction that may have similar effects on the model is a
congressional earmark. Before going forward, however, it may be helpful to make a
distinction between line-item appropriations and earmarks. While the terms earmark
and line-item are often used synonymously, the two designations are conceptually
different when used in the context of appropriations. Recall that a line-item
appropriation is a distinct sum of money dedicated toward a specific purpose. An
earmark, however, is an amount of funding within a lump-sum appropriation (GAO,
2004e, 2005a); a specific spending item which will benefit constituents, written into the
bill at the request of a member(s) of Congress (Lazarus & Steigerwalt, 2009). The former
is an appropriation in and of itself, while the latter is a subunit of a lump-sum
appropriation.
Congress may wish to designate part of a lump-sum appropriation for a
particular purpose. Using earmarks, the legislature may specify maximum and/or
minimum levels of spending with regard to certain objects. In relation to the model,
Congress could stipulate that within the Salaries and Expenses appropriation the agency
may spend “not more than” a given dollar amount on office supplies. Referring to
equation (10), a ceiling-type earmark would limit the ability of agency officials to
stockpile semi-durable goods which would cause the model to fail.
It is important to note, however, that a maximum earmark does not imply that
funding must be spent on the object in question. That is to say, funding not used for the
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express purpose stated in the earmark may be applied elsewhere within the
appropriation (GAO, 2004e). In the hypothetical example given, if the funding is not
used for the purchase of office supplies it may be used to purchase small equipment.
Multi-year appropriations
Not all lump-sum appropriations are limited to a single-year of availability; in
fact, there are several types of lump-sum appropriations which operate under multiyear budget authority. Research and development funds are available for two fiscal
years, procurement funding is available for three, and construction and shipbuilding
monies are available for five years (Schick, 2007).
Base assumption two refers to the lapsing of budgets and the inability of
agencies to carry unobligated funding across fiscal year boundaries. By considering the
possible effects of an interim continuing resolution on the obligation behavior of agency
officials managing a multi-year appropriation, it is possible to explore what might
happen with the easing of base assumption two.
Some agencies have reported that having multiyear budget authority helps to
mitigate the effects of continuing resolutions on agency spending behavior. GAO
(2009b) conducted a case study of six federal agencies to evaluate the effects of
continuing appropriations on federal agencies.25 When queried, managers of multi-year
appropriations noted that the ability to carry unspent funding across fiscal year
25

The six agencies included in the GAO case study were: (1) Administration for Children and Families and
(2) Food and Drug Administration, which fall under the Department of Health and Human Services; (3)
Veterans Health Administration and (4) Veterans Benefit Administration under the Department of
Veterans Affairs; and under the Department of Justice, (5) Bureau of Prisons and (6) Federal Bureau of
Investigation (GAO, 2009b; Pulmonte, 2011).
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boundaries alleviated the need to obligate funding before year-end, and provided less of
an incentive to acquire lower priority items which could be obtained quickly.
To illustrate the point, imagine a continuing appropriations act which lasts for
five months (i.e., October thru February). Such a resolution would leave an agency
funded with a single-year appropriation with only seven months remaining in the fiscal
year (i.e., April to September) to execute the remainder of its budget. In contrast, an
agency funded with a two-year appropriation, subject to the same CR, would have
another 19 months before the end of its fiscal cycle (i.e., April to September, plus the
whole of the second fiscal year). In essence, multi-year appropriations may help to
reduce distortions in year-end spending which are brought about by a compressed fiscal
timeframe.
To determine if a multi-year appropriation would produce similar benefits or
disadvantages in the context of the model requires asking whether: (1) an extended
fiscal cycle would preclude the need to stockpile additional tangible goods in light of an
impending interim continuing resolution; (2) a multi-year appropriation would mitigate
spending restrictions in a manner that would relieve agency officials of having to abide
by the previous fiscal year’s obligation rate; and (3) agency personnel would refrain
from consuming a superfluous stockpile of tangible goods on account of multi-year
appropriations. One can explore each of these questions, in turn, through a comparison
of the spending behavior of a single-year- and a multi-year agency over the course of
four fiscal years.
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Assume that Congress funds Agency A with a single-year lump-sum
appropriation and Agency B via a two-year lump-sum appropriation; that is, Agency A’s
funding is valid for 12 months and Agency B’s funding is valid for 24 months. Assume
further that the first and second fiscal years, FYj and FYj+1, pass without the occurrence
of a continuing appropriations act. Now, suppose that Congress implements a
continuing resolution at the outset of FYj+2. Since the close-out of FYj+1 signals the end
of the fiscal cycle for both agencies, officials in both organizations would be subject to
spending restrictions in FYj+2. Consequently, the model predicts that officials in both
agencies would engage in stockpiling of tangible goods; therefore, hypothesis one is
expected to hold.
To address the notion of obligation rate restrictions, imagine that the continuing
resolution lasts for six months. While under the constraint of continuing appropriations,
agencies would be instructed to obligate funding at a rate no greater than the previous
fiscal year. Aside from an extended fiscal cycle, there is nothing inherently special about
multi-year appropriations which would exempt Agency B from having to abide by the
spending limitations. Indeed, the substance of the GAO report cited above suggests that
officials responsible for multi-year appropriations were held to the same restrictive
standard as those officials managing single-year appropriations. While both agencies
are under the restrictions of a continuing resolution, the obligation rates for both
agencies should not differ from the organizational mean by a statistically significant
amount; therefore, hypothesis two is predicted to hold.
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Assume the Congress and the president come to final agreement on the FYj+2
budget, and the continuing resolution is lifted on the final day of March in FYj+2, leaving
6 months for Agency A to execute its budget and Agency B with eighteen months to
execute appropriations. Assuming no crises happen that would compel either agency to
consume stockpile balances during the period under continuing resolution, there is
nothing to suggest that agency officials would not follow the spending behavior detailed
in equations (17a-e). One would expect to find a curtailment of spending on tangible
goods consistent with Zimmerman (1976) and Balakrishnan, Soderstrom, and West
(2007); therefore, hypothesis three is predicted to hold.
Finally, if a continuing resolution is passed in FYj+3, Agency A would be subject to
spending restrictions, whereas Agency B would be in the second year of its fiscal cycle
operating under an already approved budget. The cycle for both agencies would begin
anew with the arrival of FYj+4. Because multi-year appropriations are only subject to the
restrictions of a continuing resolution during the transition to a new budget cycle,
continuing appropriations should have an effect only when the transition to a new fiscal
year coincides with the passage of a continuing appropriations act.
Conclusion
Leland (1968) pioneered the notion of precautionary demand for saving.
Zimmerman (1976) applied Leland’s ideas in a nonprofit setting to find that budget
and/or expenditure uncertainty led to the establishment of contingency funds and the
saving of durable inventory as a means of transferring organizational resources across

108

fiscal year boundaries. The approach in this chapter seeks to build on Zimmerman’s
efforts through a theoretical discussion of ex ante and ex post modifications in
expenditure behavior of federal agency officials faced with the uncertainty of spending
restrictions.
A simplified arithmetic model of agency spending behavior illustrates that
officials managing federal agencies, which are funded via lump-sum appropriations, will
stockpile additional levels of tangible goods in anticipation of the spending restrictions
that come with interim continuing resolutions. The additional stockpiling of tangible
goods will be used to offset the uncertainty that accompanies continuing resolutions
and will afford agency officials a measure of spending latitude while the agency is under
restraint during the first part of a new fiscal year. After the federal budget passes and
the continuing resolution terminates, agency officials will consume the stockpile while
applying unencumbered funding to other needs of the organization.
An extended discussion regarding the applicability of the model suggests that
the model may be suitable not only to single-year lump-sum appropriations but also to
those lump-sum appropriations with multi-year availability. However, the model seems
to fail when Congress seeks to govern discretion of agency officials by way of line-item
restrictions, provisos, or earmarks. Notwithstanding that limitation, the majority of
discretionary federal expenditures are carried-out using lump-sum appropriations so the
model may still prove useful in a federal setting.
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Given the preceding theoretical exploration of modifications in expenditure
behavior, the discussion will now turn toward quantitative analyses of federal budget
data. The next two chapters reflect an attempt to determine: (1) which factors account
for the modifications in organizational expenditure behavior as agency officials
compensate for restrictions on federal spending, and (2) which econometric methods
might one use to reveal the expenditure behavior of agency officials under said
spending constraints.
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Chapter Five
Continuing Resolutions: Evidence of Expense Shifting in Federal Contract and Supply
Spending

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to explore quantitatively the influence of
continuing resolutions on monthly federal spending patterns at the agency level. More
specifically, the analysis involves the application of event study methods to a subset of
federal obligations to demonstrate how federal agency officials adjust monthly
expenditure behavior to compensate for the uncertainty that accompanies continuing
appropriations. This study provides not only another example of the applicability of
broadly applied event study methods but also a quantitative measure of the ability of
the federal budget and resource management community to adjust to new information.
Findings reveal evidence of ex ante and ex post modifications to spending
behavior as a result of the implementation of continuing resolutions. When stopgap
measures are on the horizon for the coming fiscal year, federal organizations increase
the purchase rates on contract services and supplies three months prior to the end of
the terminating fiscal year, beyond the levels normally purchased when continuing
resolutions are not a concern. Further, while short-term spending restrictions are in
effect, agencies do not deviate from normal monthly expenditure patterns in a
statistically significant fashion. After the budget is passed and continuing resolutions
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are lifted, however, it takes approximately two months for obligation rates to return to
a normal state.
The results highlight: (1) the ability of the federal resource management
community to adjust to new information; (2) the continued used of baseline budgeting
techniques; and (3) the presence of signaling mechanisms between higher echelons of
the federal government and subordinate agencies. The findings also raise concerns
about expense shifting vis-à-vis federal appropriations law and the bona fide needs rule.
The next section offers a brief discussion of event study methods and the
attendant hypotheses, followed by a description of the data. Afterward comes
presentation of the econometric model of choice and event study estimation methods.
The results section houses estimation and post-estimation findings, and the chapter
closes with implications and conclusions.

Event studies
Recall from the discussion section of chapter three that event studies seek to
determine whether a particular event influences a subsequent outcome (Wooldridge,
2009). Since Fama and colleagues’ (1969) seminal work on the connection between
stock prices and anticipated stock splits, event study methods have been applied
broadly to topics such as motor carrier deregulation by the Interstate Commerce
Commission (Rose, 1985); municipal bankruptcy in Orange County, California (Denison,
2000); effects of the Food Stamp Program on work incentives (H. W. Hoynes &
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Schanzenbach, 2012); birth weight improvements in neonatal mortality (Almond, et al.,
2010); and implementation of the Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants,
and Children (H. Hoynes, et al., 2011).
In the context of this chapter, event study methods are used to explore the link
between the implementation of a continuing resolution and the modification of agency
expenditure behavior. In the same way the investment community anticipates stock
splits, the federal government’s resource management community may be able to
anticipate the likelihood of continuing resolutions. Federal budget process literature
suggests two points in the congressional budget process which associated agency
personnel may monitor for signals regarding the implementation of continuing
appropriations acts: (1) the congressional budget resolution, and (2) the hearings of the
appropriations committees.
Regarding the first point, Congress establishes budgetary boundaries by
allocating budget authority and outlays among House and Senate committees via the
congressional budget resolution. The current congressional budget process prescribes a
date of April 15 for adoption of the congressional budget resolution, but the reader will
recall from Table 2.5 that the resolution rarely passes by that date. Thus, the amount of
delay in the adoption of the resolution may be an indicator of the level of budgetary
conflict (Schick, 2007) and a sign of impending continuing resolutions.
With respect to the second point, appropriations move through Congress in a
structured manner as a result of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. The House is
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scheduled to begin consideration of appropriations bills early in June and the Senate
soon thereafter; sometimes consideration happens concurrently. The bills may pass the
House and Senate by the end of June and may be deliberated upon by conference
committees as early as July. Federal agencies and the Office of Management and
Budget maintain close tabs on appropriations committees and the progress of
appropriations bills, and often are informed of committee intentions prior to the filing
of the committee report. In fact, agencies may appeal to Senate Appropriations
Committees before the House completes its work (Schick, 1980, 2007). Aside from the
congressional budgetary process and any established lines of communication between
Congress, OMB, and the departments, the committees on appropriations for both the
House and the Senate maintain websites updating the general public on the progress
and status of appropriations legislation (U.S. House of Representatives, 2012; U.S.
Senate, 2012).
It stands to reason that agency officials with access to such information may seek
ways to generate supplemental spending latitude for themselves in the event of
expenditure restrictions in the coming fiscal year. By purchasing additional supplies and
contract services during the final months of the terminating fiscal year, agency officials
free-up funding in the coming fiscal year when stopgap measures will impose an upper
limit on expenditures. Thus, dollars that would have been used for the purchase of
supplies and contracts in the new fiscal year can be applied toward other factors of
input, if necessary. (Appendix A provides a list of expenditure categories.)
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To be clear, the increase in contract service purchases and supply expenditures is
not to be confused with the normal year-end rush to spend unobligated funding.
Rather, the associated increase is reflective of a shift between expenditure categories.
This practice amounts to a concerted effort to forego certain expenditures in favor of
stockpiling additional supplies and the like during the terminating fiscal year as a way to
free-up funding in the approaching fiscal year. For example, in any given fiscal year
agency personnel might devote X-amount to contract services and supplies and Yamount to all other expenditures at the end of the fiscal year. When a continuing
resolution is on the fiscal horizon, agency personnel would then purchase X+ε of
contract services and supplies and Y-ε in all other goods and services. By increasing
stockpiles of contract services and supplies, agency personnel effectively shift expenses
from the upcoming fiscal year to the terminating fiscal year, thereby unencumbering
future monies and providing the agency with additional spending latitude while under
the constraints of a continuing resolution. The following hypothesis is suggestive of that
approach:
Hypothesis 1: When a continuing resolution is on the fiscal horizon for the coming
fiscal year, the rate of spending on contract services and supplies during the final
quarter of the terminating fiscal year will exceed the rate of spending on contract
services and supplies for the corresponding timeframe when a continuing
resolution will not be in effect in the coming fiscal year.
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While the standard provisions of continuing resolutions and the Antideficiency
Act are designed to constrain spending, associated funding should be sufficient to
enable operations at mildly attenuated levels. Organizations are most often instructed
to maintain a rate of operations less than or equal to that of the prior fiscal year (GAO,
2009b; Schick, 2007; Streeter, 2008a; Wildavsky & Caiden, 2004) and continuing
resolutions provide a commensurate level of funding to ensure such restrictions. In
addition, continuing appropriations cannot be used to fund new initiatives and this “no
new starts” criterion prohibits agencies from entering into new contractual
arrangements or from funding projects that were not being executed in the prior fiscal
year. Even agencies that spend at higher rates under normal operating conditions are
prohibited from doing so under a continuing resolution. At the same time, the
Antideficiency Act generally prohibits federal employees from incurring obligations or
making outlays in excess of appropriations (GAO, 2004e; Pulmonte, 2011). This line of
thought leads to the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: While under a continuing resolution, the rate of spending on
contract services and supplies will be less than or equal to the rate of spending on
contract services and supplies during corresponding periods in the fiscal year void
of continuing resolutions.

Contradictory reasoning makes it difficult to determine, a priori, agency
expenditure behavior immediately after a continuing resolution is lifted. On one hand,
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agencies emerging from spending restrictions may have fallen behind budgetary
schedules and may try to catch up to spending plans by increasing obligation rates.
Such an approach would yield a positive sign on coefficients associated with ex post
expenditure activity. On the other hand, ex post coefficients may assume a negative
sign if organizations delay obligations to allow sufficient time for appropriations to filter
through bureaucratic channels, or if expenditure patterns follow a saving-dissaving
model similar to Zimmerman (1976) and Balakrishnan, Soderstrom, and West (2007).
The third hypothesis proposes dissaving behavior after budget approval:
Hypothesis 3: The average rate of spending on contract services and supplies
during the period immediately following the termination of a continuing
resolution will be less than the average rate of spending on contract services and
supplies during a corresponding period of a fiscal year void of continuing
resolutions.

The Data
The data consist of an unbalanced panel of 3,768 monthly obligations from the
Department of the Army and the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).
The data span eight fiscal years and are combined with continuing resolution
information contained in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, and the
Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act under which the NARA is
classified as an Independent Agency.
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With regard to Department of the Army obligation data, Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) requests went unanswered initially. Fortunately, Army data were provided
upon informal request from an Army resource management office and pertain to the
Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) appropriation account which provides
operational funding for the U.S. Army to organize, equip, and train its forces.
Several other FOIA requests for data were made using the online resources
available at www.FOIA.gov. Thus far, requests have been sent to seven federal
agencies: (1) Department of Commerce, (2) Department of Treasury, (3) Environmental
Protection Agency and related regional offices, (4) Federal Labor Relations Authority, (5)
Merit Systems Protection Board, (6) National Archives and Records Administration, and
(7) Office of Management and Budget.
Of the seven agencies queried, only the National Archives and Records
Administration provided useful data in a timely fashion. NARA provided seven years of
budgetary obligation data pertaining to fiscal years 2006-2012 in Microsoft Excel format.
The expenditure data included fiscal year, month, object class, dollar amount obligated,
and number of full-time equivalent personnel employed per annum. Accordingly, this
data will be used to verify the validity of the proposed model and estimation methods.
The Environmental Protection Agency also responded affirmatively to the FOIA
request. The Agency agreed to provide the requested data after receiving assurance of
payment for the requested dataset, and personnel in the EPA’s Office of the Chief
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Financial Officer are assisting in the matter; however, as of the date of this dissertation,
the data were still being compiled.
Two other agencies answered the FOIA requests with aggregated data which
does not provide sufficient detail for analysis. The Merit Systems Protection Board
referenced its Fiscal Year 2012 Congressional Budget Justification and the Federal Labor
Relations Authority offered its Performance Budget Submission to Congress for fiscal
years 2012, 2013, and 2014. On both accounts, the references offered were press
release documents containing aggregate figures which are of insufficient detail for this
research project. Both agencies recommended using the FOIA appeals process if the
data provided did not meet expectations.
The NARA obligation data pertain to NARA’s Salaries and Expenses (S&E)
appropriation. Congress commonly provides federal agencies funding for general
operating expenses by way of S&E appropriations and it is important to note that the
funding contained in the OMA appropriation account is equivalent to the funding
contained in the lump-sum S&E appropriation (GAO, 2004d, 2004e; Schick, 2007).
Presently, the majority of appropriation accounts in the discretionary federal
budget are funded via lump-sum appropriations.26 In fact, the federal budget is
comprised of more than 1,000 appropriation accounts, 200 of which account for more
than 90 percent of discretionary federal expenditures (GAO, 2004e; Schick, 2007).
26

An appropriation account such as the Operation and Maintenance, Army appropriation account is the
basic unit of an appropriation (i.e., the Operation and Maintenance Appropriation). In general, an
appropriation reflects each unnumbered paragraph in an appropriation act which is the document signed
into law by the president (GAO, 2005a).
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Accordingly, expenditure patterns associated with the OMA and NARA S&E
appropriation account may be representative of expenditure patterns contained in the
Salaries and Expense appropriations of other federal agencies.
The obligations cover contract services and supply spending from fiscal years
2005 to 2012 and are related to eight spending categories which fall under the heading
of contract services and supplies: (1) travel of persons; (2) transportation of things; (3)
rents, communications, and utilities; (4) printing and reproduction; (5) contract services;
(6) supplies and materials; (7) service charges; and (8) contract personnel and indirect
hire foreign nationals (DFAS, 2012). Appendix A provides a categorical list of
expenditure categories as compiled by the OMB.
With regard to the structure of the data, the Army obligations data are less
aggregated than the NARA data. While the NARA monthly data are aggregated at the
agency level, the Army data are more granular in nature thus contributing another
organizational level of detail known as Subactivity Group or SAG (Appendix B provides a
detailed listing of U.S. Army Operation and Maintenance Subactivity Groups). In the
same fashion that Maneuver Units (SAG 111) or Central Supply Activities (SAG 422) are
subactivity groups of the Department of the Army, the National Archives and Records
Administration can be thought of as a subactivity group of Independent Agencies
subsumed within the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations. For
this reason, NARA obligations were assigned a pseudo-SAG (SAG 500) to ensure
consistency within the dataset.
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Further, for time series analysis Wooldridge (2009) recommends converting
nominal dollars to real dollars by way of an index such as the Index of Industrial
Production (IIP) used in the Economic Report of the President. Accordingly, obligations
herein are measured in millions and were converted to real 2007 dollars using the
Consumer Price Index.
As displayed in Table 5.1, the average monthly contract service and supply
obligation was $111.8 million positively skewed with a median value of $16.9 million.
However, the data are distorted by $21.5 billion of obligations during the month of
September 2007 in the SAG labeled “Additional Activities.” This year-end spending
spike coincides with the 2007 troop surge associated with the war in Iraq and is
associated with supplemental funding provided by Congress for the war effort (Office of
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller: Army
Budget, 2007). Without the obligations in the Additional Activities SAG, the data
remains positively skewed with a median of $15.9 million but with a much lower mean
of $52.5 million (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2).
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics
Variable
Total Contract Services &
Supplies (in millions)
Total Contract Services &
Supplies (less: Addit’l Activities)
Personnel
Number of observations: 3,768

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

$111.8

$16.9

$523.8

-$199.3

$19,940.4

$52.5
11,627

$15.9
2,680

$106.1
29,890

-$199.3
23

$1,375.6
189,749

One may also take notice of the minimum obligation of -$199.3 million (refer to
Table 5.1). An obligation is a legal requirement to pay for some good or service, while
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disbursements involve the outlay of funds (Office of the Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller), 2011). Since an obligation can signify a promise to pay at a future date,
they are often recorded and then adjusted for various reasons; adjustments can be
made because the actual disbursement of funds has not yet taken place. For instance,
an erroneously recorded obligation may be reversed in a subsequent month and then
properly documented elsewhere. Consequently, 170 negative observations drop from
the estimation on account of the application of the log-linear model introduced later in
the chapter.
While NARA included personnel figures with agency obligation data, U.S. Army
personnel data were retrieved from the OMA [budget] Justification Books available on
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller (ASA
FM&C) website. Since the Justification Books maintained on the ASA FM&C website are
preliminary budget estimates subject to Department of Defense markup and revision,
the figures pertaining to the corresponding fiscal year are only estimates. To obtain
actual figures for a given fiscal year, one must refer to the Budget Estimate two years
hence. For example, the actual fiscal year 2011 obligations are contained in the fiscal
year 2013 Budget Estimate Submission (BES). The personnel totals include both military
end-strength and civilian full-time equivalents (Office of the Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Financial Management and Comptroller: Army Budget, 2004, 2005, 2006,
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012).
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Continuing resolution data originated with Congressional Research Service
reports detailing the occurrence of stopgap measures and were reconciled with
appropriations acts associated with each of the fiscal years included in the analysis.
Streeter (2008b) and Pulmonte (2011) provide a general timeline of continuing
resolutions from 1977-2010, while appropriations acts provide the actual dates upon
which the president signed the acts into law.
During the period of analysis, the DoD was under the constraint of interim
continuing appropriations on four occasions: the first two months of fiscal year 2006
(i.e., October and November of 2005); the first two months of fiscal year 2008 (October
and November of 2007); the first three months of fiscal year 2010 (October, November,
and December of 2009); and the first seven months of fiscal year 2011 (October 2010April 2011) ("DoD Appropriations Act, 2009," 2009; "DoD & Full-Year Continuing
Approprations Act, 2011," 2011; "DoD Appropriations Act," 2005; "DoD Appropriations
Act," 2007; "DoD Appropriations Act, 2008," 2008; "DoD Appropriations Act, 2010,"
2010; "Military QoL & VA Appropriations Act," 2006).
By contrast, NARA was subject to either interim- or full-year continuing
resolutions during each year of the analysis. The agency was under the constraints of
interim resolutions during the first two months of fiscal year 2006; the first three
months of fiscal year 2008; the first six months of fiscal year 2009; and the first three
months of fiscal years 2010 and 2012. The agency was also under the constraints of a
full-year continuing resolution in fiscal years 2007 and 2011.
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Fama and colleagues (1969) event study market model controls for the
relationship between an individual stock and the market at large by incorporating the
returns of a broad market portfolio (J. J. Binder, 1998). To control for a similar
relationship between the agencies under study and the federal government at large, the
estimation relies on the monthly outlays of the federal government as reported in the
Monthly Treasury Statement compiled by the Financial Management Service Bureau of
the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Financial Management Service, 2013).

Econometric models & estimation methods
Because of the temporal ordering of the data, time series methods of analysis
and estimation are necessary. More precisely, event study methodologies serve to
isolate the effects of continuing resolutions on spending behavior. Having already
indexed the data, a few pre-estimation procedures help to ensure accurate estimation.
First, Figure 5.1 reveals a stationary time series process with a sharp change in
spending behavior in fiscal year 2007. A stationary process refers to the temporal
stability of the data such that the joint probability distribution of the data remains
unchanged as the data move forward through time (Wooldridge, 2009); the data still
appear stationary without the September 2007 year-end obligation data (see Figure
5.2). Indeed, a Fisher-type unit root test with the Phillips-Perron option confirms a
stationary process, so one may rule out the presence of a time trend in the data; in
other words, contract services and supply obligations do not seem to have grown over
time.
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Figure 5.1: Contract Services & Supply Obligations
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Figure 5.2: Contract Services & Supply Obligations
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Next, monthly time series data often exhibit seasonal patterns and NARA and
OMA spending tends to abide by those expectations. For instance, McCaffery and
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Mutty (1999) find that all three branches of the U.S. Military (i.e., the Army, Navy, and
Air Force) and the Department of Defense exhibit cyclical spending patterns that
coincide with the advent of the new fiscal year, year-end close-out, and the receipt of
quarterly funding allotments from the Office of Management and Budget. They find
that over the course of the fiscal year, obligations are highest during the months of
October and September. The letting of new contracts is the impetus for elevated
expenditures at the beginning of the fiscal year, while the rush to spend unobligated
funds before year-end drives September obligation rates. In addition, obligation rates
also tend to increase in January, April, and July when funding allotments arrive. With
regard to expenditure patterns at U.S. Army Hospitals, Balakrishnan, Soderstrom, and
West (2007) also find a year-end peak in spending patterns but they find the lowest
obligation rate in October.
Correspondingly, a cycle plot of the contract services and supply obligations by
month shows the routine increase in spending at the end of the fiscal year (see Figure
5.3). Removing the obligations associated with supplemental funding uncovers higher
spending during the first and fourth quarters of the fiscal year (Figure 5.4). Dummy
variables are, therefore, incorporated to control for seasonality and October serves as
the base month.
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Figure 5.3: Obligations by Month
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Figure 5.4: Obligations by Month
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Because the current period’s budget and obligation rate may be a linear function
of budgets and obligation rates from previous periods, a lagged dependent variable is
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necessary for an accurate specification of the model. The use of lagged dependent
variables, however, may lead to inconsistent estimators if the error term follows a
stable autoregressive model. For that reason, one must also test for the presence of
serial correlation between the error term and the regressors. A Bruesch-Godfrey test
for AR(q) serial correlation, which regresses ordinary least squares residuals on the
general regressors, reveals the presence of fourth-order serial correlation.
Using a lagged dependent variable also introduces endogeneity to the equation,
so instrumental variables are compulsory for proper estimation. Since the correct
methods call for estimation of a large-N panel, autocorrelation within individual SAGs
but not between them, and explanatory variables that are not strictly exogenous, the
Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond linear dynamic panel-data approach should be
appropriate for estimating the following log-linear model:

𝐶𝑆𝑆�
𝐿𝑜𝑔�𝐶𝑆𝑆�𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠 � = ∝0 + ∑2𝑗=−3 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑅𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑠)𝑡 + ∑−30
𝑗=−1 𝛾𝑖 𝐿𝑜𝑔�
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠 �

Where:

𝑖,𝑡−𝑗

𝛿𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ + 𝑢𝑡

+

CSS = Contract services & supplies obligations per SAG by month
Pers = Annual number of personnel per SAG, to include civilian full-time
equivalents and military end-strength.
(CSS/Pers) = The ratio of contract services and supplies obligations per SAG to
associated personnel (i.e., contract services and supply expenditures per
employee) expressed in logarithmic form.
The dependent variable is also lagged for 30 periods. This structure controls for
autocorrelation during the first four periods and provides for correct
specification of the model as determined in post estimation.
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CR = Indicator variable for continuing resolutions equal to 1 if there is a
continuing resolution in effect and zero otherwise.
The CR variable is lagged by three periods and led by two periods to detect ex
ante and ex post effects of spending restrictions.
Outlays = Monthly outlays of the U.S. Treasury expressed in logarithmic form
Month = Indicator variable corresponding to the applicable fiscal month thereby
controlling for seasonality; October is the base month.
ut = Autocorrelated error term of the form: 𝑢 = 𝜐𝑡−1 + 𝜐𝑡−2 + 𝜐𝑡−3 + 𝜐𝑡−4 +
𝜖𝑡
Results
Referring to Table 5.2, estimation of the model assuming a generalized method
of moments approach reveals abnormal spending behavior before and after the
implementation of a continuing resolution. First, on average and holding all else equal,
the main effect of the implementation of interim continuing resolutions on contract
services and supplies expenditures is an increase of 22.8 percent in the third month
prior to the implementation of stopgap measures (i.e., July of the terminating fiscal
year). This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 1 and underscores the notion that
agencies monitor closely aspects of the congressional budget process. If a continuing
resolution seems imminent, agency officials will begin to stockpile supplies and to
increase contract-related expenditures at a rate higher than that which would normally
occur with the receipt of fourth quarter allotment. What is more, average contract and
supply obligation rates show mild attenuation during the months of August and
September but do not seem to be affected in a statistically significant manner by an
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impending resolution. This pattern suggests that the July purchases are one-time or
bulk expenditures.
Second, while continuing appropriations are in effect they have virtually no
influence on obligation rates. This finding is in agreement with Hypothesis 2 and
suggests that continuing resolutions provide sufficient means for agencies to operate
while under expenditure restrictions.
Third, obligation rates tend to fall by 23.7 percent, ceteris paribus, two months
after the President signs the budget into law. This finding is in accord with Hypothesis 3
and hints that agency officials spend-down stockpiles of supplies as uncertainty
associated with interim resolutions dissipates. In agreement with Zimmerman (1976),
agency officials may devote unencumbered funding to other factor inputs. Since this
dataset only applies to contract services and supply purchases, however, such behavior
is not estimable here. At the same time, the two-month delay in effect may imply that
organizations allow sufficient time for appropriations to filter through bureaucratic
channels before spending-down excess stores of supplies and the like.
Results are also in line with Balakrishnan, Soderstrom, and West (2007) findings
that support the expense-shifting hypotheses. Their analysis of pharmaceutical supply
purchases at U.S. Army Hospitals shows that increases in saving expenditures carriedout at the end of the terminating fiscal year tend to be smaller in magnitude than the
dissaving practices at the beginning of the subsequent fiscal year. Said another way,
managers at U.S. Army Hospitals tend to build-up supply reserves at the end of the fiscal
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year to help mitigate budgetary uncertainty and then spend down those reserves over
the course of the next fiscal year, but managers do so in a tightly controlled manner.
Balakrishnan and colleagues (2007) focus exclusively on supply purchases at U.S. Army
Hospitals, but were unable to rule out budget uncertainty in general, and continuing
resolutions in particular, as a contributing factor for expense shifting. The analysis in
this chapter extends the Balakrishnan and colleagues findings by encompassing contract
and supply spending across two federal agencies, but presents evidence of expense
shifting as a result of continuing resolutions.
Post-estimation
A post estimation Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions suggests that the
model is correctly specified. To say that a model is overidentified means that
instrumental variables outnumber endogenous variables. Thus, the idea behind
overidentifying restrictions is that there are more instruments than necessary to
estimate parameters consistently. Referring to Table 5.3, the estimation technique
above applies 751 instruments to 49 parameters yielding a chi-square statistic of
731.6684 with 702 degrees of freedom and a p-value equal to 0.2123. Therefore, with
reasonable assurance, one fails to reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan test that
overidentifying restrictions are valid.
Estimation of the model under assumptions of heteroscedasticity and
compensation for robust standard errors does not overturn any of the results from the
GMM approach, but doing so enables the application of another post-estimation test to
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ensure correct specification of the model. An Arellano-Bond post estimation test
presents the null hypothesis that there is no serial correlation in the first-differenced
errors (see Table 5.3). Rejecting the null hypothesis at order one does not imply that
the model is misspecified, because first-differencing to eliminate fixed effects creates
first order autocorrelation, whereas rejection at higher orders (i.e., order two and
higher) suggests invalidity of the moment conditions, because autocorrelated
disturbances in the original model would be implied. The output of the Arellano-Bond
post-estimation test does not present evidence that the model is misspecified.
Moreover, removing the obligations associated with Additional Activities from the
estimation does not change the results of the estimation in a significant manner in
either of the models.
Lags of the dependent variable
Also of note are the levels of correlation with previous years’ obligation rates.
The four-month lag of the dependent variable controls for autocorrelation in the first
four periods immediately preceding the current period of execution, and brings to light
the level of statistical significance associated with the 11th, 12th, 22nd, 24th, and 25th lags
of the dependent variable. Correlation between the current time period and lags of
approximately one and two years earlier highlights the importance of the previous
year’s budget and obligation rates to the current year’s budget and obligation rates.
This finding is further evidence of the incremental nature of budgeting (Joseph White,
1994; Wildavsky & Caiden, 2004) and the continued use of baseline budgeting
techniques (Schick, 1994).
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Along with the positive correlation, the model finds statistically significant
negative correlation at the 14th, 21st, 26th, and 28th lags. These patterns of correlation
may represent an interaction of continuing resolutions with the recursive nature of
budget formulation. Negative correlations could possibly point to bulk purchases made
in one fiscal year but not in the next. For example, July/August of Fiscal Year 02 occurs
14 or 15 months after the July/August of FY00 timeframe. If a bulk purchase of
additional supplies were made in anticipation of an interim continuing resolution in July
or August of FY00 but not in July/August of FY01, the corresponding obligation rates
should be negatively correlated.
The model also displays an affinity for the 30th lag of the dependent variable
during estimation trials. Estimating the GMM model with less than 27 lags of the
dependent variable results in rejection of the null hypothesis under the Sargan test.
Once the 27th lag of the dependent variable is introduced as an endogenous variable,
the estimation becomes viable. More importantly, the statistical significance of the CR
variable begins to manifest with the introduction of the 30th lag. The leap in viability of
the model may be due to white noise but likely results from the minimum number of
periods necessary to conduct an event study. Fama and colleagues (1969) use a 29 time
period lag prior to a stock split to conduct the original event study, and Binder (1998)
echoes those methods in his review of event study methodologies.
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Table 5.2: Regression Results
GMM Estimator

Log(CSS/Pers)
Endogenous Variables
1-Month Lag (of Dep. Var.)
2-Month Lag
3-Month Lag
4-Month Lag
5-Month Lag
6-Month Lag
7-Month Lag
8-Month Lag
9-Month Lag
10-Month Lag
11-Month Lag
12-Month Lag
13-Month Lag
14-Month Lag
15-Month Lag
16-Month Lag
17-Month Lag
18-Month Lag
19-Month Lag
20-Month Lag
21-Month Lag
22-Month Lag
23-Month Lag
24-Month Lag
25-Month Lag
26-Month Lag
27-Month Lag
28-Month Lag
29-Month Lag
30-Month Lag
Observations

Coefficient

Standard
Errors

0.123***
0.108***
0.132***
0.065*
-0.037
-0.003
0.005
0.024
0.023
-0.041
0.107***
0.205***
-0.015
-0.085**
-0.047
0.045
-0.015
-0.024
0.030
0.014
-0.128***
0.091**
-0.013
0.119***
0.090**
-0.093**
0.015
-0.091**
-0.015
0.078**

(0.0322)
(0.0340)
(0.0391)
(0.0391)
(0.0384)
(0.0371)
(0.0371)
(0.0383)
(0.0367)
(0.0364)
(0.0369)
(0.0374)
(0.0381)
(0.0382)
(0.0390)
(0.0392)
(0.0386)
(0.0373)
(0.0361)
(0.0359)
(0.0356)
(0.0358)
(0.0364)
(0.0363)
(0.0365)
(0.0375)
(0.0365)
(0.0360)
(0.0354)
(0.0364)

741
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Robust Estimator
Robust
Standard
Coefficient
Errors
0.123**
0.108*
0.132***
0.065
-0.037
-0.003
0.005
0.024
0.023
-0.041
0.107**
0.205***
-0.015
-0.085*
-0.047
0.045
-0.015
-0.024
0.030
0.014
-0.128**
0.091**
-0.013
0.119*
0.090
-0.093*
0.015
-0.091*
-0.015
0.078
741

(0.0527)
(0.0558)
(0.0488)
(0.0564)
(0.0534)
(0.0562)
(0.0463)
(0.0353)
(0.0532)
(0.0398)
(0.0521)
(0.0378)
(0.0542)
(0.0502)
(0.0374)
(0.0470)
(0.0469)
(0.0497)
(0.0395)
(0.0567)
(0.0562)
(0.0411)
(0.0392)
(0.0626)
(0.0652)
(0.0509)
(0.0355)
(0.0476)
(0.0416)
(0.0609)

Table 5.2: Continued
GMM Estimator

Robust Estimator
Robust
Standard
Coefficient
Errors

Coefficient

Standard
Errors

0.228**
-0.006
-0.052
-0.089
0.012
-0.237**

(0.111)
(0.126)
(0.124)
(0.121)
(0.116)
(0.102)

0.228**
-0.006
-0.052
-0.089
0.012
-0.237*

(0.0996)
(0.131)
(0.133)
(0.119)
(0.157)
(0.140)

Control Variable
Log(Outlays)

-0.043

(0.155)

-0.043

(0.175)

Dummy Variables
November
December
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September

0.222
0.077
0.117
-0.015
0.098
0.165
0.179
0.361**
0.208
0.241
0.939***

(0.160)
(0.176)
(0.175)
(0.160)
(0.153)
(0.136)
(0.144)
(0.141)
(0.144)
(0.164)
(0.161)

0.222
0.077
0.117
-0.015
0.098
0.165
0.179
0.361**
0.208
0.241
0.939***

(0.182)
(0.226)
(0.204)
(0.147)
(0.131)
(0.158)
(0.162)
(0.174)
(0.162)
(0.232)
(0.214)

Constant term

3.228

(1.988)

3.228

(2.230)

Log(CSS/Pers)
Exogenous Variables
Continuing Resolution (CR)
3-Month Lag
2-Month Lag
1-Month Lag
CR in effect
1-Month Lead
2-Month Lead

Observations

741
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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741

Table 5.3: Post-estimation Tests
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions
H0: Overidentifying restrictions are valid
Chi-square statistic
Degrees of freedom
Prob > Chi2

731.6684
702
0.2123

Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors
H0: No autocorrelation
Order
1
2
3
4

z
-4.1912
-1.2292
0.7264
-0.7989

Prob > z
0.0000
0.2190
0.4676
0.4244

Table 5.4: Isolating the Effect of the 30th Lag While Controlling for Autocorrelation
During Periods Immediately Preceding Implementation of a Continuing Resolution
Coefficient

Standard Errors

1-Month Lag (Dep. Var.)
2-Month Lag
3-Month Lag
4-Month Lag

0.295***
0.224***
0.157***
0.129***

(0.0337)
(0.0351)
(0.0352)
(0.0343)

29-Month Lag
30-Month Lag
31-Month Lag

0.049*
0.116***
0.016

(0.0291)
(0.0290)
(0.0288)

Constant term

0.178

(0.1200)

Observations
R-squared

967
0.855
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Implications and Conclusion
Thus, the model finds evidence of expense shifting as a result of the
implementation of continuing resolutions. To quantify the effects, organizations within
federal agencies increase spending on contract services and supply purchases by an
average of $11.970 million or $1,029.54 per employee when there is a possibility of
continuing appropriations in the coming fiscal year. Incidentally, this increase in
spending does not seem to take place during the final month of the fiscal year when the
typical year-end spending takes place nor even the month prior to that. Instead, the
surge in spending happens a full three months before the end of the fiscal year.
Controlling for the regular receipt of fourth quarter funding allotment, the surge in
expenditures coincides with the appropriations committee schedule, thereby implying a
high degree of anticipation within the resource management community regarding the
implementation of spending constraints. The spike in expenditures is suggestive of the
presence of signaling mechanisms between higher echelons of the federal government
and the agency in question; this relationship is the focus of the next chapter.
Further, federal agencies seem to be unaffected by the actual application of
expenditure constraints as obligation rates continue unabated while continuing
resolutions are in effect. Once the president signs the associated appropriation act into
law, however, obligation rates tend to fall below normal levels by approximately
$12.443 million or $1,070.18 per employee in the second month after the budget
passes. The overall pattern may confirm a savings-dissaving approach with regard to
contractual and supply obligations.
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The model also highlights the incremental nature of budgeting and importance
of simple baseline budgeting techniques to the federal budget cycle. Obligation rates
one- and two-years prior to the current period of spending display the highest level of
statistical significance among the lagged dependent variables; thus, the best predictor of
the current year’s spending rate is the previous year’s spending rate.
Expense shifting vis-à-vis bona fide needs
In a normative sense, continuing resolutions are not necessarily a bad policy; in
fact, they provide a feasible alternative to shutting down the federal government in the
event of protracted disagreements over the budget. Still, qualitative research suggests
that stopgap measures generate budgetary uncertainty and distortions in year-end
spending. One manifestation of these distortions is the shifting of expenditures
between fiscal years. Indeed, the federal budget and resource management community
seem to have adapted to stopgap measures by way of saving-dissaving practices that
straddle fiscal years.
At issue, then, would be whether agencies have violated the bona fide needs rule
through the purchase of additional supplies and contract services. The rule, which is
based in statutes such as the Antideficiency Act and the Adequacy of Appropriations
Act, and various rulings of the Comptroller General, holds that an appropriation is
available only for the needs of the current fiscal year, not those of a future fiscal year.
Therefore, agencies should be earnest in purchasing only what they need to make it
through the current fiscal year (GAO, 2004d).
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To that end, the GAO offers the following example for consideration:
“… suppose that, as the end of a fiscal year approaches, an agency
purchases a truckload of pencils when it is clear that, based on current
usage, it already has in stock enough pencils to last several years into the
future. It would seem apparent that the agency was merely trying to use
up its appropriation before it expired, and the purchase would violate the
bona fide needs rule.”
With that example in mind, the Federal Appropriations Law handbook is careful
to point out that the spirit of the rule is not to prevent the maintenance of
legitimate levels of inventories which are purchased to avoid a disruption of
operations. Instead, a violation of the rule would occur when the magnitude of
purchases evolves from reasonable to excessive, the determination of which
depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case at hand (GAO,
2004d).
In a broad sense, continuing appropriations acts may present agency
officials with the prospect of walking a policy tightrope. Federal resource
managers must balance their desire to offset the budgetary uncertainty that
comes with continuing resolutions with their obligation to abide by federal fiscal
law, and overcompensation in either direction could spell misfortune for both
the agency and the individual.
Copyright © Thomas Alexander Jacobs 2014
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Chapter Six
Budgetary Signals: Organizational Learning, Agenda Setting, and Federal Bureaucracies

Introduction
The findings in the previous chapter demonstrate that federal agencies are able
to anticipate the enactment of continuing appropriations acts. In response to the
implementation of stopgap measures, federal agencies tend to increase spending on
contract services and supply purchases, beyond normal seasonal levels, during the final
quarter of the terminating fiscal year. Through the accrual of additional stockpiles of
supplies and the shifting of contract expenditures between fiscal years, agency
personnel afford themselves an added degree of spending latitude while under the fiscal
constraints of a continuing resolution. In other words, the federal budget and resource
management community seem to have adapted to stopgap measures by way of savingdissaving behavior that straddles fiscal years.
In light of the finding that federal agencies engage in expense shifting in
response to pending enactment of continuing resolutions, we are left with a puzzle.
How is it that agencies know that they should alter spending well in advance of the
failure to adopt an appropriations act? The purpose of this chapter is to explore
budgetary signaling mechanisms between the highest echelons of the federal
government and subordinate federal agencies. Explicitly stated, this research seeks to
determine which factors in the federal budget process act as signaling mechanisms
between the president, Congress, and executive agencies. In seeking to answer this
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research question, this chapter explores the concept of organizational learning and
suggests a theoretical framework of agenda setting in which federal organizations
monitor germane sources of information, compile implicit indices of indicators, and then
process that information to reach decisions.
The notion of organizational learning first emerged in the early 1960s. While it
has since expanded and evolved, the concept has been applied sparingly to the public
sector. Thus, this study aims to expand the knowledge of organizational learning as it
relates to the federal bureaucracy. The results show that federal agencies have learned
to monitor particular sources in the federal budget process to gain insight about the
likelihood of continuing appropriations acts being passed. Moreover, decision-makers
may also be able to determine which budgetary signals are most relevant to a given
problem in the congressional budgetary scheme. These findings contribute to the field
of public budgeting by providing a link between theories of organizational learning and
agenda setting by way of the information processing aspect of the Implicit Index
Approach.
This chapter is organized in the following manner. The next section provides a
brief review of the organizational learning literature with an emphasis on the research
related to information processing. This topic carries-over into the theory section, which
discusses a framework of information processing within the field of agenda setting. A
brief discussion of a priori theoretical expectations precedes a description of the data,
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while the fifth section discusses the econometric model of choice and the associated
estimation methods. Results of the analysis follow and the final section concludes.

The Organizational Learning Literature
As a formal theory, the notion of organizational learning goes as far back as 1963
when Cyert and March conceptualized the term as the process by which an organization
adapts to its environment and the associated external shocks in a rational and
systematic manner, given the internal decision rules of the organization (Cyert & March,
1963). Since that seminal work, the definition has evolved as the concept of
organizational learning has spread to multiple disciplines. Scholars in fields, such as
organizational theory, economics, information management, business management,
marketing, and psychology (Dodgson, 1993; Easterby-Smith & Lyles, 2011) have set-out
to capture the essence of the term and the resulting definitions represent a panoply of
thought.
As it is perceived currently, organizational learning may occur at the individual
(Dodgson, 1993) or system level (Cyert & March, 1963; Dixon, 1992) and the term may
refer to the study of learning processes of and within organizations (Easterby-Smith &
Lyles, 2011). The phenomenon can be thought of as the development of insights,
knowledge, and associations between past, present, and future organizational activities
(Fiol & Lyles, 1985). Sinkula (1994) characterizes it as the method by which knowledge
is maintained such that it benefits future organizational users, while Rashman, Withers,
and Hartley (2009) survey the literature and describes organizational learning as the
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sharing of thoughts and actions, in an organizational context, with cognitive (Shipton &
Defillippi, 2011), social (Gherardi, Nicolini, & Odella, 1998), behavioral (Cyert & March,
1963; Huber, 1991), and technical implications (Huber, 1991).
As learning takes place, the organization is thought to change over time. Further
elaboration on the concept of organizational learning holds that as organizations learn
to make sense of their environment, members of the organization will encode historical
inferences into the organizational norms, training programs, policies, strategies, and
culture of the organization (Levitt & March, 1988; Sinkula, 1994). These shared
assumptions, beliefs, and norms form an organizational memory which serves to guide
individual and organizational actions (Argyris & Schön, 1978; Huber, 1991; Walsh &
Ungson, 1991). Thus, enhanced knowledge and understanding of “how things are done
(Argyris & Schön, 1978)“ lead to improved actions (Fiol & Lyles, 1985) and fundamental
changes to the structural elements and outcomes of the organization (Herbert
Alexander Simon, 1969).
In the same way that the definition of organizational learning has expanded, the
field of study has become very diverse and nuanced. For instance, Huber (1991) and
Dixon (1992) articulate a number of constructs related to organizational learning such
as: (1) knowledge acquisition, which concerns the processes by which organizations
acquire or obtain information, (2) the sharing of knowledge via information distribution;
(3) information interpretation, or the process by which information is assigned meaning;
and (4) and the storage and retrieval of information which is referred to as

143

organizational memory. As another example, Easterby-Smith and Lyles (2011) map the
field of study into four topics: (1) organizational learning, which, as mentioned above,
refers to the study of learning processes of and within organizations; (2) the learning
organization, which is seen as an organizational ideal; (3) organizational knowledge,
which is concerned with the nature of knowledge within the organization; and (4)
knowledge management, which addresses the storage, measurement, dissemination,
and leverage of knowledge by the organization.
Because the literature is expansive and multi-faceted, review articles abound
(Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999; Dixon, 1992; Dodgson, 1993; Friedman, Lipshitz, &
Popper, 2005; Huber, 1991; Levitt & March, 1988; Miner & Mezias, 1996; Rashman, et
al., 2009; Shipton, 2006). Among these reviews, Shipton (2006) serves as a particularly
helpful resource for identifying literature which is related to the processing of
information by the organization. To compare different elements of the organizational
learning literature, Professor Shipton uses a two-by-two matrix with the
prescriptive/normative and descriptive/explanatory literature arrayed along a vertical
continuum, while the individual/organizational literature is ordered along the horizontal
axis. From an explanatory perspective, organizational learning depends, in part, on
whether organizations use a behaviorist or cognitive approach to process information.
Organizations that rely on a behaviorist approach process information by way of
routines and standard operating procedures. Organizational learning, then, is a method
of skill-building based on repeated execution of routines and procedures (Argote, 2012;
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Zollo & Winter, 2002). Organizational routines are the result of trial and error learning
and they reflect a concerted effort to select and retain past behaviors (Gavetti &
Levinthal, 2000). Routines are essentially procedural memories (M. D. Cohen &
Bacdayan, 1994) and they serve as repositories of learning (Shipton, 2006). Indeed,
Levitt and March (1988) find that members of organizations may use routines that guide
behavior (e.g., forms, rules, and paradigms) as a means of storing and retrieving
experiences. This practice offers individuals within the organization access to the
substance of historical lessons and enables these encodings to withstand personnel
turnover and the passage of time.
From a cognitive perspective, the processing of information enhances the
organization’s potential for changed behavior. This style of organizational learning
brings about changes that are not readily apparent, but which develop the
organizational knowledge base favorably to afford the organization flexibility in times of
perceived need (Nonaka, Takeuchi, & Takeuchi, 1995; Shipton, 2006; Shrivastava, 1983).
Exposure to variegated circumstances, experiences, and points of view may increase the
propensity for individuals within the organization to question the adequacy and
effectiveness of current routines and procedures (Shipton, 2006). Thus, in turbulent
environments when conventional routines and procedures become obsolete, the ability
of an organization not only to recognize the value of new information, but also to
assimilate and apply it may ensure that the organization is able to adjust accordingly (W.
M. Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Huber, 1991; Lichtenthaler, 2009).
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Incidentally, organizational learning research tends to focus on private sector
entities over public sector organizations. Although the field of organizational learning
has grown significantly since the early 1990s, multiple authors agree that little of the
research pertains to public and non-profit agencies (Bate & Robert, 2002; EasterbySmith & Lyles, 2011; Kelman, 2005). A systematic review of the organizational learning
and knowledge literature by Rashman, Withers, and Hartley (2009) suggests an overreliance on the private sector with regard to theoretical and empirical endeavors. Their
survey of literature includes research efforts pertaining to organizational learning, interorganizational learning, and organizational knowledge and excludes papers that are
normative or purely descriptive in nature. Of the 131 papers analyzed, 61 focused on
the private sector while only 29 focused exclusively on public sector entities (the
remaining 41 papers addressed multiple sectors or did not specify a sector). Rashman
and colleagues find the organizational learning literature, as it relates to public
organizations, to be thin and fragmented. While the associated research addresses a
wide range of institutions and extends across a number of disciplines and journals, the
limited number of articles addressing public sector issues amounts to an underrepresentation in the literature that may hold implications for the generalizability of
current theories of organizational learning and knowledge (Rashman, et al., 2009).
Thus, organizational learning, as it relates to public sector entities, is a subject that is in
need of further exploration.
Fortunately, there is an avenue of approach toward this endeavor in the
policymaking literature. Jones and Baumgartner (2005) explore, theoretically and
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empirically, the manner by which government institutions and policymakers process
information. The authors develop a theory of disproportionate information processing
which relies, in part, on a micro-theory of information processing called the Implicit
Index Approach. Using behavioral models, Jones and Baumgartner explore boundedly
rational decision making from an individual viewpoint and from a collective frame of
reference. In so doing, they are able to draw similarities between individual and
organizational decision-making perspectives. This approach serves as a viable
theoretical framework to help explain organizational learning as it relates to the public
sector in general and federal agencies in specific. Below is a brief description of Jones
and Baumgartner’s idea of agenda setting and their Implicit Index Model in which
organizations monitor their respective environments for signals which may inform
leadership decisions.

A Micro-theory of Information Processing
Unlike individuals, organizations are able to process large amounts of
information by delegating responsibility to organizational sub-units. Because individuals
are boundedly rational, they process information in seriatim. On balance, time
constraints and limited cognitive abilities make it so that individuals must focus their
own attention on one issue at a time when making decisions (Herbert A. Simon, 1991).
To a certain extent, division of labor enables organizational leaders to augment
cognitive abilities to allow for simultaneous management of multiple issues. By creating
specialized sub-units, agencies are able to delegate the responsibility for disparate
147

issues to units which are organizationally structured to suit a particular field. Thus,
organizations are much more adept at managing a litany of multidimensional issues
than are individual persons (B. D. Jones & Baumgartner, 2005).
There are myriad examples of this type of delegation of responsibility at the
federal level. From a fiscal perspective, Congress uses the committee system to
delegate consideration of budget policy to House and Senate Budget Committees, which
then formulate budgetary legislation for the approval of the full Congress. Likewise, the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) bears the responsibility for formulating,
compiling, and submitting the president’s annual budget submission to Congress.
Similarly, each cabinet-level department has a budget office that formulates and
submits an annual budget to the OMB. For instance, the Office of Management within
the Treasury Department compiles the Congressional Justification of Appropriations for
the Department of the Treasury, while the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
compiles similar documentation for the Department of Defense.
Yet, even organizations as large as the federal government suffer cognitive
limitations which force them, at some point, to switch from parallel- to serial processing,
which further implies issue prioritization. The use of a single point of adjudication will
force a decision-making body to prioritize issues, thereby creating a logjam of sorts in
the processing of information. Furthermore, increasing the number of decision-makers
does not alleviate the bottleneck; even with 535 members, Congress can vote on only
one issue at a time. At the individual level, issue prioritization is known as attention-
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shifting because one must focus one’s attention on a single matter while ignoring all
other issues. At the organizational-level, issue prioritization is called agenda setting (B.
D. Jones & Baumgartner, 2005).
In an organizational context, specialized units, such as the ones mentioned
previously, work to detect signals in the environment during the agenda setting stage of
decision-making. These signals come from a variety of origins and they help to inform
the decision-making process. While some of those sources are highly dependable, some
of them are irrelevant, others are redundant, and there are far too many for a single
agency to monitor and evaluate effectively. Therefore, agencies select only the most
relevant of sources to monitor and those who rely on the information derive indices
comprised of only the most germane indicators. Incidentally, these indices are not
explicitly published like the Consumer Price Index or the Standard and Poor’s 500.
Instead, they are internal to the agency and are more akin to organizational norms that
evolve over time (B. D. Jones & Baumgartner, 2005).
Jones and Baumgartner (2005) refer to this practice of cataloguing information
as the Implicit Index Approach. With regard to any given problem which an organization
may face and as illustrated in Figure 6.1, a variety of sources produce indicators which
yield information about the state of the world. Decision-makers rely on this information
to inform their decision calculus. Random errors, distortion, or noise enters the
equation when decision-makers interpret information from sources toward the
construction of indicators, and again as decision-makers combine indicators into an
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index which informs their ultimate decision. In summary, decision-makers, upon
recognition of a problem, select a series of what they perceive to be the most pertinent
and reliable sources of information about that problem. Then, taking biases into
account, they assimilate the information, determine a course of action, and make a final
decision (B. D. Jones & Baumgartner, 2005).

Figure 6.1: The Implicit Index Model: Combining Information from Diverse Sources
Noise
Source 1

Indicator 1

Source 2

Indicator 2

Computation

Decision

. .

. .
Source k

Indicator k
Noise

Source: Jones, B. D., & Baumgartner, F. R. (2005). The Politics of Attention: How Government Prioritizes Problems.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p 59.

At this point, principal-agent theory may also play a role in the organizational
learning process. Agency theory postulates that the relationship between elected
officials and nonelected bureaucrats is hierarchical, and that differences between
bureaucratic agents and democratic principals will result in bureaucratic agents pursuing
interests of the agency over those of the principal (Nicholson & Snyder, 2012; Wilson,
2000). It follows then that if federal agencies, acting as bureaucratic agents, are seeking
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to monitor the most relevant sources of information in their environment, they will
monitor the actions of democratic principals for indicators that inform the
organization’s decision-making process and ultimately influence organizational learning.
In fact, research on political control of the bureaucracy demonstrates the
feasibility of this line of thought. As Wood and Waterman (1991) explain, congressional
control over the resources of federal agencies compels agency decision-makers to keep
close tabs on the rewards and sanctions that legislators distribute. However,
bureaucratic agents often have multiple principals (Wilson, 2000) and, with respect to
budgetary resources, federal organizations are also subject to the control of the
president via the OMB (Wood & Waterman, 1991). At a minimum, federal organizations
must monitor Congress and the president when processing information about
continuing resolutions. Thus, examining certain aspects of these two sources, one may
be able to determine which factors of the federal budgetary process act as signaling
mechanisms or indicators for bureaucratic agencies in the processing of information
related to continuing resolutions.

Expectations
Bearing in mind that bureaucratic agencies monitor Congress and the president
for budget-related signals, one might formulate a series of a priori expectations
regarding the association and influence of certain factors on the implementation of
continuing resolutions. In keeping with the Implicit Index Model, federal agencies might
view the president and Congress as relevant sources of information. In turn, certain
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elements associated with those two entities may serve as indicators which are compiled
into an index that informs the decision-making process.
Presidential factors
Concerning the president, there are several factors which may act as signaling
mechanisms to the bureaucracy. First, the party of the president is an obvious element
of consideration but one for which the influence is difficult to predict a priori. On one
hand, a president from the Republican Party may favor budget reductions toward a
smaller federal government, while a president from the Democratic Party may favor
budget increases in support of more robust social programs. Either of these scenarios is
likely to generate budgetary discord and may ultimately lead to delays in the
appropriation of funding. Thus, the relationship between the party of the president and
the enactment of continuing resolutions is predicted to be a positive one.
Second, the length of a president’s tenure may also influence the incidence of
continuing resolutions. Stimson (1976) shows that presidential approval ratings tend to
decline in the second term and Schick (2007) submits that budgetary successes are more
difficult to come by later in one’s presidency. Hence, the relationship between
presidential tenure and the implementation of continuing resolutions is thought to be a
positive one. As the length of a president’s tenure increases, instances of continuing
resolutions should increase as well.
Third, the dynamic between the president and members of Congress is sure to
influence budgetary dialogue. Recall from chapter three that veto negotiations over the
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federal budget are most prevalent under conditions of divided government. Indeed,
Edwards and colleagues (1997) find that presidents are more apt to oppose significant
legislation when the government is divided and that important legislation fails to pass
more often under divided government. Coleman (1999), however, found that unified
government leads to greater production of significant legislation, while other studies
have shown that legislative gridlock can occur equally under circumstances of divided
and unified government and that legislative production has little to do with whether the
government is divided (Fiorina, 1996; Krehbiel, 1996; Mayhew, 1991). Assuming the
status of the government exhibits statistical significance in this study, a priori
expectations are toward a positive relationship between divided government and the
occurrence of continuing appropriations.
Congressional polarization factors
Polarization in the U.S. Congress, as measured by the distance between party
means, tends to vary across time. At times, the average ideological views of political
parties differ greatly from each other, at other times the differences are less
pronounced. Since 1975, the distance between party means has grown wider and
several scholars (Beckmann & McGann, 2008; Cummins, 2012; D. R. Jones, 2001, 2010)
find polarization to be a contributing factor to legislative gridlock. Apropos of the
budget discussion, Cummins (2012) examines gridlock in the context of delayed budget
adoption at the state level and finds party polarization to be a key factor for California’s
inability to pass a state budget in a timely manner. Assuming an increase in polarization
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leads to an increase in legislative gridlock, then one might expect an increase in
polarization to yield an increase in the likelihood of continuing resolutions.
Factors related to the congressional budget resolution
There are also a number of factors associated with the congressional budget
resolution that may help predict the implementation of continuing appropriations acts.
First, recall from chapter two that the congressional budget resolution is rarely
approved in a timely fashion. Recall also that intense and sustained conflict over budget
policy engenders dysfunction within the regular appropriations process, and delay in
adoption of the congressional budget resolution is a prime indicator of dissonance over
budgetary matters (Schick, 2007). It follows that delay in the adoption of the
congressional budget resolution should increase the likelihood of continuing resolutions.
Two additional factors which may be relevant are the number of changes made
to the budget resolution and the number of members who object to the adoption of the
resolution. Naturally, changes to the budget resolution, in the form of amendments or
reserve funds (discussed further below), take time to negotiate, and the resolution
cannot pass without an adequate number of supporting votes. Thus, one might
anticipate a positive relationship between these factors and the implementation of
continuing resolutions. As the number of changes considered to the budget resolution
increases, so too should the likelihood of continuing resolutions. Similarly, as the
number of nay votes pertaining to the adoption of the budget resolution increases, the
probability of continuing resolutions being implemented should increase as well.
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Another factor might be the views that members of Congress have toward the
substance of the budget resolution. Members of Congress will often make public
statements about pending legislation that may have bearing on the implementation of
stopgap measures. For instance, either or both chambers of Congress can formally
articulate their opinions regarding matters of national interest by way of “sense of the
House,” “sense of the Senate,” or “sense of the Congress” provisions. Such provisions
have no formal effect on policy, but foreign governments and domestic agencies attend
to them as early signals of policy intent (Davis, 2013; Rundquist, 2003). However,
“sense of” provisions can be used to express both positive and negative views of policy
and legislation (Davis, 2013); therefore, the relationship between continuing resolutions
and formal expressions of opinion is thought to be ambiguous.
Factors related to the appropriation hearings
Finally, certain aspects of the appropriations hearings may also act as indicators
for decision-makers. Recall from the discussions of the annual appropriations process
that the House begins consideration and mark-up of annual appropriations in May with
the Senate following suit soon thereafter, and that agencies monitor the legislative
actions of appropriations committees. The appropriations for which the associated
hearings have not concluded by the end of the fiscal year must suffer continuing
resolutions. Thus, the amount of time it takes for appropriations hearings to conclude
may be an indicator of pending continuing appropriations and the relationship is
thought to be a positive one. As the duration in time of appropriations hearings
increases, the implementation of continuing resolutions should also increase.
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Data
The data for the analysis consists of an unbalanced panel of 4,067 observations
related to the passage of annual appropriations of 15 cabinet-level departments.
Temporally, the data span a period of thirty-four federal fiscal years, from 1976 to 2010,
and includes elements pertaining to divided government, polarization, congressional
budget resolutions, and appropriations hearings.
The dependent variable
The basic unit of analysis is continuing resolutions. To be more specific, the
analysis relates to the odds of the implementation of a continuing resolution given the
influence of certain presidential and congressional factors in the federal budget process.
Data having to do with continuing resolutions were retrieved from the Proquest
Congressional database. The annual Appropriations Acts for the Departments of
Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Education, Energy, Health and Human Services,
Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Justice, Labor, State,
Transportation, Treasury, and Veterans Affairs were queried for each fiscal year
between 1976 and 2010. Those appropriations which were signed into public law on or
before the first day of October of each fiscal year are assumed to have passed without
being subject to a continuing resolution or any other restrictions on spending, such as a
funding gap. For those appropriations signed into public law after the first day of
October, it is assumed that a continuing resolution or the like was incorporated.
Continuing resolutions is a dichotomized binary variable coded 1 if continuing
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appropriations are present or coded 0 to represent the timely passage of an annual
budget.
Table 6.1 shows the number of times, between Fiscal Years 1976 and 2010, that
the 15 annual Appropriations Acts mentioned above were signed into law on or before
the first day of the federal fiscal year. Each fiscal year in which the budget for those
agencies was passed in a timely manner is denoted with an “X.” Conversely, those times
during which budgets were delayed beyond the first day of the fiscal year signifies the
presence of continuing resolutions for the respective agency; such instances are
identified with a dash. Further, four agencies were not designated as cabinet-level
department until after 1976, and a null sign is used to designate the fiscal years during
which these agencies were not yet in existence. Finally, the party of the president
residing in office is identified in the second column; “D” represents a president from the
Democratic Party, while “R” represents a Republican.

This space was left blank intentionally.
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Table 6.1: Instances of Continuing Appropriations Acts by Department by Fiscal Year
(1976 – 2010)
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- denotes implementation of a continuing resolution
X denotes timely passage of annual appropriations
Ø denotes periods during which the agency was not a cabinet-level organization
D represents a Democratic president
R represents a Republican president
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Independent variables
Beyond the federal agencies themselves, two key entities are involved in the
overall formulation of the federal budget: the president and Congress. Thus, the
analysis will employ 19 independent variables related to the president, congressional
polarization, the congressional budget resolution, and the appropriations committees.
A description of the explanatory variables follows this paragraph. To help summarize
this information, Table 6.3 contains summary statistics and Table 6.4 lists abbreviated
descriptions of each variable and the expected sign of the coefficient upon estimation.
Data for divided government and the presidential came from the Database of
Political Institutions 2012 (Norwegian Social Science Data Services, 2012). Compiled by
the Development Research Group of the World Bank, and most recently updated in
January 2013, this database contains information on 180 countries and is used for
comparative studies of political economy and political institutions. Beck (2001) presents
the database and examines the effect of divided government on public debt. Three
categorical variables pertaining to divided government and the party of the U.S.
president were chosen from the database: (1) Democratic president is an indicator
variable coded 1 if a Democratic president is in office or coded 0 otherwise, (2) Years in
office signifies the number of years that the president has been in office, and (3) Unified
government is an indicator variable which is coded 1 if the party of the executive
controls all houses of the government or coded 0 otherwise.
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Following the efforts of Binder (1999) on legislative gridlock and Woon and
Anderson (2012) on the timing of congressional appropriations, political polarization
scores were also used as explanatory variables. House and Senate polarization data
pertaining to the liberal-conservative aspect of party polarization were retrieved from
Voteview.com, which was established by Howard Rosenthal and Keith Poole and which
is currently affiliated with the Department of Political Science at the University of
Georgia (Keith T. Poole & Rosenthal, 2014). An average of the polarization figures for
the House and Senate was computed and labeled Average polarization. Multiple
regression was used to determine the level of residual polarization attributable to either
chamber and labeled as Residual polarization (House) and Residual polarization
(Senate).
Several explanatory variables came from a Congressional Research Service report
titled Congressional Budget Resolutions: Historical Information (Heniff & Murray, 2013).
The report includes a comprehensive list of the resolutions and accompanying measures
adopted and rejected by Congress since implementation of the Budget Resolution Act in
1974. The first variable chosen from this report pertains to the amount of delay in
adoption of the congressional budget resolution. The congressional calendar plans for
adoption of the resolution by April 15 (May 15 prior to 1987). However, as Table 6.2
shows, Congress rarely adopts the budget resolution in a timely manner and delays are
often perceived as an indication of budgetary conflict (Schick, 2007). Thus, the variable
Deadline, represents the number of days by which adoption of the budget resolution
exceeds the target adoption date.
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For this analysis, it is important to take notice of the instances during which
Congress did not formally adopt a budget resolution. Since the passage of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Congress has failed, on six occasions, to complete
action on an annual budget resolution: (1) in 1998 for Fiscal Year (FY) 1999; (2) in 2002
for FY2003; (3) in 2004 for FY2005; (4) in 2006 for FY2007; (5) in 2010 for FY2011; and
(6) in 2011 for FY2012 (Heniff & Murray, 2013). The accompanying dataset encompass
four of these fiscal years.
In the absence of a formal budget resolution, Congress may rely on a deeming
resolution to address the issue in an ad hoc manner. While the term deeming resolution
does not have an official definition or any specific rule which governs its use, members
of Congress use the legislation as an annual budget resolution to establish enforceable
budget levels for a budget cycle. In addition to providing revised spending allocations to
the appropriations committees, deeming resolutions may also adjust aggregate budget
levels and spending allocations to other House and Senate committees (Lynch, 2010).
Instead of leaving the Deadline data field open-ended, marking it as missing, or
assigning an arbitrary date when Congress failed to pass a formal budget resolution, the
date which the House adopted the associated deeming resolution was used instead. For
Fiscal Year 1999, January 6, 1999 was used, which was 266 days past the April 15 target
adoption date. For Fiscal Year 2003, March 20, 2002 was used. This date occurs prior to
the deadline, so the data field was zero-filled. For Fiscal Year 2005, the House adopted
the deeming resolution on May 19, 2004, which was 34 days past deadline, and for
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Fiscal Year 2007, May 18, 2006 was used, which was 33 days past deadline (Lynch,
2010). Accordingly, an indicator variable labeled Deeming resolution was coded 1 to
signify the application of a deeming resolution, and coded 0 otherwise.

This space was left blank intentionally.
Table 6.2 follows on the next page.
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Table 6.2: Budget Resolution Adoption Dates, Fiscal Years 1976 – 2010
Fiscal Year
Date adopted
Days after deadline
(Target date: 15 May)
1976
14 – May – 1975
0
1977
13 – May – 1976
0
1978
17 – May – 1977
2
1979
17 – May – 1978
2
1980
24 – May – 1979
9
1981
12 – Jun – 1980
28
1982
21 – May – 1981
6
1983
23 – Jun – 1982
39
1984
23 – Jun – 1983
39
1985
1 – Oct – 1984
139
1986
1 – Aug – 1985
78
27
(Target date: 15 April)
1987
27 – Jun – 1986
73
1988
24 – Jun – 1987
70
1989
6 – Jun – 1988
52
1990
18 – May – 1989
33
1991
9 – Oct – 1990
176
1992
22 – May – 1991
37
1993
21 – May – 1992
36
1994
1 – Apr – 1993
0
1995
12 – May – 1994
27
1996
29 – Jun – 1995
75
1997
13 – Jun – 1996
59
1998
5 – Jun – 1997
51
1999
Adopted deeming resolution
266
2000
15 – Apr – 1999
0
2001
13 – Apr – 2000
0
2002
10 – May – 2001
25
2003
Adopted deeming resolution
0
2004
11 – Apr – 2003
0
2005
Adopted deeming resolution
34
2006
28 – Apr – 2005
13
2007
Adopted deeming resolution
33
2008
17 – May – 2007
32
2009
5 – Jun – 2008
51
2010
29 – Apr – 2009
14

Source: Congressional Research Service, Congressional Budget Resolutions: Historical Information, CRS
Report RL30297, Table 12, p. 28-29.
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As originally enacted, the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 required that Congress adopt two budget
resolutions each year: (1) an advisory resolution by May 15 and (2) and a binding resolution by September
15. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 eliminated the requirement for a
second resolution and set April 15 as the target adoption date (Heniff & Murray, 2008).
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To capture the amount of disagreement and compromise associated with
adoption of the congressional budget resolution, “Nay” votes and amendments were
also chosen as explanatory variables. If delay in adoption of the resolution is a
barometer of budgetary discord (Schick, 2007), then the number of amendments
considered while crafting the resolution and the number of members voting against
adoption of the resolution should also help to gauge levels of budgetary conflict. Hence,
four variables are devoted to the number of amendments accepted and rejected by
both houses of congress: Amendments accepted (House), Amendments rejected (House),
Amendments accepted (Senate), and Amendments rejected (Senate). In addition,
another four variables capture the number of Nay votes cast, in the House and Senate,
during the vote on initial passage of the resolution and the again during the vote on
adoption of the conference reports: Nay votes initial passage (House), Nay votes
conference (House), Nay votes initial passage (Senate), and Nay votes conference
(Senate).
A component of the budget resolution which relates to revisions in spending and
revenue generation may also point to delays in preparation of the budget resolution. To
formulate the resolution, committees are given a budget for the legislation in their
jurisdiction and committee members are instructed not to generate spending that will
exceed the committee’s allocated budget (Schick, 2007). In a similar manner, tax
committees are instructed to meet revenue floors. Incidentally, if a committee were to
report legislation that increases federal spending beyond committee allocations or
reduces revenue below budget resolution floors, the legislation would be subject to a
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Budget Act point of order 28. So long as the legislation does not increase the budget
deficit, reserve funds enable the Chairman of the Budget Committee to adjust
committee allocations and budget resolution aggregates to reflect the attendant
legislative changes. In essence, reserve funds provide congressional committees the
flexibility to consider spending and/or revenue legislation that would normally be
subject to procedural objections (Heniff & Murray, 2013; Horney, 2009a, 2009b).
Hence, the presence of a reserve fund(s) in the budget resolution signifies the need to
compromise and to make budgetary adjustments, which may lead to an extension of the
budgetary timeline and an increase in the likelihood of continuing resolutions. This
variable is named, creatively enough, Reserve funds.
Another important component of the budget resolution relates to the desire for
one or both chambers of Congress to express an opinion on a budgetary matter in a
formal setting. Declaratory statements are non-binding proclamations that allow the
relevant chamber, or the Congress as a whole, to make a public statement without
formally affecting public policy. Accordingly, domestic agencies tend to view these
“sense of” provisions as an early indication that Congress may alter established laws
(Davis, 2013). Over time, the number of declaratory statements included in the budget
resolution has increased. The first 18 resolutions included an average of 2.5 declaratory
statements, while the last 10 have averaged 24 such declarations (Heniff & Murray,
2013; Heniff, Raiter, & Murray, 2008). Because members of Congress seek to broadcast
28

A point of order is a query, raised during a formal debate or meeting, as to whether parliamentary
procedures are being followed. Point-of-order provisions included in the Congressional Budget Act of
1974 permit any member in either congressional chamber to prevent the consideration of legislation that
would violate budget resolution policies (Lynch, 2010).
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their sentiments on the budget and because agencies actively monitor those
sentiments, the variable Declaratory statements represents declaratory statements that
may portend the implementation of continuing resolutions.
Schick (1980, 2007) suggests that federal organizations monitor closely the
actions of appropriations committees. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974 structured the congressional calendar such that bills often pass the
House and Senate by the end of June and move to conference as early as July.
Accordingly, agencies, such as the Office of Management and Budget, maintain tabs on
appropriations committees and review proposed legislation and testimony in hopes of
influencing congressional budget decisions prior to the beginning of the associated fiscal
year. Hence, data on congressional hearings was obtained to analyze the relationship
between appropriations hearings and the implementation of continuing appropriations.
The congressional hearings data were retrieved from the Policy Agendas Project
website (www.policyagendas.org). The Policy Agendas Project, currently located at the
Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin, was initiated in 1993 to
facilitate the study of policy changes across time (Department of Government at the
University of Texas, 2014). The Agendas Project Hearings Data Set contains information
on all congressional hearings conducted between 1947 and 2014 (B. D. Jones &
Baumgartner, 2013). Two data fields were chosen with the notion that the longer it
takes for hearings to conclude, the greater the likelihood of continuing appropriations:
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(1) Sessions represent the number of sessions within a hearing and (2) Days signifies the
duration of the hearings, expressed in days.
Variables conspicuously absent from the data
Appropriations committee roll call votes were excluded from the dataset.
Whereas the roll call votes associated with the initial passage and subsequent adoption
of the congressional budget resolutions were reported in Congressional Budget
Resolutions: Historical Information, roll call votes pertaining to the appropriations
committees hearings were not available in a format such that they could be merged
consistently across all years with the data used in this analysis. What is more, some
appropriations committee roll call votes do not take place in a timely manner. While
appropriations committee hearings are scheduled to begin as early as June of the
terminating fiscal year (Schick, 1980, 2007), the associated roll call votes may not take
place until after the terminating fiscal year has passed and the new fiscal year has
begun. When this occurs, those particular votes would cease to be a factor that affects
the year-end spending decisions of federal agencies.
Finally, budget reconciliation directives were not included in the data either.
When spending, revenue, and debt-limit levels set forth in the congressional budget
resolution require changes to existing laws, the budget resolution will instruct affected
committees to report legislation incorporating such statutory changes (Committee on
the Budget: U.S. House of Representatives, 2013b; Heniff & Murray, 2013; Schick, 2007).
However, budget reconciliation occurs with such frequency that, within this dataset,
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they are almost collinear with the dependent variable. Including budget reconciliation
directives as a variable results in endogeneity by construction; therefore, instances of
budget reconciliation were also excluded from the data.
Table 6.3: Summary Statistics
Variable
Continuing resolution (CR)
Democratic president
Years in office
Unified government
Average polarization
Deadline
Deeming resolutions
Nay votes initial passage (House)
Nay votes conference (House)
Amendments accepted (House)
Amendments rejected (House)
Nay votes initial passage (Senate)
Nay votes conference (Senate)
Amendments accepted (Senate)
Amendments rejected (Senate)
Reserve funds
Declaratory statements
Days
Sessions

Mean
0.796
0.321
3.815
0.297
0.689
40.419
0.120
185.717
167.026
1.454
6.265
37.705
32.547
23.931
15.994
4.561
7.904
3.440
6.114

Std. Dev.
0.403
0.467
2.247
0.475
0.137
52.073
0.325
27.418
61.961
2.994
7.250
13.886
14.856
24.273
12.745
7.702
11.166
2.653
5.573

Min
0
0
1
0
0.514
0
0
99
0
0
0
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Max
1
1
8
1
0.919
266
1
214
213
12
34
100
50
101
48
37
44
31
41

Number of observations: 4,067

Econometric Model and Estimation Methods
Because of (1) the reliance on a limited dependent variable, (2) the use of
predicted values in subsequent analysis, and (3) the structure of the error terms, binary
logistic regression is preferred as an estimation method over the use of linear
probability models.
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The unit of analysis, continuing resolutions, is a binary-outcome variable that is
coded 1 to signify the implementation of spending restrictions and coded 0 when annual
appropriations are passed in a timely manner. Binary-outcome variables have an upperand lower limit of one and zero, respectively. Using a linear probability model may
result in fitted probabilities of greater than unity or less than zero, which presents
problems if the predicted values are going to be used in subsequent analysis. In
addition, summary statistics show that the mean for continuing resolutions is 0.796,
which is to say that continuing appropriations are implemented, on average, during 79.6
percent of the fiscal years within the data. This statistic is in line with prior findings in
the literature that 75 percent of all spending bills between 1976 and 2009 were not
passed before the beginning of the fiscal year (Woon & Anderson, 2012). When such
probabilities are closer to unity, logistic regression is the preferred method of
estimation (Acock, 2012).
The non-normal and heteroscedastic structure of the error terms also rules-out
the use of linear probability models. Figure 6.1 provides a graphical display of the kernel
density estimate of the residuals in relation to a normal distribution, and a ShapiroFrancia test for normality confirms that the residuals are not normally distributed
(p<0.0001). Two tests for heteroscedasticity confirm non-uniform variance in the error
terms. White’s general test for heteroscedasticity reports chi-square(94) = 1283.94,
p<0.001 and a Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisbert test for heteroscedasticity reports chisquare(1) = 389.24, p<0.001; thus, one must accept the alternative hypothesis that the
variance of the error terms is not homogeneous.
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Figure 6.2: Kernel Density Estimate of Residuals
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Hence, logit regression was used to estimate the following log-linear model:

ln �𝑃(𝐶𝑅)�(1 − 𝑃(𝐶𝑅))� = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜷𝒊 (𝑷) + 𝜷𝒊 (𝑪) + 𝜷𝒊 (𝑩𝑹) + 𝜷𝒊 (𝑨) + 𝜇𝑖
Where the dependent variable is the natural log of the odds ratio that Congress will pass
a continuing appropriations act in the absence of annual appropriations. P is a vector of
three variables associated with the president, C represents is a vector of congressional
polarization variables, BR is a vector of twelve variables associated with the
congressional budget resolution, A is a vector of two variables associated with the
hearings of appropriations committees, and β are the associated coefficients. α is the
constant term, 𝜇 is the disturbance term, and the subscript i denotes the ith observation

from the sample of size N. Table 6.4 includes a summary of all variables along with the
expected sign of the coefficients.
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Table 6.4: Determinants of Continuing Resolutions
Variable
Dependent variable
𝑙𝑛 �

Pr(𝐶𝑅)
�(1 − Pr(𝐶𝑅))�

Description

Expected sign
of coefficient

- Natural log of the odds ratio that Congress will
pass continuing appropriations in lieu of annual
appropriations

Independent variables
Presidential variables
Democratic president
Years in office
Unified government

- Indicator variable for U.S. President, equal to 1
if a Democratic president is in office and equal
to zero otherwise.
- Number of years the president has been in
office.
- Indicator variable equal to 1 if the party of the
president is in control of both chambers of
Congress and equal to zero otherwise.

Congressional polarization factors
Average polarization
- Average polarization, on the liberalconservative spectrum, of the House and
Senate.
Residual polarization
- Residual polarization in the House
(House)
Residual polarization
- Residual polarization in the Senate
(Senate)
Factors related to the congressional budget resolution
Deadline
- Number of days past the target date of
adoption for the budget resolution.
Deeming resolution
- Indicator variable equal to 1 if House adopted a
deeming resolution and equal to zero otherwise.
Nay votes initial passage
- Number of nay votes regarding initial passage
(House)
of the budget resolution in the House.
Nay votes conference
- Number of nay votes regarding adoption of the
(House)
budget resolution conference report in the
House.
Amendments accepted
- Number of amendments to the budget
(House)
resolution accepted in the House.
Amendments rejected
- Number of amendments to the budget
(House)
resolution rejected in the House.
Nay votes initial passage
- Number of nay votes on initial passage of the
(Senate)
budget resolution in the Senate.
Nay votes conference
- Number of nay votes on adoption of the
(Senate)
budget resolution conference report in the
Senate.
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+
+
-

+
+
+

+
+ or +
+
+
+
+
+

Amendments accepted
(Senate)
Amendments rejected
(Senate)
Reserve funds
Declaratory statements

Table 6.4: Continued
- Number of amendments to the budget
resolution accepted in the Senate.
- Number of amendments to the budget
resolution rejected in the Senate.
- Number of reserve funds included in the
budget resolution
- Number of declaratory statements included in
the budget resolution.

+
+
+
+ or -

Factors related to the appropriations hearings
Days
- Duration of hearings, expressed in days.
Sessions
- Number of sessions within a hearing.

+
+

Results
Table 6.5 reports the maximum likelihood logit regression coefficients along with
standard errors. The model was run twice using the same covariates but the first
iteration (1) includes estimates of the effect of residual polarization in the House, while
the second iteration (2) includes estimates of the effect of residual polarization in the
Senate. For the overall model, Stata reports a likelihood ratio chi-squared(19) = 925.76,
p < 0.001; as a whole, the model is statistically significant. When forecasting the
occurrence of continuing appropriations, the model is correct 84.60 percent of the time,
and when predicting the timely passage of annual appropriations, the model is accurate
93.51 percent of the time. In general, the model accurately predicts 85.17 percent of
cases, and when the model errs it is most likely to predict a continuing resolution.
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Table 6.5: Results of Binary Logistic Regression
Variable
Presidential factors
Democratic president
Years in office
Unified government

(1)
(2)
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
-2.010***
0.324***
1.000***

(0.159)
(0.030)
(0.197)

-2.010***
0.324***
1.000***

(0.159)
(0.030)
(0.197)

-2.629*
7.510***

(1.496)
(2.869)

-2.435

(1.482)

-14.600***

(5.578)

Budget resolution factors
Deadline
Deeming resolution
Nay votes initial passage (House)
Nay votes conference (House)
Amendments accepted (House)
Amendments rejected (House)
Nay votes initial passage (Senate)
Nay votes conference (Senate)
Amendments accepted (Senate)
Amendments rejected (Senate)
Reserve funds
Declaratory statements

0.009***
-3.019***
0.036***
-0.012***
0.150***
-0.110***
-0.032***
-0.027***
-0.022***
0.028***
0.135***
0.020***

(0.002)
(0.668)
(0.003)
(0.001)
(0.043)
(0.018)
(0.008)
(0.010)
(0.006)
(0.005)
(0.016)
(0.007)

0.009***
-3.019***
0.036***
-0.012***
0.150***
-0.110***
-0.032***
-0.027***
-0.022***
0.028***
0.135***
0.020***

(0.002)
(0.668)
(0.003)
(0.001)
(0.043)
(0.018)
(0.008)
(0.010)
(0.006)
(0.005)
(0.016)
(0.007)

Appropriations hearings factors
Days
Sessions

0.023
0.009

(0.025)
(0.012)

0.023
0.009

(0.025)
(0.012)

Constant

-0.092

(0.869)

-0.226

(0.850)

Observations
Positive predictive value
Negative predictive value

4,067
84.60%
93.51%

Congressional polarization factors
Average polarization
Residual polarization (House)
Residual polarization (Senate)

4,067
84.60%
93.51%

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Odds ratios can be computed by exponentiating the coefficient. For example, the coefficient for
(-2.010179)
) yields an odds ratio of
Democratic president is -2.010179. Exponentiating the coefficient (i.e., e
0.133968. Subtracting 1 from this number and multiplying by 100 yields -86.60353 percent.
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Presidential factors
All three of the coefficients related to the president are highly statistically
significant. The negative coefficient on the Democratic president variable indicates that,
on average, the election of a Democratic president decreases the odds of a continuing
resolution being implemented by 86.6 percent (refer to the note to Table 6.5 for odds
ratio calculations and percentage conversions). Said another way, the odds of a
continuing resolution are 2.01 times less likely under a Democratic president than under
a Republican president. Yet the positive coefficient on Years on office shows that, on
balance, for each additional year that a president holds office, the odds of a continuing
resolution being enacted increase some 38.3 percent, holding all other independent
variables constant. What is more, the Unified government coefficient indicates that if
the party of the president controls all houses of the government, the probability of
continuing appropriations increases. In other words, the odds of a continuing resolution
are almost 172 percent greater under conditions of unified government than they are
under divided government.
The unified government finding runs counter to expectations and seems
counterintuitive, but literature on divided and unified government does offer
explanations. Skowronek (1993) submits that presidents, such as Carter and Hoover,
have been known to be legislatively unsuccessful under unified government if the
broader policy regime is in decline. Woon and Anderson (2012) and Schick (2007) add
that internal party conflict is a major cause of delay in the passage of congressional
appropriations, while Quirk and Nesmith (1995) propose that incidental factors like the
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budget deficit and issue complexity during the George H. W. Bush Administration had
more of an influence over legislative gridlock than did divided government (government
was divided during Bush’s presidency). To underscore Quirk and Nesmith’s suggestion,
President Clinton operated under a unified government during the 103rd Congress
(1993-1994) but Democrats did not hold a strong majority and the Clinton deficit
reduction plan passed the House by only two votes, 218-214 (Eaton & Tumulty, 1993;
Rosenbaum, 1993). That same year, 13 of the 14 cabinet-level departments listed in
Table 6.1 were subject to continuing resolutions. President George W. Bush also
operated under a unified government during the 108th (2003-2004) and 109th (20052006) Congresses but, similar to the Clinton example, a majority of cabinet-level
departments experienced continuing appropriations during that time. Hence, over the
timeframe under study and within this particular dataset, unified government is
associated with an increase in continuing resolutions.
Congressional polarization factors
Also over this 34-year period in this data set, average polarization exhibits a
negative influence on the incidence of continuing appropriations; however, average
polarization exhibits statistical significance in the House iteration of the model only.
Controlling for polarization in the House, a one standard deviation increase in Average
polarization leads to a 30.2 percent decrease in odds of continuing resolutions being
enacted. Average polarization does not exhibit statistical significance in the Senate
iteration of the model.
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The residual effects of party polarization present a more nuanced story.
Controlling for average polarization, residual polarization in the House tends to increase
the likelihood of stopgap measures. On average and ceteris paribus, an increase of one
standard deviation in Residual polarization (House) increases the odds of continuing
resolutions by some 20.9 percent. Conversely, a one standard deviation increase in
Residual polarization (Senate) reduces the odds of continuing appropriations by 17.3
percent. Thus, on balance, continuing resolutions are more likely to be a result of
polarization in the House than in the Senate.
Budget resolution factors
All of the budget resolution factors are highly statistically significant. Other
things equal, the positive Deadline coefficient illustrates that the more tardy Congress is
at adopting a budget resolution, the more likely continuing appropriations are to be
implemented; by and large, the odds increase by 0.9 percent with each day that
legislators miss the target adoption date. On four occasions, the House adopted a
deeming resolution in place of a budget resolution and when such an occurrence takes
place, continuing resolutions are 3.02 times less likely to be implemented. The Reserve
funds coefficient shows that revisions to spending- and revenue legislation also tend to
increase the likelihood of continuing resolutions, which is consistent with a priori
expectations. On average, the addition of one more reserve fund to the budget
resolution will increase the odds of a stopgap measure by 14.4 percent. The Declaratory
statements variable is also statistically significant and the sign of the coefficient is in the
expected direction. Thus, adding a declaratory statement to the congressional budget
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resolution tends to increase the chances that stopgap measures will be implemented by
approximately 2 percent.
While each of the voting and amendment variables displayed statistical
significance, the signs of the coefficients generally exhibited an alternating pattern.
With regard to actions in the House, a vote against initial passage of the resolution
typically increases the odds of a stopgap measure by 3.6 percent, while a vote against
adoption of the conference report will decrease the odds of a continuing resolution by
1.2 percent. For each amendment to the budget resolution accepted, odds of a
continuing resolution increase by 16.2 percent, while the rejection of an amendment
will likely decrease the odds by 10.4 percent, ceteris paribus. In the Senate, holding all
covariates constant, negative votes for initial passage of the resolution will, ordinarily,
decrease the odds of a continuing resolution by 3.1 percent. Likewise, nay votes for
adoption of the conference report portend a decrease in the odds of stopgap measures
by 2.7 percent. Each amendment to the resolution accepted by members of the Senate
usually decreases the odds of continuing appropriations by 2.1 percent, while each
rejected amendment increases the odds by 2.8 percent.
One may notice that the signs of the coefficients tend to be opposite of each
other, both within and between the chambers; some run counter to expectations,
others agree with the anticipated influence. There seems to be a game at play between
legislators with regard to initial passage of the resolution and the conference report,
and again between the number of amendments accepted and rejected. However, it is
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impossible to tease out the reasons for this vacillation in signs using only the variables in
this data set. While outside the immediate scope of this study, the roll call voting
literature (K. T. Poole & Rosenthal, 1991; Snyder & Groseclose, 2000) suggests party
influence over congressional voting behavior is most prevalent in substantive matters,
such as budget resolutions, taxation, and welfare policy. Thus, an opportunity for future
research may exist in the incorporation of party divisions into the data to help reveal
nuances of congressional voting behavior.
The change in signs may also be an artefact of the role that each chamber of
Congress is expected to assume. Wildavsky (1979) refers to these roles as “expectations
of behavior attached to institutional positions.” For instance, the House Appropriations
Committee acts as guardian of the Treasury, while the Senate Appropriations
Committee serves as an appeals court (Wildavsky, 1979). With the polarization results
in mind, one might imagine the House as a first mover in the appropriations game,
responsible for setting budget policy which may contribute, incidentally, to continuing
resolutions. The Senate, as second mover and court of appeals, may revise the budget
policy thereby contributing to a reduction in the likelihood of continuing appropriations.
This alternating pattern also lends weight to an observation made by Jones and
Baumgartner regarding the selection of indicators when constructing indices. Coupled
with the notion that decision-makers cannot be sure of the relevance of the indicators
to the decision at hand, computational errors may be systematic and biased or they may
be the result of random noise. Therefore, decision-makers tend to rely on a
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combination of several biased indicators in the hopes that misleading information from
one direction will counterbalance inaccuracies elsewhere (B. D. Jones & Baumgartner,
2005).
Appropriations hearings factors
Finally, neither of the appropriations hearings factors is statistically significant.
Either the length of Congressional consideration is irrelevant, or the relevant factors are
better measured by other variables.

Conclusions
The findings demonstrate the importance of the president and Congress as
sources of information for federal agencies seeking to gain insight to the likelihood of
continuing resolutions being enacted. Previous research demonstrates the significance
of congressional and presidential control over the budgetary resources of bureaucratic
agencies. Taken together with the findings that agencies engage in expense shifting in
response to the pending enactment of continuing appropriations acts, the findings in
this chapter suggest that bureaucratic agencies have learned to monitor particular
aspects of the federal budget process.
Moreover, the differentiation among indicators in the congressional budget
process underscores the notion of organizational learning. Earlier studies suggest a
positive relationship between budgeting conflict and delay in the adoption of the
congressional budget resolution, as well as agency monitoring of the actions of
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appropriations committees. Results here suggest that implicit indices pertaining to the
enactment of continuing resolutions might include indicators such as the party of the
president and the tenure in office; party polarization; the delay in adoption of the
congressional budget resolution; the number of reserve funds established; the sense of
the Congress; and possibly the roll call votes from initial passage and conference
reports. Conversely, decision-makers may not lend much weight to the amount of time
it takes for appropriations committees to conclude their business.
Thus, this study has provided a link between organizational learning and agenda
setting by way of the information processing aspect of the Implicit Index Approach. The
field of organizational learning has been concerned mostly with entities in the private
sector, leaving the topic, as it pertains to the public sector, largely unexplored. At the
same time, there is a robust literature on agenda setting which is just one aspect of how
government entities prioritize and process information. It seems natural enough, then,
to think of the concepts of organizational learning and agenda setting as being two sides
of the same coin; indeed, the Implicit Index Approach illustrates the close relationship
between the two topics. The research in this chapter has demonstrated the ability of
bureaucratic agencies to learn and to prioritize and process information while also
contributing to the overall field of knowledge of public budgeting.
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Chapter Seven
Conclusion

Contributions to the field of budgeting
For almost 140 years Congress has been using continuing resolutions to help
govern federal spending, yet the attendant literature is surprisingly thin on empirical
studies that isolate and quantify the behavioral effects of stopgap measures. Classifying
the attendant literature into government-wide and agency-specific segments reveals an
abundance of empirical case studies which conclude that continuing appropriations
generate uncertainty for federal agencies. Theoretical work by Leland and Zimmerman
informs the field of budgeting that uncertainty combined with risk aversion leads to
precautionary saving behavior which may take the form of contingency funding and
saving-dissaving strategies. Indeed, Balakrishnan and colleagues confirm expenseshifting behavior at U.S. Army hospitals but are unable to attribute the behavior to the
implementation of continuing appropriations. Quantitative analysis of the effects of
continuing resolutions on federal spending behavior has been all but nonexistent. This
circumstance is due in part to the notion that agency personnel do not track explicitly
the effects of continuing resolutions, and federal organizations are very reluctant to
divulge budget and expenditure data to outside parties.
One of the main contributions of this dissertation is the presentation of
quantitative evidence of expense shifting between fiscal years in response to the

181

implementation of continuing resolutions. By monitoring certain facets of the federal
budget process, resource managers seem able to anticipate the use of stopgap
measures to the extent that these resource managers engage in the strategic purchase
and consumption of additional inventories and contract services. In so doing, managers
shift expenditures between fiscal years while affording themselves additional spending
latitude in the face of spending constraints. Thus, the research presented verifies the
influence of continuing appropriations acts on federal spending behavior.
This research also builds on the expense-shifting findings by exploring the
signaling mechanisms between higher echelons of the federal government and
subordinate agencies, and agencies’ capacity to interpret those signals. When it comes
to budgetary discord, not only do organizations keep a watchful eye on the president
but also on the amount of disagreement surrounding the congressional budget
resolution. When combined with theoretical work on organizational learning and
agenda setting, the findings in this study suggest that federal agencies have learned to
rely on an implicit index of signals coming from the president and Congress to help
inform expenditure decisions.
Thus, continuing resolutions provide a feasible alternative to shuttering the
federal government while the president and Congress are at loggerheads over
budgetary differences, but enactment of continuing appropriations leaves federal
organizations uneasy about availability of future resources. In response to this
uncertainty, the federal resource management community has learned to shift
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expenditures to help prevent a disruption of operations, but they do so at the risk of
violating federal law and the bona fide needs rule. The findings of this research
illustrate both the ability of public sector organizations to learn from their environment,
and the difficulty of abiding by policy while ensuring the prudent use of federal funding.

Future research
With regard to future research on continuing appropriations, two questions
readily come to mind as a result of this dissertation. First, do spending restrictions have
the same effect at the state level as at the federal level? Currently, only nine U.S. states
use stopgap measures similar to continuing appropriations (Grooters & Eckl, 1998;
Kousser & Phillips, 2009). In addition to conducting a similar event study and agenda
setting approach as has been conducted in this dissertation, one might also compare
and contrast those states that use stopgap measures to those states which do not.
One might also question the effect that polarization has on the occurrence and
duration of continuing resolutions. Polarization in the U.S. Congress, as measured by
the distance between party means, tends to vary over time. Since 1975, the distance
between party means has grown wider thereby impeding the enactment of proposals
on the legislative agenda and leading to the notion that polarization increases legislative
gridlock (D. R. Jones, 2001, 2010). In addition, conflict is inherent to the budgeting
process and interim continuing appropriations are the legislative mechanism used to
keep the government operating while the president and Congress reconcile budgetary
differences. Interim continuing appropriations, then, might be thought of as one
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manifestation of legislative gridlock. If polarization increases gridlock and interim
continuing resolutions are a manifestation of gridlock, it follows that as party
polarization grows the duration of interim continuing resolutions should increase in a
corresponding manner. One might rely on the party polarization hypothesis (D. R.
Jones, 2001) in estimating the relationship between the increase in polarization and the
duration of interim continuing resolutions.
Thus, the subject of continuing resolutions provides ample opportunity for
scholarly research. Congress has used continuing resolutions since the mid-1800s and
much has been written about these stopgap measures, yet there are still prospects for
quantitative efforts. What is more, the combination of the federal fiscal cycle and
persistent budgetary conflict almost guarantees that the subject of continuing
appropriations and government shutdowns remains in the foreground of federal budget
discussions.
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Appendix A: Table of Standard Continuing Resolution Provisions

Provision
Rate for operations
Extent and manner
No new starts

Coverage of continuing
resolution obligations
Adjustment of accounts
Apportionment timing

High rate of operations

Limited funding actions
Appropriated
entitlements

Furlough restriction

Termination date

Government Accountability Office (GAO) Description
- Appropriates amounts necessary to continue projects and
activities that were conducted in the prior fiscal year at a specific
rate for operations.
- Incorporates restrictions from prior year’s appropriations acts or
the acts currently under consideration.
- Amounts appropriated under a continuing resolution are not
available to initiate or resume projects or activities for which
appropriations, funds, or authority were not available during the
prior fiscal year.
- Appropriations made available under the continuing resolution
shall remain available to cover all properly incurred obligations
and expenditures during the continuing resolution period.
- Expenditures made during the continuing resolution period are to
be charged against applicable appropriations acts one they are
finally enacted.
- Apportionment time requirements under 31 U.S.C. § 1513 are
suspended during the continuing resolution period but
appropriations provided under a continuing resolution must still
be apportioned to comply with the Antideficiency Act and other
federal laws.
- Programs/activities with high rates of obligation or complete
distribution of appropriations at beginning of prior fiscal year shall
not follow the same pattern of obligation nor should obligations
be made that would impinge upon final funding prerogatives.
- Agencies are directed to implement only the most limited funding
action to continue operations at the enacted rate.
- Authorizes entitlements and other mandatory payments whose
budget authority was provided in the prior year appropriations
acts to continue at a rate to maintain program levels under
current law (or to operate at present levels). Amounts available
for payments due on or about the first of each month after
October are to continue to be made 30 days after the termination
date of the continuing resolution.
- Authorizes the Office of Management and Budget and other
authorized government officials to apportion up to the full
amount of the rate for operations to avoid a furlough of civilian
employees. This authority may not be used until after an agency
has taken all necessary action to defer or reduce non-personnel
related administrative expenses.
- Date on which continuing resolution expires. Based on earlier of
specific date or enactment of annual appropriations acts.

Reproduced from an edited version of GAO Report number GAO-09-879, Continuing Resolutions:
Uncertainty Limited Management Options and Increased Workload in Selected Agencies (Pulmonte, 2011).
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Object Class
10
11.0
11.1
11.3
11.5
11.6
11.7
11.8
11.9
12
12.1
12.2
13
20
21
22
23
23.1
23.2
23.3
24
25
25.1
25.2
25.3
25.4
25.5
25.6
25.7
25.8
26
30
31
32
33
40
41
42
43
44
90
91
92
94

Appendix B: OMB Table of Object Classifications

Category
Personnel compensation and benefits
Personnel compensation
Full-time permanent
Other than full-time permanent
Other personnel compensation
Military personnel – basic allowance for housing
Military personnel
Special personnel services payments
Total personnel compensation
Personnel benefits
Civilian personnel benefits
Military personnel benefits
Benefits for former personnel
Contractual services and supplies
Travel and transportation of persons
Transportation of things
Rents, communications, and utilities
Rental payments to General Services Administration
Rental payments to others
Communications, utilities, and miscellaneous charges
Printing and reproduction
Other contractual services
Advisory and assistance
Other services from non-federal sources
Other goods and services from federal sources
Operation and maintenance of facilities
Research and development contracts
Medical care
Operation and maintenance of equipment
Subsistence and support of persons
Supplies and materials
Acquisition of assets
Equipment
Land and structures
Investments and loans
Grants and fixed charges
Grants, subsidies, and contributions
Insurance claims and indemnities
Interest and dividends
Refunds
Other
Unvouchered
Undistributed
Financial transfers
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99

Appendix B: Continued

Subtotal, obligations

Adopted from OMB Circular A-11(Office of Management and Budget, 2012)
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Appendix C: Table of U.S. Army Operation and Maintenance Subactivity Groups
SAG
111
112
113
114
115
116
121
122
123
131
132
133
134
135
138
211
212
213
311
312
313
314
321
322
323
324
331
332
333
334
335
411
421
422
423

Activity
Operating Forces (Budget Activity 01)
Maneuver Units
Modular Support Brigades
Echelons Above Brigade
Theater-level Assets
Land Forces Operations Support
Aviation Assets
Force Readiness Operations Support
Land Forces Systems Readiness
Land Forces Depot Maintenance
Base Operations Support
Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization
Management and Operational Headquarters
Combatant Commands Core Operations
Additional Activities
Combatant Commands Direct Mission Support
Mobilization (Budget Activity 02)
Strategic Mobility
Army Prepositioned Stocks
Industrial Preparedness
Training and Recruiting (Budget Activity 03)
Officer Acquisition
Recruit Training
One Station Unit Training
Senior Reserve Officer Training Corps
Specialized Skill Training
Flight Training
Professional Development Education
Training Support
Recruiting and Advertising
Examining
Off-duty and Voluntary Education
Civilian Education and Training
Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps
Administration and Service-wide Activities (Budget Activity 04)
Security Programs
Service-wide Transportation
Central Supply Activities
Logistic Support Activities
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Appendix C: Continued
424
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
441
442

Ammunition Management
Administration
Service-wide Communications
Manpower Management
Other Personnel Support
Other Service Support
Army Claims
Other Construction Support and Real Estate Management
Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness
International Military Headquarters
Miscellaneous Support of Other Nations

Adapted from Department of the Army Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Estimates Justification Book (Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller: Army Budget, 2012).
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